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Abstract
The dependence of society on Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
over the past decade has brought with it an increased vulnerability to Distributed
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. These attacks harness the power of thousands,
and sometimes tens or hundreds of thousands of compromised computers to at-
tack information-providing web-services and online trading sites, resulting in
significant down-time and financial losses. Consequently, the study of DDoS at-
tacks, and the development of techniques to accurately and reliably detect and
mitigate their impact is an important area of research. One particular challenge
in detecting such attacks is distinguishing them from similar looking Flash Events
(FEs), which occur when a server experiences an unexpected surge of requests
from its legitimate clients. Distinguishing DDoS attacks from FEs is important
because each requires a different set of actions to be undertaken by a network
administrator. However, developing and investigating realistic techniques to dis-
tinguish between the two is complicated by an extreme lack of experimental
datasets that record representative real traffic, whether attack or benign.
The work presented in this thesis addresses the above challenges and makes
a number of related contributions.
The first contribution of the thesis is the design of a DDoS attack detec-
tion technique based on the change in the rate of previously unseen source IP
addresses (IPs) of the incoming packets, and its proof-of-concept implementa-
tion. Using this simple feature of source IPs provides good scalability at higher
network speeds.
The second contribution is the design and implementation of a model that
provides the foundation for both detecting and synthesising Flash Events. The
detection part is based on the subtle differences between DDoS attacks and FEs.
Analysing two widely used and publicly available datasets, representing a DDoS
attack and an FE, three parametric differences between DDoS attacks and FEs
iii
are identified: change in the rate of incoming traffic, change in the rate of new
source IP addresses, and the distribution of requests among source IPs. With a
view to synthetic generation of FEs, the model classifies them into three broad
categories: predictable, unpredictable and secondary, and describes each type
via three key components: a) the volume of incoming traffic, b) the number of
source IP addresses, and c) the resources being accessed.
The third contribution is the design and experimental implementation of an
ensemble-based DDoS attack detection technique. The proposed technique com-
bines the analysis of both network traffic features and server load characteristics
to detect a wide range of network and application layer DDoS attacks and to
effectively distinguish them from FEs.
The fourth contribution of the thesis is a traffic generation and testbed frame-
work, cooperatively developed as part of this research, to synthetically generate
different types of DDoS attacks and FEs, and to monitor their effects on the
target. The testbed makes use of modest hardware through the exploitation of
IP aliasing, a well-known technique available on most computing platforms, to
generate synthetic benign and attack traffic originating from a wide range of
valid IP addresses.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the past decade, advances in Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) have significantly transformed the way in which information is accessed
and communicated, particularly via the Web. The range of services supported
by ICT has been constantly expanding and in recent years has even included the
control and monitoring of key systems like power, water, gas, etc., also known as
Critical Infrastructure (CI). This evolution of ICT has also entailed a significant
dependence of society on the systems for storing, processing and communicating
information. As a result, any malfunction in these information and communica-
tion systems directly affects, in one way or another, nearly all major aspects of
contemporary society. This increasing reliance on ICT in general, and on com-
munication networks in particular, is most keenly felt when the services delivered
by these networked systems are disrupted even for relatively short periods.
These situations can be the result of a deliberate attempt by an attacker1
to disrupt the services of a provider, as in the case of a Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attack, or they may be the unintended consequence of a Flash Event (FE), where
the sheer volume of legitimate traffic leads to a degradation of service. Both of
these situations represent anomalies in the normal behaviour of Internet traffic.
FEs and Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks – the latter being the case
where DoS traffic originates from a number of attackers simultaneously – are the
subjects of this thesis.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.1 provides a brief
1The terms adversary and attacker are used interchangeably throughout the thesis.
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overview of the background of DoS attacks and FEs and explains the motivation
for the research presented in the thesis. Section 1.2 then identifies a set of
research objectives and related research questions. Section 1.3 summarises the
contributions of the thesis. Finally, Section 1.4 describes the overall structure of
the thesis.
1.1 Background and Motivation
The Internet community has been facing the DoS problem for over two decades.
One of the earliest known DoS attacks occurred in 1974 at the Computer-based
Education Research Laboratory (CERL), at the University of Illinois Urbana-
Champaign [39]. A novice programmer forced 31 computers in the laboratory
to simultaneously power-off by exploiting the default configuration of PLATO
terminals running the TUTOR programming language i.e. the default is to
accept remote ‘external or ext’ commands. An ‘ext’ command issued to a PLATO
terminal, not connected to an external peripheral device, would force it into a
locked state, requiring it to be manually restarted. This incident, although on
a small scale, introduced the concept of a DoS attack. The DoS problem was
first brought onto the global stage in November 1998 with the introduction of
the Morris Worm [111], a computer program written by a graduate student at
Cornell University, which paralysed the Internet in its nascent stages. Even
though the spread of the Morris worm is considered to be the first DoS attack to
infect geographically distributed machines, it is believed that the program was
originally designed without any malicious intent.
The first deliberate DoS attack on the public Internet occurred at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota in August 1999, more than a decade after the spread of the
Morris Worm [45, 133]. Very soon after, in February 2000, a group of popular
commercial websites: Yahoo, eBay, and CNN were attacked and flooded with a
large number of requests, forcing them off-line, and causing significant financial
losses [48]. Historically, this incident has been identified as the first deliber-
ate large-scale DoS attack aimed at creating financial havoc, and thus can be
regarded as the start of a new kind of threat to network security.
These attacks harnessed the computing power of hundreds or thousands of
attacker-controlled machines (also known as ‘bots’) and used them collectively
to send huge volumes of traffic against a target host to cause a DoS. This type of
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attack is commonly known as a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) or High-
Rate Flooding (HRF) attack2. Now decades later, and notwithstanding their
conceptual simplicity, DDoS attacks using the same basic modus operandi still
exist; the only difference being their magnitude, complexity and frequency, all
of which have increased dramatically. Over the years, the DDoS problem has
become so widespread that every networking or computing device connected to
the Internet is potentially susceptible to such attacks. Thus the study of DDoS
attacks, and the development of techniques to accurately and reliably detect and
mitigate their impact, continues to be an active area of research and development.
Flash Events
The delivery of an online service can also be degraded as a result of legitimate user
activity, without any malicious intent. Such situations arise when a large number
of users concurrently access a web-server, either following some newsworthy event
(e.g., the Olympics, the 9/11 attacks), or as a result of redirection from widely-
followed websites such as Slashdot or other social media like Facebook or Twitter.
These situations are called Flash Events (FEs). Both DDoS attacks and FEs
represent anomalies in the normal Internet traffic, and share a number of similar
characteristics, such as a substantial increase in the incoming network traffic,
the overloading of the servers providing the services, and a degradation in the
delivery of service.
Like DDoS attacks, FEs can also have significant financial implications. A re-
cent example of an FE causing a substantial financial loss occurred on the 20th of
November, 2012, when Click Frenzy, a national online-shopping initiative in Aus-
tralia similar to the US based Cyber Monday3 event, was launched after heavy
media and online publicity. The website (clickfrenzy.com.au) experienced many
times its anticipated traffic volume, leading to a dramatic increase in page-load
times, and the failure of the website within minutes of its launch [41, 79]. Organ-
isers of the website had pre-arranged sales partnerships with leading Australian
and International retailers and brands, many of whom had paid large amounts
for advertisements, which they asked to be refunded [42].
DDoS attacks and FEs share a number of similar characteristics, and can
2In the context of this thesis, DDoS refers to High-Rate Flooding (HRF) attacks. Both the
terms – DDoS and HRF DDoS attacks – are used interchangeably throughout the thesis.
3Cyber Monday is a marketing term defined by retail companies in US to persuade buyers
to shop online on the Monday following the Thanksgiving.
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thus be mistaken for one another [64]. A recent example of the misinterpretation
of an FE as a DDoS attack occurred on the 8th June 2012, when the Star Trek
hero George Takei posted a link on his Facebook page to a website selling ‘Takei
T-shirts’. The Facebook post soon attracted the interest of his 2 million fans,
and redirected them to a relatively small web-server. The click-through rate was
high enough to make the web-server’s ISP believe that the incoming traffic was
a DDoS attack, orchestrated by nefarious bots (compromised machines) rather
than by legitimate clients, forcing the site to be shut-down for several hours.
Owing to such similarities, DDoS attacks and FEs may be mistaken for one
another, yet it is important to differentiate between them, since each anomaly
requires a different set of actions to be undertaken by a network administrator.
While the identification of DDoS attacks requires the initiation of attack mit-
igation strategies and the filtering out of malicious traffic, the identification of
an FE ideally requires the use of load-balancing and other content distribution
techniques to cater for the increased demand.
1.2 Research Aims and Questions
The overarching aim of this thesis is to investigate and develop techniques to
detect DDoS attacks accurately and reliably, and to investigate and develop tech-
niques to differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs with which they share similar
characteristics. A necessary and related aim has been to investigate and develop
techniques to synthesise realistic emulations of DDoS attack traffic and FE traf-
fic that can be used to enable the primary research aim. As a result of these
complementary aims, the following research questions have been identified:
Research Question 1 The literature reviewed and presented in Chapter 2
indicates that the source IP address of network traffic is widely used in deter-
mining the onset of a DDoS attack. Research question 1 seeks to simplify the
application of this property to the DDoS detection problem: Can the onset of a
DDoS attack be detected based on simple network traffic characteristics such as
source IP address? Using this one simple feature of source IP address directly
addresses the issue of scalability of the proposed DDoS attack detection method
when applied to higher network speeds.
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Research Question 2 The detection techniques available in the public domain
focus on detecting DDoS attacks without considering their differentiation from
FEs, and yet a reliable method for detecting DDoS attacks must also be able
to distinguish these two network anomalies. This leads to the second research
question: Is it possible to differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs?
Research Question 3 An important resource for developing and evaluating
techniques to identify FEs are traffic traces of actual FE events. Unfortunately,
only a very limited number of FE datasets are available, mainly due to the legal
and privacy concerns associated with sharing them publicly. Given this scarcity,
an obvious remedy to overcome this issue is to develop a theoretical model of
FEs, and use it to synthetically generate realistic FE traffic. Although a number
of FE models have been proposed, they fail to capture the essential character-
istics of different types of FEs (see Section 2.4.2 for details). This gives rise to
Research Question 3: What are the essential characteristics of different types
of FE and is it possible to use those characteristics to model and subsequently
generate different types of synthetic FE traffic?
Research Question 4 The extreme paucity of recent and realistic datasets
reflecting real-world DDoS attacks and FEs in the public domain gives rise to
Research Question 4: Is it possible to design and implement a simple experimental
traffic generation and testbed framework, using only modest hardware for the
testbed and a software-only traffic generator, to synthetically generate realistic
network traffic representing DDoS attacks and FEs?
Research Question 5 The final research question follows from all the above:
given real or realistic synthetic traffic representing FEs and DDoS attacks, how
can these two network anomalies best be detected and differentiated? The DDoS
attack detection literature surveyed for this thesis indicates a heavy use of traffic
based parameters obtained either from the incoming network traffic or collected
by polling the Management Information Base (MIB) of the target host using the
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). To the best of our knowledge,
there is no DDoS detection technique in the public domain which makes use of the
target machine’s load-based features such as CPU and memory utilisation. Thus,
one final research question is: Can a more sophisticated ensemble-based technique
based on both network traffic characteristics and server-load data (memory and
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CPU utilisation) improve the accuracy of DDoS attack detection and provide a
means to identify and differentiate DDoS attacks, FEs and normal traffic?
1.3 Research Contributions
This thesis has resulted in a number of research contributions covering various
facets of DDoS attacks and FEs, mainly relating to their identification and differ-
entiation from one another and from normal traffic, and the synthetic generation
of all three. Specifically this research has resulted in the following contributions
and research outcomes.
Contribution 1: In Chapter 3, the design and a proof-of-concept implemen-
tation of a a DDoS attack detection technique based on the change in rate of
new source IP addresses of the incoming packets is presented, thereby address-
ing Research Question 1. The proposed technique extends the previous research
conducted in this direction by demonstrating how a simple network traffic char-
acteristic such as source IP address of the incoming packets, coupled with a
change-point analysis of the rate of arrival of new source IP addresses may be
sufficient to detect the onset of a DDoS attack. The proposed technique min-
imises the number of features to be examined, thereby directly addressing the
issue of scalability of the detection process at higher network speeds. This re-
search outcome led to the following publication:
Ejaz Ahmed, George Mohay, Alan Tickle, and Sajal Bhatia. Use of IP
addresses for High Rate Flooding Attack Detection. In 25th IFIP Interna-
tional Information Security Conference (SEC 2010): Security & Privacy –
Silver Linings in the Cloud, pages 124–135, Brisbane, Australia, 20th - 23rd
September 2010.
The chapter also outlines the conceptual design of a lightweight mitigation
strategy, including a DDoS Detection and Mitigation Model (D2M2), which uses
ModSecurity as the application firewall.
Contribution 2: In Chapter 4, an FE model is proposed which provides the
foundations for identifying and synthesising FEs. The proposed model addresses
Research Question 2 by first exposing some subtle differences between FEs and
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DDoS attacks. It proposes a set of parameters for differentiating DDoS attacks
from FEs, and extends previous attempts that have been made to distinguish
between these two network anomalies. The proposed parametric differences are
based on the analysis of two widely used and publicly available datasets repre-
senting a real-world FE and a DDoS attack, thereby providing for validation and
reproducibility of the obtained results – a characteristic lacking in the majority
of proposed approaches, which use proprietary datasets. This contribution led
to the following publication:
Sajal Bhatia, George Mohay, Alan Tickle and Ejaz Ahmed. Parametric
Differences Between a Real-world Distributed Denial-of-Service Attack and
a Flash Event. In 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability
and Security (ARES 2011), pages 210–217, Vienna, Austria, 22nd - 26th
August 2011.
Chapter 4 also presents a server-side FE model with a view to synthetically
generating different types of FE. The novelty of this work is its use of a sim-
ple exponential model with a small set of configurable parameters that captures
various characteristic properties of different types of FEs, and can thus be used
to synthesize realistic emulations of different FE traffic. This research contri-
bution addresses Research Question 3 identified above, and led to the following
publication:
Sajal Bhatia, George Mohay, Desmond Schmidt, and Alan Tickle. Mod-
elling web-server Flash Events. In 11th IEEE International Symposium on
Network Computing and Applications (IEEE NCA12), pages 79–86, Cam-
bridge, MA USA, 23rd - 25th August 2012.
Contribution 3: Chapter 5 presents a network traffic generation and testbed
framework, co-operatively developed as a part of this research, to synthetically
generate and deploy different types of DDoS attacks, FEs and normal traffic,
which closely resemble real-world scenarios. The framework makes use of modest
hardware and exploits IP-aliasing – a well-known technique available on most
computing platforms – for assigning multiple distinct IP addresses to a single
hardware address, and uses these aliases to synthetically generate normal and
anomalous traffic originating from a wide range of source IPs. The testbed design,
being simpler than existing approaches such as the DETER [17] and Emulab [124]
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testbeds, provides a means for constructing and managing an isolated DDoS test
facility at minimal cost, and thus addresses Research Question 4.
Contribution 4: In Chapter 6, a novel ensemble-based DDoS attack detection
technique is proposed. The experimental implementation of the proposed tech-
nique correlates network traffic features with server-load characteristics to detect
a wide variety of DDoS attacks and to effectively distinguish them from FEs. To
the best of our knowledge, no other technique has been found which correlates
these two rather orthogonal DDoS attack detection strategies – network traffic
analysis and server-load analysis. The proposed DDoS attack detection model
addresses Research Question 5, and led to the following publication:
Sajal Bhatia, Desmond Schmidt, and George Mohay. Ensemble-based
DDoS Detection and Mitigation Model. In 5th International Conference on
Security of Information and Networks (SIN 2012), pages 127–134, Jaipur,
India, 25th - 27th October 2012.
1.4 Organisation of Thesis
The remaining six chapters of the thesis, after the current one, are organised as
follows:
Chapter 2 begins by introducing the concepts of DoS and DDoS attacks and
subsequently gives an overview of DDoS attack classification, focusing on attack-
types and attack-targets. It summarises some of the most pertinent research
conducted in detecting DDoS attacks, and covers the two major attack detec-
tion strategies, viz., those based on network traffic analysis and SNMP MIB
data analysis. The review of existing literature aids in identifying the limitations
of existing attack detection approaches and presents the research challenges in-
volved in addressing the problem. This chapter also provides a summary of
research work done towards distinguishing FEs from DDoS attacks, including
FE modelling, and reviews current practices in synthetic traffic generation, for
both DDoS attacks and FEs. Some sections of Chapter 2 have been previously
published as the following book chapter.
George Mohay, Ejaz Ahmed, Sajal Bhatia, A. Nadarajan, B. Ravindran,
Alan Tickle, and R. Vijayasarathy. Detection and Mitigation of High-Rate
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Flooding Attacks. In S.V. Raghavan and E. Dawson, editors, An Investiga-
tion into the Detection and Mitigation of Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection chapter 5, pages 131–181,
Springer 2011.
Chapter 3 presents a DDoS attack detection technique based on source IP
addresses of the incoming network traffic. The chapter demonstrates how a
simple network traffic characteristic like source IP address, coupled with a change
detection technique, can be sufficient to detect the onset of DDoS attacks. The
chapter provides a proof-of-concept implementation, using bit vectors, of the
proposed attack detection technique. The implementation also illustrates how
information about potentially anomalous source IP addresses could be used to
dynamically alter source IP address based filtering rules within existing network
security devices like firewalls, and thereby mitigate the effect of a DDoS attack.
Chapter 4 proposes an FE model which can be used to identify FEs, to dif-
ferentiate them from DDoS attacks and to synthetically generate realistic FE
network traffic. This chapter provides a comprehensive study of FEs and classi-
fies them into three broad categories: predictable, unpredictable and secondary.
It further analyses two publicly available datasets and proposes a set of parame-
ters that can be used to distinguish DDoS attacks from FEs. Finally, the chapter
presents a characterisation of FEs according to three key components and uses
that characterisation to develop a server-side mathematical model for FEs. The
FE model uses a small set of configurable parameters and captures the various
characteristic features of different types of FEs. The proposed model is used
in the following chapter to synthetically generate network traffic representing
different types of FEs.
Chapter 5 outlines the characteristics of the datasets required for this research
and summarises the available options for obtaining them. The chapter highlights
the shortcomings of some of the highly referenced public domain datasets and
off-the-shelf traffic generators used in DDoS-related research. The chapter also
describes a traffic generation and testbed framework, including both the hard-
ware set-up and the software traffic generator, cooperatively developed as a part
of this research. Finally, this chapter uses the developed testbed facility to real-
istically emulate different types of DDoS attack and FE traffic, which are used
10 Chapter 1. Introduction
in the following chapter.
Chapter 6 proposes an ensemble-based DDoS attack detection model. The
model correlates two orthogonal DDoS attack detection strategies – network
traffic analysis based DDoS detection and server-load analysis based DDoS de-
tection. The post-hoc implementation of the proposed attack detection model
not only increases the spectrum of DDoS attacks that can be efficiently detected,
but also differentiates DDoS attacks from similar looking FEs.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarising the research contributions and
proposing possible directions for future research.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Works
The primary research aim of this thesis, as described in Chapter 1, is to inves-
tigate and develop techniques that detect DDoS attacks accurately and reliably,
and which can differentiate them from FEs, with which they share some similar
characteristics. A necessary and related aim has been to investigate and develop
techniques to synthesise realistic emulations of DDoS attack and FE traffic that
can be used to enable the primary research aim. In this Chapter, some of the
most pertinent research conducted in detecting DDoS attacks, including those
approaches seeking to distinguish them from FEs, along with current practices
in synthetic traffic generation (both for DDoS attacks and FEs) will be reviewed
and analysed.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the concept of
a DoS attack and its distributed form called a DDoS attack, also commonly
known as a High-Rate Flooding (HRF) attack, which forms the research focus
of this thesis. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the classification of DDoS
attacks, focusing on the type of attacks and their targets. A detailed analysis
of the research conducted in detecting DDoS attacks, using both network traffic
analysis and SNMP MIB data analysis, is presented in Section 2.3. Section 2.4
presents related work in detecting and modelling FEs, and in differentiating them
from DDoS attacks. Section 2.5 summarises previous work done in the synthetic
generation of network traffic, both attack and benign. Section 2.6 then presents
the remaining research challenges associated with the efficient detection of DDoS
attacks and their separation from FEs. Finally, the chapter is summarised in
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Section 2.7.
2.1 Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks
On Thursday, 6th August, 2009 one of the most widely followed social networking
and micro-blogging online services, Twitter, was brought down for several hours,
silencing its millions of Tweeters [27]. This was the first major, and possibly
deliberate, outage of service that the social networking website had suffered. The
first official word that came in was a rather terse statement: ‘Site is down – We
are determining the cause and will provide an update shortly’. This message was
soon updated by its co-founder Biz Stone: ‘On this otherwise happy Thursday
morning, Twitter is the target of a denial of service attack’. This statement,
however, gave no indication to its clients as to how they were trying to defend
against the attack or how long would it take to restore services.
A DoS attack is a malicious attempt by an attacker to disrupt the online
services of a service provider (server) and to make it unavailable to its legitimate
users. The National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary provided by the Com-
mittee on National Security Systems (CNSS) gives a more general definition and
identifies DoS as [120]:
Any action or series of actions that prevents any part of an [informa-
tion system] from functioning.
A DoS attack against an online service provider can target a computing resource
such as CPU, or a network resource such as the bandwidth of the victim’s network
link or a combination of both. The effect of a DoS attack can range from a minor
increase in the service response time to complete inaccessibility, and at times
having financial implications on organisations heavily reliant on the availability
of their service. A recent report by Amazon suggests that even a 100 ms delay
in response time causes an approximately 1% drop in their overall sales [67].
2.1.1 Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) Attacks
A Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack is a distributed variant of the
more generic DoS attack, in which an array of geographically spread compro-
mised machines (aka bots, zombies, slaves, agents) controlled by an attacker
(or bot-master) are used against some target(s) to cause denial of service. A
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set of these compromised machines or bots is called a botnet. In this form of
DoS attack, the individual attacking capacity of each compromised machine is
aggregated and subsequently used against a common target, thereby magnify-
ing the effect. Figure 2.1 shows the working model of a typical DDoS attack.
The bot-master takes control of an army of machines without the knowledge of
their owners, commonly by infecting them with a Trojan or a backdoor program.
These compromised machines are controlled by the bot-master, often via C&C
(Command and Control) channels, and simultaneously used to attack a target
server using the public Internet infrastructure.
Figure 2.1: A typical set-up of a DDoS attack.
The motives behind DDoS attacks are various, ranging from fun to financial
gain to political, as in the case of the attacks on Estonia and Georgia [108].
According to a recent report on Worldwide Infrastructure Security by Arbor
Networks, ideologically-motivated ‘hacktivism’ and ‘vandalism’ appear to be the
most readily-identified motivations behind DDoS attacks [97]. Figure 2.2 high-
lights the different attack motivations based on the survey conducted by Arbor
Networks [97].
The worldwide prevalence of DDoS activity was exposed by Moore et al. us-
ing their proposed traffic monitoring technique called ‘backscatter analysis’ [77].
Their technique was based on the observation that during an attack, attackers
often forge or ‘spoof’ the source IP address of packets before sending them to
the target host. Source IP address spoofing may be done to conceal identity or
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Figure 2.2: DDoS attack motivation (source: Arbor Networks [97]).
location. Subsequently, when these incoming packets from spoofed IPs arrive at
the victim’s machine, a response is sent back to what is believed to be a genuine
host (the faked IP address). As the IP address is randomly selected, the entire
Internet address space is equally likely to receive a response, a phenomenon they
refer to as backscatter. Using backscatter analysis, based on the number of reply
packets sent to non-existent or unallocated IPs, over a period of three weeks,
12,805 attacks directed against an approximately 5,000 distinct Internet hosts
belonging to more than 2,000 different organisations – ranging from small ISPs
to well-known e-commerce companies like Amazon – were observed.
A recent report by Prolexic conforms with the widespread nature of the DDoS
problem, with attacks originating from a wide gamut of countries, lead by China
(55.44%) and followed by Germany (9.07%) and India (8.77%), during the fourth
quarter of year 2012 [3]. The published report speculates that the reason for
China being at the top of this hierarchy is due to the large number of vulnerable
machines (servers and normal workstations) residing within the country.
2.2 Taxonomy of DDoS Attacks
Research into DDoS attack detection has, not surprisingly, been based largely on
an overall two-dimensional view of the DDoS problem – the problem generally
being viewed in terms of the ‘type of attack’ and the ‘target of attack’1. The
classification of DDoS attacks in terms of the ‘target of attack’ not only foreshad-
1A detailed classification of DDoS attack mechanisms can be obtained from the paper by
Mirkovic and Reiher [71].
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ows the possibility of a DDoS attack on virtually any networked system, but also
highlights the fact that the magnitude of its impact depends on the resources
available to the attackers.
Figure 2.3: Taxonomy of DDoS Attacks.
Mirkovic et al.[71] classified DDoS attacks by: degree of automation, exploited
vulnerability, source address validation, possibility of characterisation, attack
rate dynamics, impact on victim, victim type, and persistence of agent set. The
research presented in this thesis focuses on High-Rate Flooding (HRF) DDoS
attacks against the networking and computing resources of a target host, i.e.,
flooding attacks targeting the network and the application layer of the TCP/IP
network model. Some examples of such attacks are given in Figure 2.3. It is to
be noted that both HRF and semantic attacks can occur either at the network or
application layer of the TCP/IP stack. An ICMP flooding attack is an example of
a network layer attack targeting the available network bandwidth of the victim,
whereas a HTTP flood attack targeting an application running on the target
host is an example of an application layer flooding attack. Similarly, Teardrop
and Deeply Nested Extensible Markup Language (XML) attacks are examples
of network and application layer semantic attacks respectively.
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2.2.1 Types of DDoS Attack
The increasingly critical dependence of society on networked systems presents
adversaries with a multitude of possible targets. In order to exhaust their avail-
able resources and cause a DoS for legitimate clients, an adversary can mount an
attack by either flooding the victim with a large number of spurious requests, as
in a High-Rate Flooding (HRF) or brute force attack, or by exploiting the design
or implementation flaws of a communication protocol or service application as
in a semantic attack, as shown in Figure 2.3. The following two sub-sections
discuss these two attack types, with a particular emphasis on HRF attacks, their
coordination and their mechanisms.
2.2.1.1 High-Rate Flooding Attacks
High-rate flooding or brute force attacks aim at consuming critical resources
on the victim, thus compromising its ability to deliver services to its legitimate
clients. The modus operandi of these attacks is flooding the victim with a large
number of packets and thus exhausting its available network or computing re-
sources.
High-Rate flooding attacks often require the adversary to amass sufficient
resources, both network bandwidth and computing power, in order to overwhelm
the victim. Accumulating these resources might have been difficult in the past,
but today, with the advent of advanced software techniques, higher available
bandwidths, and the proliferation of compromised machines (bots) that can be
‘hired’ for as low as $6 an hour, it is not particularly difficult [57]. Once these
desired resources have been acquired, launching high-rate flooding attacks is
simple.
2.2.1.1.1 Common High-Rate Flooding Attacks
The three common HRF attacks – TCP SYN flooding, UDP flooding and HTTP
flooding are now described.
TCP SYN flooding attack A classic example of a high-rate flooding
attack is the ‘TCP SYN flooding attack’ [37]. In this attack, the adversary takes
advantage of design flaws in the three-way handshake of the TCP protocol, shown
in Figure 2.4. In a normal execution of a TCP connection, a client first sends
a SYN packet to the server. The server, upon receiving the connection request,
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Figure 2.4: TCP three-way handshake.
opens a new session, allocates resources for this connection and responds to the
client with a SYN/ACK packet. The client then responds with a ACK packet to
complete the three-way handshake.
If no ACK packet is received by the server within a specified duration, a
connection timeout state is reached, closing the TCP session and releasing the
allocated resources. Using a lower timeout is a plausible but is an insufficient de-
fence during a high rate TCP SYN flooding attack, in which the adversary sends
a large number of SYN packets without sending the final ACK to complete the
three-way handshake. This forces the server to maintain and allocate resources,
albeit briefly, for each of the ‘half-open’ connections and eventually exhausts its
available resources.
One common security measure often employed to guard against TCP SYN
flooding attacks is the use of ‘SYN cookies2’ on the victim’s machine [20]. SYN
cookies are defined as ‘particular choices of initial TCP sequence numbers by
TCP servers’ [20], the use of which allows the server not to drop connections
when the SYN queue fills up. The TCP sequence number is encoded in the
SYN-ACK response sent by the server, instead of being stored locally in the
2On most Linux based systems, SYN cookies can be enabled by editing
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies file, and adding it permanently to the start-up
scripts.
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SYN queue. When the ACK packet comes back from the client the entry is
reconstructed from the TCP sequence number. Thus, using SYN cookies, the
server avoids keeping half-open states for incoming TCP connections, and so
prevents memory exhaustion.
UDP flooding attack An example of a transport layer flooding attack is
the ‘UDP flooding attack’. In this form of attack, the adversary sends a large
number of UDP packets to random ports on the target machine, usually from
spoofed IP addresses [33]. As a result, the target host checks for applications
running on the ports specified in the incoming packets. If no application is
listening on those ports, it replies with an ICMP Destination Unreachable packet.
Thus, for a large number of incoming UDP packets on random ports, the target
machine can be forced to send a large number of ICMP packets, provided no
application is listening on those ports, and so use up its connection bandwidth
and eventually become unreachable by its clients.
HTTP flooding attack A ‘HTTP flooding attack’ is an example of a high-
rate flooding attack operating at the application layer of the TCP/IP stack [28,
68]. In this form of attack, the adversary sends a large number of ‘seemingly
legitimate’ HTTP requests, commonly GET and POST, to the target server
requesting web-pages, usually index.html, and sometimes the server incurs a
substantial resource (CPU or memory) cost in their processing and transfer. In
this form of attack, the access requests are sent via a normal TCP connection
containing a ‘valid’ HTTP GET or POST request, so forcing the target server to
treat them as ‘legitimate or normal’ requests, and thus aggravating the existing
problem of efficient DDoS attack detection.
Such high-rate flooding attacks appear to be conceptually simple and fairly
easy to execute. However, in order to cause any substantial damage to a commer-
cial server equipped with much higher resources than a normal desktop computer,
the attacker needs to make use of an army of compromised machines, a botnet,
with aggregate resources at least comparable to those of the victim. Details of
such HRF attacks executed using a botnet are provided later in this section.
2.2.1.1.2 Attack Coordination
HRF attacks can be further categorised based on how the attack is coordinated:
2.2. Taxonomy of DDoS Attacks 19
either manually through human coordination, or automated via the use of bot-
nets.
Manually Coordinated DDoS Attacks This type of DDoS attack is
usually ‘ideologically-motivated’ and requires significant human coordination in
order to have the desired effect on the victim. In such attacks, the attacker
orchestrates a large army of volunteers with a common purpose, who use their
own machines running a shared attack tool, for example connecting via the The
Onion Route (Tor)3 network to simultaneously send service requests to the target
host. Depending upon the number of volunteers participating in the attack, the
computing capacity of the individual machines, and the sophistication of attack
tool being used, the aggregated volume of traffic sent to the victim can consume
its available resources and eventually cripple its services.
The F5 attack is a classic example of such attack. This attack can be launched
by coordinating a large group of volunteers and instructing them to continuously
press and hold down the F5 (page reload) key while accessing a web-page through
a browser. By continuously holding down the F5 key, the browser sends repeated
HTTP GET requests to the web-server and so downloads a large volume of data.
A teenager from Lake High School was charged with a felony for launching an
F5 attack against his school’s computer system [119].
A more recent example of a DDoS attack executed with human coordina-
tion was Operation Payback, a name given to a series of attacks conducted by a
group called Anonymous against anti-piracy organisations and commercial web-
sites (PayPal, Mastercard, Amazon EC2), who withdrew their ties with whistle-
blower website WikiLeaks [5, 26, 62]. The attacks were conducted using the
LOIC (Low Orbit Ion Cannon) tool, an open source network stress testing util-
ity, modified for launching DDoS attacks. A new feature called ‘Hivemind’ was
added and used to connect the participants’ LOIC tool to ‘AnonOps’ (an inter-
national communication platform used by Anonymous in Operation Payback)
to receive instructions for the attack [104]. Later the tool had to be installed
on the participant’s machine in order to take part. The Anonymous group even
created a web-page, which could effectively turn a web-browser into an attack
3Tor is system/network providing online anonymity to its clients. The Tor client soft-
ware routes the Internet traffic via a widespread network of volunteer servers, implementing
onion routing, in order to conceal user’s identity such as location or usage pattern, from peo-
ple/organisations conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis.
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tool. It required volunteers only to visit that web-page and click on the attack
button [104].
Figure 2.5: Amplification-based DDoS attack mechanism.
Automated or Semi-automated DDoS Attacks These attacks rely on
exploiting aspects of network protocols and misusing them in order to amplify
and/or obfuscate traffic they direct towards a victim. Such attacks can be auto-
mated or semi-automated in nature and are launched via botnets.
2.2.1.1.3 Attack Mechanisms
The most commonly used mechanisms for launching attacks – amplification and
reflection are now described.
Amplification Attacks An ‘Amplification-based DDoS attack’ consists of
an attacker, an amplification network and a victim. An amplification network
is essentially a network of host machines which permits broadcast messages.
Any such network, when used for communicating via a reply-based protocol like
ICMP, is potentially prone to amplification-based DDoS attacks. The ampli-
fication is caused by the broadcast packet of the network, usually sent from
a spoofed source IP address, which triggers a response from every host in the
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network. Depending on the number of hosts present, an equivalent number of
response packets are generated and directed towards the intended victim. Fig-
ure 2.5 illustrates a typical set-up for an amplification-based DDoS attack.
The Smurf Attack (or ICMP flooding attack) is a common example. In this
attack, the adversary spoofs the IP address of the intended victim and sends a
large number of ICMP Echo Request packets to the broadcast address of the
(amplifier) network, which then sends these messages to all the hosts within
the broadcast domain of the network. Every host, upon receiving the ICMP
Echo Request packets, sends ICMP Echo Reply packets to the victim, thereby
consuming its available bandwidth.
Reflection-based DDoS Attacks Similar to an amplification-based at-
tack, an adversary can also exploit a reply-based protocol to potentially launch
a ‘reflection-based DDoS attack’. This consists of an attacker, a reflective net-
work (or a set of reflectors) and a victim. A reflector can be any host that
responds to an incoming packet by sending a reply to the source IP address of
that packet [90]. Web-servers, mail servers and DNS servers are examples of
reflectors, because they send reply packets such as SYN+ACK or ICMP Echo
Reply in response to SYN and ICMP Echo Requests respectively. These attacks
differ from amplification-based attacks, since the attacker in this case is required
to make use of a set of hosts (reflectors) rather than a single host (broadcast
address) in order to initiate a response and cause the desired effect. Figure 2.6
illustrates a reflection-based attack mechanism.
A DNS Reflector Attack is one example of a reflection-based attack. In this
attack, the adversary first harvests a large number of DNS server IP addresses
and then issues DNS queries with spoofed source IPs (instead of the sender’s
source IP, the source IP is spoofed to be that of the intended client), thereby
resulting in a large volume of traffic (DNS replies) to the intended victims. The
amplification effect of this attack is based on the fact the a small DNS query
(60 bytes) can generate much larger response (512 bytes) from the name server,
thus amplifying the outgoing traffic by a factor of 8.5. New RFC specifications
require an even larger response from the name servers, thereby further increasing
the amplification factor. While in the Smurf Attack the amplification was caused
by packet(s) being sent to the broadcast address of a network, in a DNS Reflec-
tor Attack the amplification mainly occurs because of a mismatch between the
query and response size, the response being significantly larger than the query.
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Figure 2.6: Reflection-based DDoS attack mechanism.
This attack was recently used against Spamhaus, a provider of anti-spam DNS-
based Blocklists and Whitelists to generate allegedly the largest HRF attack yet
measured [4].
An adversary, with the aid of a botnet, can employ one or more attack tech-
niques, including amplification and reflection, to launch an attack against a target
host. While the amplification technique is used to increase the magnitude of the
attack, a reflection attack is generally used to conceal the attackers’ (or rather
the bots’) identity and prevent them from being traced. These attack tech-
niques, coupled with the distributed nature of botnets, makes such automated
or semi-automated attacks extremely difficult to detect and mitigate.
2.2.1.2 Semantic Attacks
Semantic attacks exploit a design (or implementation) flaw in a communication
protocol, or more often, in the application(s) installed on the victim host. This
can make semantic attacks difficult to execute compared to brute force attacks,
because they require an adversary to have a thorough understanding of the proto-
col or application being targeted. However, since semantic attacks are ‘stealthy’
in nature, taking advantage of imperfections at various levels, they can be suc-
cessfully launched even with a disproportionate allocation of resources, in terms
of bandwidth or processing capacity, between an attacker and a target. So a rel-
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atively poorly resourced attacker can degrade the services (or potentially cause
the shut down) of a much more powerful server.
The ‘Ping of Death’ is a classic example of a semantic attack [56]. It is exe-
cuted by sending malformed ICMP (or ping) packets to the target. In this attack,
the adversary sends oversized (larger than 65,535 bytes) ICMP packets instead
of the normal 64 bytes. Most operating systems, released before 1997, could not
efficiently handle packets of this size. Therefore, accepting such oversized packets
would cause memory related (buffer overflow) issues and often end up crashing
the target system.
The ‘Teardrop attack’ is another common example of a semantic attack [34].
This attack exploits a vulnerability in TCP/IP fragment reassembly, and is ex-
ecuted by sending malformed TCP/IP fragments with overlapping, oversized
payloads to the target’s machine. If the victim is unpatched for this exploit, the
attack can easily cause the target system to crash.
A recently published application layer semantic attack exploits the Simple
Object Access Protocol (SOAP) format which allows deeply nested Extensible
Markup Language (XML) to be embedded into the message body [112]. When
such a message is sent to a web-service provider, it forces the XML parser within
the service to process the document, thereby causing memory exhaustion and
leading to a DoS attack.
2.2.2 Targets of DDoS Attack
A DDoS attack may target an application, host, network or infrastructure [71].
DDoS attacks targeting different points of the communication channel may pro-
duce varied effects, but they all intend to cause a disruption of service, at some
level, irrespective of their targets. For example, a DDoS attack targeting a net-
work may differ, in the impact caused, from an attack targeting an application,
but each of them intends to cause a degradation of the services being offered by
the victim to its clients. In a network-based DDoS attack, the adversary may
exhaust the connection bandwidth to the victim, thereby preventing legitimate
clients from connecting and accessing its services. However, in an application-
based DDoS attack, the adversary may send relatively few malformed packets
and yet still disrupt the resource allocation strategies of the application under
attack. Out of all possible targets of DDoS attacks – application, host, net-
work and infrastructure – this thesis focuses on developing detection techniques
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against HRF DDoS attacks that target networks and applications running on the
victim host.
2.2.2.1 Attacks Targeting Networks
DDoS attacks targeting networks aim at consuming the incoming bandwidth of
the target network by sending a large number of packets. An attacker launching
DDoS attacks at the network layer can easily take advantage of source IP address
spoofing to not only send attack packets in large numbers but also to prevent
itself from being detected or traced. The prime focus of DDoS attacks targeting
networks is on the volume of traffic being sent rather than the actual content of
the packets, thereby consuming the network bandwidth. TCP SYN, UDP and
ICMP flooding attacks discussed above (2.2.1.1) are some common examples of
DDoS attacks targeting a network.
2.2.2.2 Attacks Targeting Applications
In recent years, DDoS attacks have not only increased dramatically in frequency
and size, but have also become more sophisticated, with the focus slowly shift-
ing from more general network-based attacks to more specific application-based
attacks, targeting the security holes at layer 7 or the application layer of the
TCP/IP stack [82].
Application layer DDoS attacks operate by exploiting the design or imple-
mentation level flaws of the applications running on the victim’s machine, thus
preventing its legitimate clients from accessing them. Application layer attacks
can be low enough in volume not to trigger any ‘volume based’ alerts and are
usually launched with ‘seemingly legitimate’ attack packets, thus making them
difficult to detect. HTTP Request Attacks and DNS Amplification Attacks are
some of the popular examples of DDoS attacks targeting applications.
2.3 DDoS Attack Detection
As discussed in Section 2.2, DDoS attacks come in various guises and constitute
an extremely pernicious threat within the Internet domain [81]. Notwithstanding
the amount of research done in the past decade, early and accurate detection
of DDoS attacks remains a tough challenge. Consequently, the investigation
of techniques and processes for efficient and timely detection of such attacks
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continues to be an active area of research [92]. The primary focus of this thesis is
the investigation, development and evaluation of techniques for detecting a wide
variety of DDoS attacks. DDoS attack detection has predominantly followed
two broad directions: network traffic analysis and SNMP MIB data analysis.
A selection of the most pertinent literature related to each of these two DDoS
detection strategies is now examined.
2.3.1 Network Traffic Analysis Based DDoS Detection
The very nature of HRF attacks suggests that one of the focal points for devel-
oping attack detection techniques should be the detection of anomalies in the
incoming network traffic, with the intention of efficiently identifying traffic likely
to constitute a DDoS attack. One of the key components of network traffic,
apart from traffic volume, is the source IP address of the packets. Consequently,
there is a distinct body of knowledge surrounding the use of source IP addresses,
among other techniques, for detecting the onset of anomalous network activi-
ties such as a DoS attack [15, 36, 47, 91, 93, 113], and in particular those in
which the attacker uses ‘spoofed’ source IP addresses [54]. The majority of these
techniques focus on detecting DDoS attacks without considering FEs, although
there are some approaches that take FEs into account, by tagging them as an
abnormal activity for further analysis and characterising them in an attempt to
facilitate their differentiation from DDoS attacks [15, 54]. A detailed discussion
of these techniques is presented in Section 2.4. This section presents an overview
of the existing DDoS attack detection techniques based on the analysis of the
incoming network traffic.
An integral part of any attack detection process is the need for a feature or
a set of features that capture the inherent characteristics of an attack, which
appear more frequently in the so-called attack class, but are less prominent in
the non-attack or normal traffic class [92]. In addition, in order to cater for
continuously changing attack vectors, it is important to identify and use those
features that an attacker is less likely to change [92].
A mechanism to detect SYN flooding attacks using Bloom filters was proposed
by He et al.[49]. Their proposed mechanism maintained a list of client IP ad-
dresses using a Bloom filter. If a SYN request from a given client appeared in the
network traffic being monitored, a corresponding counter was incremented. How-
ever, if a SYN+ACK packet originated from the same client, the same counter
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was decremented. Thus, by checking these counters being maintained for each
client, their proposed technique could detect SYN flooding attacks. A similar
approach was adopted by Wang et al.[121], using the ratio of the number of SYN
and FIN+RST packets (closing the connection) as the detection metric for de-
tecting SYN flooding attacks. During such an attack, the number of SYN packets
would be significantly greater than the FIN+RST packets, since the attacker’s
intention is to keep a large number of half-open TCP connections on the victim’s
machine, thereby exhausting both the networking (bandwidth) and computing
(memory) resources.
Over the years other IP address related features have also been used to in-
dicate the occurrence of DDoS attacks, including some basic features such as
the traffic volume per IP address [47] or a change in the number of distinct net-
work flows i.e. a unique combination of source IP, destination IP, source port,
destination port, and the protocol [15]. Statistical based approaches on IP ad-
dresses have also been used for detection purposes. Feinstein et al.[43] used the
distribution of source IP addresses as a detection criterion. Their approach as-
sumed that the distribution of source IPs during an attack is uniform, which can
be detected using entropy and Chi-square statistics. The experimental results
they presented show a dramatic increase in the Chi-square value during DDoS
attacks. The detection threshold used in their proposed technique was, however,
dependent on the underlying statistical result and thus required modification to
detect different types of attack.
Two important aspects associated with IP address based DDoS detection
strategies are: the practicality of storing the statistical information for each of
the 232 elements in the IPv4 address space, and the need to accommodate a sharp
increase in the rate of arrival of new source IP addresses during an attack [92].
This necessitates minimising the number of IP addresses being monitored, and
optimising the way in which information about IP addresses is stored. Gil and
Poletto [47] used a dynamic 4-level 256-ary tree (MULTOPS) to store traffic
data for each IP address. Peng et al.[91] pointed out that during a heavy traffic
scenario such as a DDoS attack, such a data structure could itself succumb
to a memory exhaustion attack. Hence Peng et al. and Takada et al.[91, 92,
113] stored only those IP addresses which either completed a three-way TCP
handshake or crossed a pre-defined threshold for the minimum number of packets
originating from an IP address.
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Peng et al.[91] used history based source IP address filtering at the edge router
to detect a DDoS attack. Their proposed mechanism maintains a historical
database of all valid IP addresses i.e. those completing the three-way TCP
handshake. This database is updated using a sliding window in order to store
the most recent addresses. Whenever the edge router gets overloaded, the IP
Address Database (IAD) is then used to decide whether to accept the incoming
packets. During an attack, only packets originating from source IP addresses
present in the database are allowed access. However, the IAD can be corrupted
by those source IP addresses which first complete a three-way handshake and
later on participate in the attack.
Clustering of IP addresses has also been used by researchers for DDoS detec-
tion. Le et al.[63] used IP aggregation to detect DDoS attacks and differentiate
them from FEs. Their technique was based on the premise that during an FE,
most of the sources are close geographically to each other, whereas in case of
DDoS attacks traffic originates from widely distributed sources. An intrinsic
challenge associated with IP based attack detection techniques is the scalability
of the solution when applied to the IPv6 address space where the number of
addresses is 2128 as compared to 232 for IPv4.
An orthogonal attack detection strategy to network traffic analysis is moni-
toring the target server, usually via SNMP, for various MIB variables, and using
that information to detect an anomaly. An overview of such techniques, when
applied for detecting DDoS attack, is now presented.
2.3.2 SNMP MIB Data Analysis Based DDoS Detection
The second area for DDoS detection that has evolved has been statistical analysis
of Management Information Base (MIB) data collected via Simple Network Man-
agement Protocol (SNMP) agents. This integrates existing detection systems,
like an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) with SNMP-based Network Manage-
ment Systems (NMSs), to detect the onset of a DDoS attack [29, 96].
The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), as defined by the In-
ternet Engineering Task Force (IETF), is a standard for network management
activities [32], and is commonly used for monitoring networking equipment such
as servers and routers. An SNMP-managed network consists of three main com-
ponents: a managed device being monitored, an SNMP agent (a daemon or ser-
vice running on the managed device), and an NMS (an application running on
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the system/manager monitoring the managed device). The SNMP agent hosts a
Management Information Base (MIB) which can be queried by the NMS. MIB is
a tree structured database containing information (state and configuration) about
the agent and the monitored objects, identified by their Object Identifier (OID).
MIB objects with similar characteristics are aggregated to form MIB Groups.
Cabrera et al.[29] proposed a methodology for using an NMS for early de-
tection of DDoS attacks. Their work was solely dependent on using MIB traffic
variables collected from the systems (attacker and the target) participating in the
attacks. The attack datasets used for analysis were synthetically created using
TFN2K and Trin00 tools [38]. The proposed methodology used 91 MIB variables
corresponding to five groups – ip, icmp, tcp, udp and snmp, collected at a 5
second sampling interval for 2 hours, and was able to detect ICMP and UDP
flooding attacks.
Streilein et al.[110] proposed a flooding-based DoS attack detection technique
using data polled from Remote Monitoring (RMON) capable devices. RMON is
a special purpose MIB for SNMP which tracks low-level network usage indicators
such as packet size, packet transmission rate, data rate etc. The attack detection
capabilities of their technique relied on the RMON capabilities of the existing
infrastructure, such as switches and routers, instead of special purpose hardware.
Using four months of RMON data collected from a switch in a production network
and superimposing it with the simulated attack data, their technique was able to
differentiate the attack traffic from the normal data using packet count, packet
size, and the ratio of packet size to packet count, as the detection parameters.
Park et al.[87] used 16 MIB objects from six groups – system, interface,
ip, tcp, udp and icmp, to propose a lightweight and fast detection technique for
flooding attacks. The MIB, belonging to the system group – system.sysUpTime
– provided measures of data rate (bits per second) and traffic rate (packets per
second), rather than system load. In their detection algorithm, a correlation of
the SNMP MIB data was performed and compared against pre-defined constant
thresholds to determine if the traffic is completely normal or possibly abnormal.
Stacheldraht [40] was used to generate flooding attack traces and their technique
was able to detect a TCP-SYN flooding attack 8.3 seconds after its start.
Bao [14] and Yu [129] used the MIB variables presented in Table 2.1, and pro-
posed a fast, lightweight, hierarchical SVM-based DDoS attack detection mech-
anism. At the first level, a one-class SVM was used to distinguish attack traffic
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Table 2.1: Commonly used MIB variables.
MIB Group SNMP MIB Object
ip
ip.ipInReceives
ip.ipInDelivers
ip.ipOutRequests
ip.ipOutDiscards
tcp tcp.tcpAttemptFailstcp.tcpOutRsts
udp udp.udpInErrors
icmp
icmp.icmpInMsgs
icmp.icmpInErrors
icmp.icmpInDestUnreachs
icmp.icmpOutMsgs
icmp.icmpOutErrors
icmp.icmpOutDestUnreachs
from normal traffic, and at the second level the attack traffic was separated into
different attack types, including TCP-SYN flood, UDP flood and ICMP flood.
The proposed mechanism could efficiently detect both known and novel attacks,
and the results obtained from analysing MIB data in conjunction with IDSs were
comparable to results achieved by analysing the traffic data.
A key observation drawn from the reviewed literature related to SNMP MIB
data analysis based DDoS attack detection is that all SNMP based work deals
only with traffic features, and does not take into account system load features.
2.3.3 Change Detection Techniques
Once the attack vector has been identified, the next challenge is to decide upon a
suitable technique that can use this information to detect the onset of a malicious
activity such as a DDoS attack. In intrusion detection systems, two widely
used strategies for detecting malicious activities are: misuse or signature-based
detection and anomaly-based detection.
A misuse-based detection uses a signature repository of known malicious ac-
tivities and uses it to compare with the traffic derived signature to identify the oc-
currence of an attack or intrusion. While signature based techniques are suitable
for detecting known attacks, they have limitations in detecting new or previously
unknown attacks, such as zero day attacks, whose signatures are not present in
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the signature repository. Bro [89] and Snort [100] are some of the widely used
signature-based intrusion detection systems.
An anomaly-based detection strategy, on the other hand, relies upon the nor-
mal profile of the system being monitored, and using this profile as the bench-
mark for differentiating normal from anomalous activity. The normal profile is
generally learned from historical data, which is then used to detect anomalous
activities, commonly indicated by a noticeable deviation from normal activity.
In contrast to the signature-based detection strategies, anomaly-based detec-
tion is able to detect new attacks, however, it can also potentially suffer from
a relatively high false detection rate i.e. normal behaviour being classified as
abnormal behaviour. An important component of these detection approaches is
change detection [60].
Any occurrence of anomalous activities, including DDoS attacks and FEs,
is also accompanied by a change in the statistical properties of the observed
parameters. Hence, the problem of detecting such anomalous activities can be
formulated as a change detection problem where the aim is to detect a change
in the observed parameters with minimal delay and false detection rate [65, 114,
115]. Detecting changes in the statistical properties of various parameters has
been extensively studied and applied in different domains such as network traffic,
image processing, seismology, and financial analysis. The book by Basseville et
al. [16] provides an overview on the various change detection techniques and their
applications. Amongst all different techniques that have been used to detect
changes, Cumulative Sum (CUSUM), moving average, and spectrum analysis
are some of the most commonly used for detecting anomalous network activities
such as DDoS attacks.
CUSUM was first studied by Page more than 50 years ago [85], and there-
after has been applied to various problem domains including DDoS attacks. As
its name indicates, the CUSUM technique involves calculating the cumulative
sum of a sequence of reading of a given parameter. For detecting changes, a
sum of the difference between the actual and expected parameter values of a se-
quence, also known as a CUSUM value, is compared against a threshold value. A
CUSUM value greater than the threshold indicates a change in the statical prop-
erties of the given parameter sequence. Carl et al. [31] performed a comparative
study of three widely used DoS attack detection techniques – activity profiling,
change-point detection, wavelet analysis – and found change-point detection to
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be computationally less expensive and lighter in terms of memory utilisation, as
compared to the other two techniques.
Bo et al. [23] proposed an application of non-parametric CUSUM4 for de-
tection of worm attacks. A time series of the number of distinct hosts (IPs) a
given source attempts to connect to was used to estimate the CUSUM score,
which was then subjected to a threshold test in order to identify an attack.
Chan et al. [35] also used non-parametric CUSUM to identify worms that use
a list of potential target IPs in order to propagate through a network. Every
incoming source IP was assigned a weight and a non-parametric CUSUM was
applied on the total weighted source IP count. Wang et al. [121, 122] applied a
non-parametric CUSUM to detect SYN flooding attacks. The difference between
SYN and FIN+RST was used as the detection metric to detect SYN flooding
attacks with a high accuracy and small detection delay.
A variation of the moving average technique, Exponentially Weighted Moving
Average (EWMA), has also been commonly used for detecting intrusions [127,
128] and flooding attacks [105]. (A detailed description of the EWMA-based
change detection technique used within this research, in the work presented in
Chapters 3 and 6, is described in Section 3.2.2 of Chapter 3.) EWMA was
first studied by Roberts [99], and relies on determining whether the value of the
observed parameter in a given time interval has exceeded a particular threshold.
This threshold is calculated in an adaptive manner and is based on the mean
value of the observed parameter, which in turn is computed from the recent
observations of that parameter.
Paul [88] used EWMA for detecting flooding-based DoS attacks against web-
servers. Münz et al. [80] compared the capabilities of Shewhart, CUSUM, and
EWMA for detecting anomalies in network traffic. Instead of using a direct
time-series of network traffic, a time-series of prediction errors was used in order
to cope with seasonal variations and serial correlation. The backbone network
traffic of an ISP was used for evaluation. The authors concluded that CUSUM,
although generally favoured, does not perform any better than relatively simpler
techniques (Shewhart and EWMA) when applied to time-series of prediction
errors. Siris et al. [105] compared the use of an adaptive threshold algorithm
and a parametric CUSUM for detecting TCP SYN flooding attacks. Real traffic
4A parametric CUSUM algorithm requires an underlying model or distribution, both for
the pre-change and post-change periods, of the parameter being analysed. In cases where
pre-change and post-change distributions are not available, a non-parametric CUSUM is used.
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traces were used for a comparative analysis based on the detection probability,
the false alarm ratio, and the detection delay. The authors concluded that while
both the algorithms gave good results for high-intensity attacks (HRF flooding
attacks), the parametric CUSUM exhibited better performance for low-intensity
attacks, without being more complex.
The reviewed literature thus indicates the use of both CUSUM and EWMA
as suitable techniques for detecting abrupt changes in the parameters being ob-
served. Although, preliminary work related to Chapter 3, published in [8, 75],
used a sliding-window-based non-parametric CUSUM proposed by Ahmed et
al. [6, 7], a change detection technique using EWMA is presented in Chapter 3
and then used throughout the work described in both Chapters 3 and 6. EWMA
was chosen mainly because it is robust, flexible and simple to implement as com-
pared to a sliding-window-based non-parametric CUSUM, and does not require
a somewhat arbitrary selection of a window size to suit different datasets. (In
the case of Chapter 3, however, the experimental results based on CUSUM are
presented in Appendix A for comparison).
2.3.4 Summary
Some key observations from the above literature review of network traffic and
SNMP MIB based DDoS attack detection techniques are:
• source IP address appears to be a useful parameter to indicate the onset of
a DDoS attack, either when used in isolation or in combination with other
parameters [15, 36, 47, 91, 93, 113].
• the majority of the SNMP MIB based detection techniques use a rather
fixed set of MIB variables, based only on the incoming and outgoing net-
work traffic [14, 87, 129], as shown in Table 2.1). The use of this one-
dimensional set of MIB variables limits the attack detection capability to
network layer DDoS attacks.
• to the best of our knowledge, no attack detection technique has been de-
veloped or even proposed that uses load based features such as CPU and
memory utilisation (Section 2.3.2). Like network traffic based features,
these load based features can be collected by probing the victim machine
at regular intervals via SNMP. The use of such load based features can po-
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tentially not only detect a variety of DDoS attacks, including application
layer attacks, but also differentiate them from FEs.
• the majority of attack detection techniques are tested and evaluated against
either the more than decade-old KDD Cup 1999 Data [50], or datasets not
available in the public domain (private datasets), or datasets generated
using old traffic generation tools (such as TFN2K [109] and Trin00 [38]),
most of which were written long ago and are now obsolete.
The majority of detection techniques discussed in this section focus on attack
detection without considering FEs, which share a number of characteristics with
DDoS attacks. The following section discusses some of the available techniques
which detect FEs and distinguish them from DDoS attacks. An overview of work
relating to FE models is also presented in the following section.
2.4 Flash Event Detection and Modelling
An intrinsic challenge in addressing the problem of DDoS detection is to ef-
fectively distinguish DDoS attacks from Flash Events generated by legitimate
clients.
The term Flash Crowd (FC) was coined by Larry Niven in a 1973 science-
fiction story to describe a situation where huge crowds of people went back in
time to re-visit historic events [84]. In the World Wide Web context, a Flash
Event (FE) refers to the situation where a large number of legitimate users con-
currently send requests to a web-server, either following some newsworthy event
or as a result of redirection from popular websites like Slashdot or other social
media. This can lead to a dramatic increase in incoming traffic and subsequently
cause a degradation in service. Some examples of FEs include popular websites
experiencing a surge in incoming traffic after major world events (e.g. earth-
quakes, 9/11 attacks), or during major national or international events such as
sporting events or elections etc. An overview of the research conducted in de-
tecting FEs and differentiating them from DDoS attacks is now presented.
2.4.1 Distinguishing Flash Events from DDoS Attacks
DDoS attacks and FEs represent anomalies in the Internet traffic that cause
performance degradation. However, each results from a different section of the
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web-community with varied intentions. DDoS attacks, executed by an attacker,
are a deliberate attempt to disrupt a service intended for its legitimate clients. On
the other hand, FEs are created by legitimate users of the web-community trying
to access a popular web-resource with non-malicious intent. From a network
administrator’s point of view, a precise distinction between DDoS attacks and
FEs is important because these events require an entirely different set of actions
to be undertaken after they have been successfully identified. Detection of an
FE requires an increase in the number of Content Distribution Networks (CDNs)
and other load sharing mechanisms to accommodate more legitimate users [54].
Whereas, in the case of a DDoS attack, the network administrator needs to
enable various attack mitigation mechanisms to filter out malicious traffic and
continue uninterrupted access for legitimate clients.
DDoS attacks are usually executed using a set of geographically separated
compromised machines (bots), controlled by a bot-master, except when the DDoS
attacks have resulted from coordinated voluntary ‘hacktivists’ such as Anony-
mous. On the other hand, an FE originates from legitimate clients trying to ac-
cess a web-resource. Therefore, this problem of differentiating DDoS attacks from
FEs can be mapped onto the problem of differentiating bots (machines) from hu-
mans. Amongst all available techniques for achieving this, CAPTCHAs [9] have
been heavily used. CAPTCHAs are graphical puzzles based on the premise that
humans can solve them but machines or bots cannot. Kandula et al. [55] used
these puzzles to build a system based on probabilistic authentication to protect
a web-server. However, the use of such puzzles introduces additional delays for
legitimate clients, and various puzzle-breaking mechanisms have now been de-
veloped which make it possible for compromised machines (bots) to break the
visual CAPTCHAs [78].
Using private datasets containing HTTP traffic from two busy web-servers,
Jung et al.[54] proposed an enhancement to CDNs to better assist web-servers
during FE scenarios. One of the traffic traces used was from a play-along web-
site for a popular TV show, and another from the Chilean election web-site,
both being FEs. They first categorised FEs into predictable and unpredictable,
based on whether the web-site is aware beforehand of the possibility of its occur-
rence. Their work further characterised FEs in terms of traffic patterns, client
characteristics, and file references. Using the above mentioned predictable FE
datasets, their work concluded that FEs (and DDoS attacks) are accompanied
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by a dramatic increase in the number of incoming requests, and a decrease in
the per-client request rate. These results deviate from the analysis presented in
this thesis, which shows that even in the case of a predictable flash event, the
intensification in the incoming network traffic to the victim can be gradual rather
than abrupt. It is also reasonable to suppose that, in an unpredictable FE, this
parameter might behave differently. The lack of datasets representing FEs, both
predictable and unpredictable, contributes to such speculation. Hyund et al.[86]
have used the FE characteristics proposed by Jung et al.[54], and have reported
the use of randomness checking to differentiate FEs from DDoS attacks. How-
ever, their results, as in the case of [54], are based on datasets of predictable FEs
not available in the public domain.
Yi et al.[125] suggested a novel hidden semi-Markov based anomaly detector
for detecting and differentiating shrew HTTP flood attacks from Flash Crowds
by monitoring the file popularity of the web-server. A shrew attack is a low-
rate DoS attack which sends ‘legitimate appearing’ requests at a sufficiently low
rate to elude detection by counter DoS techniques [61]. Their proposed tech-
nique used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Independent Component
Analysis (ICA) to abstract the multivariate observation vector. However, one
disadvantage of their model, as acknowledged by the authors, was that the pro-
posed scheme was unable to differentiate and filter out malicious sources from
normal ones, so that their model merely serves as an alert function to trigger
more complex monitoring mechanisms.
Le et al. used discrete wavelet transform on source probability, source IP
address distribution map, source IP address aggregation and request volume
intensification to differentiate FEs from spoofed DoS attacks. Yu et al.[130]
proposed a technique to distinguish between a DDoS attack and a Flash Crowd
based on flow similarity. They define flow as the packets passing through the same
router which have a common destination address. Their technique is based on
the premise that there is a stronger similarity between the flows of a DDoS attack
as compared to those in flash crowds. They used three abstract distance metrics
(Abstract distance, Jeffrey distance and Sibon distance) to measure and compare
the flow similarity among DDoS and flash crowd flows based on the number of
packets (presumably packets per flow). Their research shows that Sibon distance
is the most suitable metric to measure the flow similarity. When tested on real-
datasets, the proposed algorithm produced a differentiating accuracy of around
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65%.
The following section summarises the recent research conducted in modelling
FEs.
2.4.2 Flash Event Modelling
In order to evaluate the efficiency of a DDoS detection and FE separation tech-
nique, the availability of representative datasets, both for DDoS attacks and FEs,
is needed. However, the extreme scarcity of publicly available datasets hinders
the requisite research in this area. For the FE domain, only a very limited num-
ber of datasets representing different types of FEs are publicly available. The
majority of these datasets are web-server logs in Common Log Format (CLF)
which makes them difficult to use for experimentation, e.g. by replaying them
over a network using the tcpreplay utility in order to test various FE and DDoS
detection mechanisms, or by measuring their effects (such as CPU, Memory and
Bandwidth utilisation) on the target server. While this lack of representative
datasets is limiting, there is nonetheless sufficient data available to make useful
progress in developing models of FE traffic and using them to generate synthetic
FE traffic, which can then be used for evaluating the proposed techniques (as is
done in Chapter 4 of this thesis). In this section, some of the related work done
in modelling FE traffic is presented.
A significant amount of research has been conducted in workload characteri-
sation of web-servers [13]. However, much of this work has been directed towards
understanding typical web-traffic behaviour to improve caching and content dis-
tribution capabilities [54]. Workload analysis of web-servers during extremely
heavy traffic situations, as in an FE, is comparatively less researched.
Ari et al.[11] proposed a model for Flash Crowd traffic consisting of three
phases: a ramp-up phase, a sustained traffic phase and a ramp-down phase.
Their proposed model focused on the time duration of each phase rather than
on the shape of the curve. Each of the three phases in the proposed model is
controlled by the shock_level, a parameter used to define the order of magnitude
increase in the average request rate, and assumes a linear increase and decrease
in the incoming traffic. The proposed model defines each of the three phases as:
l1 =
1
log(1 + shock_level)
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l2 = log(1 + shock_level)
l3 = n× log(1 + shock_level)
where l1, l2, and l3 represent the duration of the ramp-up phase, the sustained
phase and the ramp-down phase respectively. Their proposed model appears
overly simplistic as the behaviour is likely to vary significantly between different
types of FE e.g., the traffic seen during Slashdot triggered FEs tends to increase
quickly by a large amount and then fade off slowly [10]. Such FEs occur when
short news articles are posted along with a Web link redirecting the reader to
another web-server containing a full description of the associated story, and the
receiving web-server can be quickly overwhelmed. In addition, a sustained traffic
phase or ‘plateau period’ can be extremely short-lived and is usually orders of
magnitude smaller than the other two phases – the ramp-up phase and the ramp-
down phase. Analysis of the real-world FE datasets, available in the public
domain, presented in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3) shows the absence of any such
plateau period.
Wendell et al.[123] analysed FC traffic (they have used the term FC instead
of FE) based on the data collected from CoralCDN, an open CDN made up of
globally cooperating proxies [44]. They defined FCs as successive intervals of
time for which the rate of incoming requests to a fully-qualified domain name
increases exponentially. In other words, they say that a domain experiences a
FC if
rti > 2
i · rt0 , ∀i ∈ [0, k]
and
max
i
rti > m ∧ max
i
rti > n · ravg
where rti is the average per-minute request rate over a time period ti. Constants
m and n are defined as the minimum per-minute request rate, and the difference
between the average and maximum sustained request rate respectively. The
proposed definition of FC traffic and the choice of constants (m = 500, n = 15
and k = 3), presented in the paper, appeared to be ad hoc, lacking supporting
arguments. Their work focuses on different aspects of online content service
delivery, rather than on developing a detailed model of FEs, which can then be
used to synthetically generate similar network traffic, as in this thesis.
Bodik et al.[24] analysed five datasets for volume and data spikes, and ob-
served variations in steepness, magnitude, duration and spatial locality. The
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datasets used for the analysis were: World Cup 1998, UC Berkeley EECS Web-
site, Ebates.com, Wikipedia.org, and a partial source of data from Twitter. The
analysis was used to create a workload model, which served as an input to a
closed-loop workload generator to synthesise similar workload traffic in a test
environment. The volume spike in their proposed model was parametrised into:
t0, t1, t2, t3, and M , representing the start-time of the spike, the peak-time,
the end-time of the period with a flat workload, the end-time of the spike, and
the constant M defined as the relative increase in the workload volume. The
workload volume profile was multiplied by a factor ct to represent a new profile
during a spike. The multiplication factor ct was set to 1.0 before time t0. It lin-
early increased from t0 before reaching M at time t1, then remained unchanged
between t1 and t2, then started to decrease linearly between t2 and t3, and stayed
at 1.0 after t3. Hence, their workload volume model was very similar to the one
proposed by Ari et al. [11] i.e. a linearly increasing ramp-up period, a sustained
period, and a linearly decreasing ramp-down period of the traffic during an FE.
In addition, their proposed workload volume model was validated against a UC
Berkeley EECS Website dataset, which is not available in the public domain.
Zhang et al.[131] presented a model for the magnitude of FCs in BitTorrent
where the service capacity increases with its peers, characteristically different
from FCs seen on web-servers. They define a BitTorrent FC as a significant
increase in the number of peers in a swarm – a group of peers sharing a torrent.
Their proposed FC model consists of four components: the arrival time (time
between the creation of swarm and the start of an FC), the duration (time
between the start and the end of the increase in the number of peers), the plateau
period (duration for which the number of peers remains fairly constant) and the
magnitude (indicating the significance of an FC in terms of the increase). Their
model resembles the model proposed by Ari et al. [11] in terms of having a
distinct plateau period. The magnitude of the proposed FC model was defined
as:
M =
∆n
∆t
× ∆n
max(nb, c)
where ∆n and ∆t represent the increase in the swarm size and the duration of
the FC (in minutes) respectively. nb is the swarm size at the start of an FC
and c is the seeder capacity i.e. the number of peers a well-provisioned seeder
can serve in a swarm. The proposed model, however, takes into account the fact
that the service capacity of a Bit Torrent swarm increases with its peers. This
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characteristic property of FCs seen in BitTorrent is different from the FCs seen
on web-servers, which have finite serving capacities. Hence, the proposed model
was not useful for modelling FEs defined as a part of this research.
2.4.3 Summary
The above research highlights:
• differences in the various models proposed that need to be resolved, and
• the difficulties in comparative evaluation of different FE models due to the
lack of available datasets
The latter, and a similar lack of publicly available DDoS datasets, has prompted
the work described in this thesis (Chapter 5) on synthetically generated traffic
to provide traffic datasets that may be used for evaluation purposes.
2.5 Synthetic Traffic Generation
Legal and privacy issues associated with sharing captured data are the key un-
derlying reasons for the relative lack of real datasets for use in evaluating DDoS
detection techniques and traffic models for DDoS attacks and FEs. This section
reviews current traffic generation techniques after first detailing the limitations
of current publicly available traffic datasets.
2.5.1 Limitations of Existing Public Domain Datasets
The KDD Cup 1999 Data is one of the most referenced and possibly the only
reliably-labelled dataset available in the public domain [50]. This is the dataset
used for the 3rd International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Com-
petition held in conjunction with the 5th International Conference on Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining (KDD99). The competition was to develop a net-
work intrusion detector and the dataset contained a wide variety of intrusions,
simulated in a military environment, that had to be audited. However, due to its
age (1999) and other limitations e.g., its prime usage is for evaluating signature-
based intrusion detection systems [70, 116], it is not really suitable for testing
DDoS detection and mitigation mechanisms.
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Other widely referenced datasets within the DDoS attack detection domain
are the network traces from Waikato Internet Trace Storage Project [1]. How-
ever, these datasets have their own limitations: IP addresses are pseudonymised,
packets are truncated 20 bytes after the transport header, and any retained pay-
loads of UDP packets (except the DNS) are zeroed. A more recent addition
has been the ‘CAIDA DDoS Attack 2007 Dataset’ containing an approximately
one hour traffic trace of a DDoS attack which aimed at consuming the comput-
ing resource of the targeted server [51]. However, the available traces have had
their IP addresses pseudonymised using CryptoPAn and their payloads removed,
thereby limiting their usability. In the FE domain, a very limited number of
datasets representing different types of FEs are publicly available. The majority
of these datasets are web-server logs in Common Log Format, thereby making
them difficult to use, e.g. it is not possible to replay them over a network to test
FE detection algorithms.
Besides these specific limitations, these datasets also share some characteris-
tics which greatly limit their usability:
• Excepting the CAIDA DDoS Attack 2007 Dataset, the other datasets are
old and obsolete in the context of continuously evolving DDoS attacks with
complex attack vectors.
• Barring KDD Cup 1999 Data, the datasets are not labelled, thus mak-
ing it difficult to filter out the attack traffic from the background traffic,
precluding detection strategies relying on machine learning algorithms.
• Even though the target addresses of the packets in these datasets can be
altered and subsequently directed to a test machine while replaying, the
real effects of the network trace still cannot be reproduced due to the non-
availability of the services addressed in the original trace.
• The missing payloads completely eliminates the possibility of developing
any content-based analysis technique.
Not all the aforementioned deficiencies affect the research presented in this
thesis, but several of them do, and hence there is a need to investigate the
problem of synthetic traffic generation.
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2.5.2 Existing Traffic Generators
A number of synthetic traffic generation techniques have been implemented on
various software and hardware platforms. The hardware traffic generators can
do much the same as their software counterparts, but at higher speed and at
greater cost. Hardware traffic generators like the SmartBits 600 [106] can arti-
ficially generate configurable flooding attacks, but they fail to interact with the
application at the target machine. Preliminary experiments with the SmartBits
generator highlighted significant differences in how the computers and the other
networking devices like switches and routers responded to hardware-generated
and software-generated network traffic. The number of packets being dropped by
the kernel was found to be much higher for hardware-generated network traffic.
On the other hand, most of the software-based traffic generators available in the
public domain are based on simple client-server models and are limited by the
number of different scenarios they are capable of simulating. Moreover, most of
these software tools were written long ago and thus need serious modifications
before they can be of any practical use.
One weakness shared by hardware traffic generators and a majority of soft-
ware based traffic generators is their inability to conduct any meaningful in-
teractions with the target. Their sole aim is to deposit packets onto the wire
that conform to the given traffic profile, as expressed by parameters like traffic
volume, traffic distribution, packet size, and protocol type. The following open-
source software traffic generators were investigated: D-ITG [25], Harpoon [107],
fudp5, Hping [102] and curl-loader [53]. Of these, fudp is used in work described
in Chapter 3 for injecting malicious packets in the normal background traffic
to test a DDoS attack detection technique based on the change in rate of new
source IPs. The functionality of the fudp tool was improved to incorporate the
use of random source IP addresses. Apart from fudp, Curl-loader [53] was the
other tool that was extensively tested and used to conduct preliminary experi-
ments for generating datasets with the desired characteristics. The investigation
of Curl-loader also led to the use of IP aliasing with Wget [83], (both available on
most computing platforms) for synthetic traffic generation. IP aliasing is a well
known technique for assigning multiple IP addresses to a single network interface
and Wget is a command line utility for retrieving files, commonly via HTTP.
5fudp – http://sourceforge.net/projects/usoft/
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2.5.2.1 Curl-loader
Curl-loader is a C-based open-source tool designed to simulate the behaviour of
a large number of HTTP/HTTPS and FTP/FTPS clients, each with its own
unique source IP address. Curl-loader has the ability to generate large num-
bers of ‘virtual clients’ (VCs), each having their own valid unique source IP and
shared MAC address. In order to generate synthetic network traffic, comprising
both malicious and normal data on the experimental testbed infrastructure, the
scalability of this approach was tested and was seen to be governed by (a) pro-
cessing capacity of the individual machines (i.e. the number and speed of CPUs
and the amount of memory); and (b) the number of distinct platforms available
in the experimental testbed. Details of the experiments conducted using both
these options are presented in Appendix B (Section B.1).
Curl-loader placed heavy demands on the host systems’ resources (CPU and
memory) and proved far from an ideal tool for generating synthetic traffic origi-
nating from a large number of source IPs at the desired rate. The tool also had to
be modified to incorporate randomness in the source IP addresses and to create
various attack profiles. These modifications led to instabilities in performance.
This, combined by the need for further modifications to incorporate different
types of attacks, eventually led to the abandonment of this approach.
2.5.2.2 IP-aliasing with wget
IP aliasing is a well-known technique, available on most computing platforms,
for assigning a large number of distinct IPs to a single hardware (Network In-
terface Card or NIC) address. On Linux and BSD, for example, thousands of
unique IP addresses can be assigned to a single Ethernet card. IP-aliasing on
the Linux platform can be achieved via the ifconfig utility. Using IP-aliasing,
traffic originating from a single host can be divided into multiple network-flows6,
with each flow having a unique value for its source IP address, and so overall the
traffic can be made to appear (to the target) to be coming from many separate
machines.
GNU Wget [83] is a non-interactive command line utility for retrieving files
using the HTTP, HTTPS and FTP protocols. As wget is an non-interactive tool,
6A TCP/IP network flow is defined as a sequence of packets from a source machine to a
destination machine with unique values for source IP, source port, destination IP, destination
port, and protocol.
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it can be easily integrated with custom scripts, cron jobs and other command line
utilities available in Linux without the support of X-windows. Therefore, when
used with IP-aliasing, wget can potentially create the appearance of an array of
machines (‘bots’ for DDoS attacks and ‘legitimate clients’ for FEs), each with
a unique source IP address, but sharing the hardware address of the physical
interface. This array of machines can then be used to synthetically generate
realistic DDoS attacks and FEs.
The approach of using wget with IP-aliasing provided a method for crafting
application layer DDoS attacks such as the HTTP flooding attack. However, the
time it took to create aliases increased with the number of requested aliases. Also,
an increase in the number of aliases resulted in a corresponding increase in the
host machines’ CPU and memory consumption. Experimental results of using
IP-aliasing with Wget are provided in Appendix B (Section B.2). In addition to
resource consumption constraints, the approach was also limited by the variety
of attacks (only HTTP based) that it was capable of generating, thereby lacking
the desired flexibility. The perceived drawbacks with this technique and with
the use of curl-loader led to the development of a customised software traffic
generator called Botloader, which was cooperatively developed as a part of this
research, and is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
2.5.3 Testbed Design Strategies
An essential requirement for replaying synthetic or original traffic traces is having
an experimental setup to play it on. To obtain experimental results also requires
some means of managing an attack and measuring its effects. These require-
ments thus imply the existence of some kind of testbed in addition to the traffic
generation software. The reviewed literature in this field suggests that there are
three commonly used testbed design strategies, viz. simulation, emulation and
direct physical generation.
2.5.3.1 Simulation
Network simulators like ns–2 [69] or Opnet [74] have often been used to simulate
DDoS attacks and measure their effects [21, 101, 124]. However, the realism of
a method in which the attackers, targets and network devices are all simulated
has recently been called into question [72]. This lack of realism, combined with
a slower speed of traffic replay, makes simulation an unattractive proposition
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for addressing the DDoS attack detection techniques developed in this thesis,
particularly for High Rate Flooding attacks.
2.5.3.2 Emulation
Emulation is a step forward in realism over simulation: real machines are used
as attackers and targets. This approach gained traction with the Emulab [124],
DETER [17] and Planetlab [94] testbeds. The DETER and Emulab testbeds
allowed users to get access to desired machines, in a central and isolated (from
the Internet) facility, whereas Planetlab, being a distributed testbed set-up, offers
shared access to machines, via a VM (virtual machine) software, thus allowing
user isolation.
In emulation only the network topology is recreated in software; targets and
attackers are represented by physical machines, with a real Operating System
(OS) and applications. The network is represented by soft-routers, and by vir-
tual LANs. Although this is more realistic than the simulation approach, and
allows the facility to be shared, the high cost of constructing and maintaining
testbeds of this type seems to limit their size to around 300 machines. Real world
DDoS attacks on the other hand, typically comprise at least several thousand
attackers [98].
2.5.3.3 Direct physical generation
In this technique the desired network topology is built by physically arranging
a network of routers, switches, and computers. The main disadvantage is lack
of flexibility: each experiment has to be set up by hand, and the facility can’t
be shared. On the other hand, larger scale facilities can be built, although at
greater cost. For example, Calvet et al. were able to create a network of 3000
virtual machines using only 98 blade servers [30]. The experimental testbed,
cooperatively developed as a part of this research and explained in detail in
Chapter 5 (see Section 5.2 for details), uses this approach as it allows a decoupling
of hardware and software, and allows for more realistic experiments.
2.5.4 Summary
Research associated with network anomaly detection, particularly DDoS attack
detection and FE separation, suffer immensely from accurate evaluation mainly
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originating from the extreme scarcity of recent and realistic network data avail-
able in the public domain. Most of the publicly available datasets are either
too old [50] to reflect the current network trends or are heavily anonymised (to
eliminate any associated privacy and legal concerns) to give any useful informa-
tion, or are available in a format like Common Log Format (CLF), which limits
their usability [12]. The other obvious alternative to overcoming this scarcity of
publicly available datasets, necessary for evaluating any DDoS attack detection
technique, is the use of traffic generators. However, the majority of traffic gen-
erator tools, both hardware and software based, are only useful for flooding the
connecting pipe with packets originating from spoofed source IPs rather than
for generating stateful and responsive TCP traffic, suggesting that the synthetic
generation of more realistic traffic may be one way around the problem.
The generated traffic also requires an experimental setup on which to be
played. Directly building the desired network topology for experiments using
physical networking equipment and computers provides greater realism over sim-
ulation or emulation approaches to testbed design, and can be set up with more
modest equipment and computing resources.
2.6 Research Challenges
The focus of this thesis is to address some of the research challenges highlighted
above, in particular challenges relating to the detection of DDoS attacks, the
modelling of FEs, and the differentiation of DDoS attacks from FE traffic. In
addition, the thesis addresses pre-existing work on traffic generation and its
deployment for use in addressing these challenges. The challenges are:
1. Extending previous work on the use of IP addresses for detect-
ing DDoS attacks: the literature reviewed indicates that the source IP
address of incoming packets may be a useful metric, either in isolation
or in combination with other traffic parameters, for identifying the onset
of a DDoS attack. This leads to Research Question 1: Can the onset of
a DDoS attack be detected based on simple network traffic characteristics
such as source IP address? Chapter 3 describes the design, implementa-
tion and evaluation of an attack detection technique based on the change in
rate of previously unseen or new source IP addresses of incoming packets.
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2. Distinguishing DDoS attacks from Flash Events and modelling
Flash Events: the majority of the attack detection techniques reviewed
focus on DDoS attacks without considering FEs. A likely contributing fac-
tor to this is the general lack of publicly available real datasets of both
DDoS and FE traffic. This leads to Research Questions 2 and 3, addressed
in Chapter 4. Research Question 2: Is it possible to differentiate DDoS
attacks from FEs? and Research Question 3: What are the essential char-
acteristics of different types of FE and is it possible to use those charac-
teristics to model and subsequently generate different types of synthetic FE
traffic?
3. Traffic generation and testbed framework: The problems of the
scarcity of publicly available datasets and the limitations of using off-the-
shelf software and hardware traffic generators leads to Research Question 4:
Is it possible to design and implement a simple experimental traffic genera-
tion and testbed framework, using only modest hardware for the testbed and
a software-only traffic generator, to synthetically generate realistic network
traffic representing DDoS attacks and FEs? This question is addressed in
Chapter 5, which explores the design and implementation of the DDoS/FE
testbed which includes a software traffic generator – Botloader, coopera-
tively developed as a part of this research.
4. Ensemble-based DDoS detection strategy: as previously mentioned,
to the best of our knowledge, no DDoS attack detection technique yet
proposed combines network traffic and server-load analysis. This leads to
Research Question 5: Can a more sophisticated ensemble-based technique
based on both network traffic characteristics and server-load data (memory
and CPU utilisation) improve the accuracy of DDoS attack detection and
provide a means to identify and differentiate DDoS attacks, FEs and nor-
mal traffic? Chapter 6 addresses this challenge by designing, implementing
and evaluating an ensemble-based DDoS detection technique.
2.7 Summary
This chapter reviewed previous work relating to DDoS attacks. It examined
current DDoS attack detection techniques, both from the network traffic analysis
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side and SNMP MIB data analysis side, and identified their limitations. It also
described the previous work done in the area of characterising FEs for detecting
FEs and differentiating them from DDoS attacks, and presented an analysis of
existing FE models and current practices for synthetic traffic generation.
Based on this survey of previous related work, four research challenges were
identified for detecting DDoS attacks and distinguishing them from FEs. These
challenges will now be explored in the following chapters.
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Chapter 3
DDoS Attack Detection Using IP
Addresses
It is now more than a decade since the first full-scale High-Rate Flooding (HRF)
DDoS attacks were unleashed on the Internet community [45]. The vector for
that attack was a set of compromised machines (bots), controlled by an attacker
(bot-master) and used to direct high volumes of unwanted network traffic towards
a target host. Even after a decade, and notwithstanding their conceptual simplic-
ity, HRF DDoS attacks in various guises still continue to constitute a pernicious
threat within the Internet community [81]. However, an efficient and timely
detection of such attacks, combined with the formulation and implementation
of an effective attack mitigation strategy, remains a challenging problem. This
chapter attempts to provide a solution to the DDoS1 attack detection problem,
and outlines the design of a corresponding lightweight mitigation strategy.
The work presented in this chapter addresses Research Question 1 identified
earlier in Chapter 1 (see Section 1.2 for details) i.e. Can the onset of a DDoS at-
tack be detected based on simple network traffic characteristics such as source IP
address? This chapter describes an approach based on the source IP address of
the incoming packets, and demonstrates how that simple network traffic feature,
coupled with a change-point analysis of the rate of arrival of new IP addresses,
is sufficient in some circumstances to detect the onset of a DDoS attack. Im-
portantly, the use of a single network feature directly addresses the scalability of
1In the context of this thesis, DDoS refers to High-Rate Flooding (HRF) attacks.
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the detection process when subjected to high network speeds. The chapter con-
cludes by presenting a scheme to download the legitimate IP addresses identified
by the above detection strategy to an application firewall to provide a mitigation
facility.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 provides a high-level design
of a source IP address based DDoS attack detection approach. This approach
comprises two main functions: ipac (for classifying IP addresses of the incoming
packets), and ddos (to identify an attack). Section 3.2 provides the implemen-
tation details of the ipac function, using bit vectors, and the ddos function used
in the attack detection technique. Section 3.3 presents the change detection
algorithm used in the proposed technique. Section 3.4 presents the experimen-
tal results and evaluates the technique against different attack datasets. Sec-
tion 3.5 presents the conceptual design for a DDoS Detection and Mitigation
Model (D2M2). Finally, Section 3.6 summarises the research presented in the
chapter and provides concluding remarks.
3.1 An IP-based DDoS Detection Strategy
The onset of a HRF DDoS attack is typically accompanied by an increase in
the number of unsolicited packets originating from previously unseen or new
source IP addresses arriving at the target host. A real-world example of a DDoS
attack with this characteristic is the CAIDA DDoS Attack 2007 dataset – a
popular dataset used by DDoS researchers containing approximately one hour of
pseudonymised traffic traces from a DDoS attack [51].
The characteristics of this attack in terms of the rate of incoming traffic
(left y-axis) and previously unseen or new source IP addresses (right y-axis) are
presented in Figure 3.1. The figure shows a dramatic increase in the number of
previously unseen IP addresses at the onset of the attack. This characteristic
feature of a HRF DDoS attack forms the basis of the proposed DDoS attack
detection approach, namely, to analyse the incoming traffic in terms of the source
IP addresses of the packets received, and to reliably determine if the current
incoming network traffic represents a DDoS attack.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the proposed DDoS attack detection approach, coopera-
tively developed as a part of this research2. It consists of two high-level functions
2While the other work presented in the remainder of the thesis is primarily the candidate’s
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Figure 3.1: Rate of incoming traffic and new source IPs for CAIDA dataset.
– ipac and ddos :
• ipac function for classifying the source IP addresses of the packets received
• ddos function for identifying an attack
The ipac or IP address classification function first extracts the IP addresses of
the incoming network traffic. It then determines whether the source IP address
has been seen previously or is new (Not Seen Previously – NSP). The resulting
time series of the rate of previously unseen or new IP addresses is then is analysed
by the ddos function to identify whether the system is under attack. The system
being protected against DDoS attacks is represented in terms of two independent
states: NA (not under attack), which is the system state when receiving non-
attack or normal traffic, and A (under attack), the system state when receiving
DDoS attack traffic.
In order to learn the network behaviour under normal (non-attack) conditions,
the ipac function is first applied to normal network traffic without the activation
of the ddos function. After the training period, the ddos function is invoked at
regular intervals (1 to 10 seconds), and based on the rate of arrival of packets
from previously unseen IP addresses (as calculated by the ipac function), the
ddos function then determines if the system is under attack.
contribution, the work presented in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this chapter was in particular a
cooperative effort.
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Figure 3.2: DDoS Detection using NSP source IPs
A transition from state NA to A signals that an attack has been identified,
and the ddos function then generates a ‘white list’, which can then be used for
mitigation, for example, by only allowing traffic from IP addresses within the
white list. On the other hand, a transition from state A to NA is indicative of
the end of an attack, and can be the prompt for the relaxation of the mitigation
strategy, for example, by ceasing to use the previously generated white list for
traffic filtering. The focus in this section is however on detection, mitigation is
discussed further in Section 3.5.
In order to perform the source IP address classification of the incoming pack-
ets, ipac maintains two data structures representing the IP addresses of the
packets received: W (White-list) and R (Recent). The data structure W is
initialised with the source IPs of known attack-free or normal traffic i.e. legiti-
mate clients. The data structure R is initialised to be empty at system start-up,
and is used to temporarily hold the source IPs of the packets arriving from new
(NSP) IP addresses. Only once the ddos function has recently determined that
the system is not under attack can those addresses be copied to the white-list –
the data structureW. This avoids polluting the white-listed (legitimate) source
IPs stored in W. If, on the other hand, the ddos function determines that the
system was recently under attack, then the data structure R is discarded.
The ipac function (described in Algorithm 3.1) analyses the source IP address
of an incoming packet, and if the ip address is new or has not been seen previously,
it updates the data structure R.
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Algorithm 3.1: ipac function for classifying IP addresses.
Input: Source IP address (ip) of the incoming packets.
Output: Previously unseen or new source IP addresses (newIP).
if NOT ((ip in W) OR (ip in R)) then
INC(newIP) /* increment the counter for new IPs */
add ip to R /* update data structure R */
end
The ddos function (described in Algorithm 3.2) is periodically invoked, at 1
to 10 second intervals, to analyse recent changes in the arrival of packets from
NSP IP addresses, as calculated by the ipac function. The ddos function calls
the StateChange function, which in turn uses a change detection technique (see
Section 3.3 for details) to detect abrupt changes in the rate of arrival of packets
from NSP IPs, specifically in the change from the state NA to A.
Algorithm 3.2: ddos function for identifying attacks.
Input: Time series of the rate of new source IP addresses.
Output: System State – A or NA
if (in state NA) then
if NOT (StateChange(NA)) then /* no state change */
add R to W /* add IP addresses to white-list */
else /* state change to A */
state = A
send white-list to the application firewall
R = empty
end
end
else if (in state A) then
if StateChange(A) then /* change state to NA */
state = NA
inform the application firewall to stop using the white-list
end
end
There are a few limitations to this approach. The first is that whenever
the system is deemed under attack, new IP addresses are treated as malicious.
This can give rise to false positives. In Chapter 6, the proposed ensemble-based
DDoS detection technique aims to limit these false positives by extending the
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rejection criterion of the incoming packets beyond the simple property of NSP
IP addresses. It does this by making use of additional network-based parameters
such as traffic volume, traffic volume per IP address, along with server-load
based parameters such as CPU and memory utilisation, in tandem with NSP IP
addresses to improve the identification of malicious traffic.
A second limitation concerns the malicious IP addresses observed during nor-
mal network operations. For example, if an attacker first performed reconnais-
sance of the target network by sending a small number of packets (such as ICMP
echo requests) then these IP addresses would be added to the white-list, giving
rise to false negatives, before actually flooding the target with a large number
of packets. This can be addressed not only by using the additional network and
server-load based features described above, but also by using smaller historical
time periods, for example, by using only IP addresses observed during the last
24 hours as trusted IP addresses.
An additional limitation concerns the time taken by the execution of the
ipac and ddos functions. The intention is to keep these two functions small
and efficient. However, if they are slow, incoming packets may not be properly
processed. Section 3.2 discusses the implementation of the NSP algorithm using
bit vectors: a data structure that compactly stores the IP addresses as a bit-array.
3.2 Implementation of an IP-based DDoS Detec-
tion Strategy
This section describes the implementation details of the main components of
the IP-based DDoS attack detection technique – IP addresses classification, and
DDoS attack detection.
3.2.1 IP Address Classification
Using the change in rate of new source IP addresses as the primary feature to
detect the onset of a DDoS attack requires keeping track of source IP addresses
already seen in the network under normal, non-attack network conditions. At
these times, the rate of arrival of new source IP addresses is relatively low, i.e.
the target server experiences a small number of previously unseen (new) source
IPs. On the other hand, the onset of a DDoS attack is generally marked by
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a substantial increase in the rate of arrival of new source IP addresses [92].
Therefore, the implementation of the IP address classification function (ipac)
requires the use of a compact and efficient data structure.
Bit Vector Implementation
In order to accommodate all the IP addresses in the IPv4 address space, a bit
vector can be used as the data structure to represent W (White-list) and R
(Recent) in the implemented NSP algorithm. In the IPv4 address space, in
order to accommodate all of 232 IP addresses using a bit vector, 0.5 GB of space
is required. In contrast, a bit vector in IPv6 address space needs to represent 2128
IP addresses. This increase in the address size from 32 bits in IPv4 to 128 bit in
IPv6 significantly increases storage requirements. One possible solution to the
scaling problem in the ipac function would be to accommodate the larger IPv6
address space by using a more efficient data structure such as a bloom filter [22].
In the IP address classification function (ipac), whenever an incoming packet
is received, a bit at a specified position in the bit vector is set to indicate the
presence of a given IP address. A separate counter is then used to calculate the
number of new source IP addresses observed during an interval, resulting in a
time series of the rate of previously unseen or new IP addresses. This imple-
mentation via bit vectors allows for a number of optimisations to the proposed
NSP algorithm. In the ddos function, the step ‘add R to W’ can be optimised by
modifying the ipac function so that at the time of setting the appropriate bit in
the data structure R, a temporary copy of the IP address value, or better still,
a copy of the address of the bit being set can be kept. This optimisation allows
the ‘add R to W’ step to be implemented as a series of bit operations rather than
as an OR operation between the entire bit vectors R and W. Another similar
optimisation relates to the step ‘R = empty’ in the ddos function. This step is
optimised by unsetting the relevant bits rather then zeroing the entire bit vector
R.
3.2.2 DDoS Attack Detection
As previously discussed in Section 3.1, the onset of a HRF DDoS attack is typi-
cally accompanied by an increase in the number of unsolicited packets arriving at
the target host from previously unseen or new IP addresses. In such attacks, an
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increase in the number of unsolicited packets usually results from a large num-
ber of compromised hosts (bots), controlled by a bot master, which send a high
volume of traffic to the target host. As a result, the target host not only experi-
ences an increase in incoming traffic volume but also an increase in the number
of sources sending such traffic. Thus, the problem of identifying the onset of a
DDoS attack can be formulated as a change detection problem. This involves
detecting changes in the statistical properties of the incoming traffic parameters
of interest, such as the change in rate of new source IP addresses.
The IP address classification function (ipac) identifies the number of new
source IP addresses within a given measurement interval. It then calls the ddos
function (change detection algorithm) to identify the onset of a DDoS attack.
For detecting abrupt changes in the parameter under investigation i.e. the rate
of new source IP addresses, a change detection technique called Exponentially
Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) has been used, and is discussed in the fol-
lowing section.
3.3 Change Detection
At the onset of a network anomaly such as a DDoS attack, it is expected that the
statistical properties of the parameters indicating anomalous activity may change
abruptly. In order to detect such changes in the parameters being observed, var-
ious detection techniques have been proposed by researchers. As previously dis-
cussed in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3.3 for details), Cumulative Sum (CUSUM),
moving average, and spectrum analysis are some of the most commonly used
techniques for detecting anomalous network activities. In the case of High-Rate
Flooding (HRF) attacks, the reviewed literature also indicates the use of either
CUSUM or Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) as suitable tech-
niques for detecting abrupt changes.
The EWMA change detection technique was chosen because of its simplicity,
flexibility, robustness and effectiveness in detecting high intensity attacks [105].
It also has a lower false positive rate as compared to CUSUM for large dataset
samples, or whenever the parameters are estimated [58]. Chapters 3 and 6 use
EWMA to detect changes in the ‘parameters of interest’, indicative of the onset
of a DDoS attack. In this chapter the parameter of interest is the number of
new or Not Seen Previously (NSP) IP addresses. Although preliminary work,
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published in [8, 75], used a sliding-window-based non-parametric CUSUM algo-
rithm proposed by Ahmed et al. [6, 7] for change detection, EWMA has been
used instead in this thesis. The two sets of results (EWMA, and CUSUM) are,
however, closely comparable. The experimental results of attack detection of
the same attacks used in this chapter, but based on CUSUM are presented in
Appendix A.
EWMA Algorithm
EWMA relies on examining whether the value of the parameter being observed
in a given time interval exceeds a particular threshold value. In order to cater
for constantly changing traffic scenarios, as in the case of DDoS attacks, this
technique uses a threshold that is adaptively computed instead of using a pre-
defined threshold value. This threshold is based on the mean value of a given
parameter, which in turn is calculated from the recent observations made for
that particular parameter. The threshold computed at each sampling interval is
then used in the decision making process. This algorithm used is now described
in detail.
Let xt represent the value of a given parameter at a time t, and µt−1 represent
an average value of that parameter computed from the measurements prior to
time t. Time t is a cardinal number and indicates the sampling time instance of
the time series, rather than an actual time stamp. A significant change in the
parameter xt is indicated if,
xt > (1 + η)µt−1 (3.1)
Change Detection Condition.
where η > 0 indicates the fractional change from the mean (µ) that consti-
tutes a ‘change’ in the behaviour of the parameter (xt) being observed. With the
onset of a DDoS attack, these parameters show a substantial increase in their
observed values. Hence, the change condition (Equation 3.1) is used only to
detect positive changes in the parameter values. After successfully identifying a
change, the end of an anomalous activity is identified with the violation of the
change condition (Equation 3.1).
The mean values of the parameter µt can be estimated, either by using a
historical time period window, or by using an exponentially weighted moving av-
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erage (EWMA) of its previous occurrences until that time interval. The EWMA
technique gives a maximum weight to the most recent observation, and an expo-
nentially decreasing weight (from most recent to the first) to older observations
[99]. The current implementation of the change detection technique makes use
of EWMA to compute the mean value of a parameter at each sampling time
interval.
Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) Xt of a parameter Yt at
a given time t, as first studied by Roberts [99] is defined as:
Xt =
Y1 if t = 1λYt + (1− λ)Xt−1 if t > 1 (3.2)
Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA)
where
• Yt is the value of the parameter being observed at a time period t. The
value of Yt can either be the individually observed values, or an average
computed using a given sampling technique.
• Xt is the EWMA value of the parameter Yt at a time period t. X1 can be
initialised i.e. at time t = 1, either by using the parameter value at that
time i.e. Y1, or an average of first few time intervals.
• λ is the EWMA coefficient (also known as a smoothing or weighting factor)
with a value between 0 and 1. A lower value of λ (close to 0) gives more
weight to the mean calculated up until that time period and ignores the
current value, and a higher value of λ (close to 1) gives more weight to the
current value and ignores the mean calculated up until that time period.
The change detection technique used in this chapter makes use of EWMA
technique to calculate the mean EWMA (µt) for the parameter of interest (xt)
at each sampling time interval (t). Thus, in the above equation (3.2), Xt repre-
sents the EWMA mean at time t i.e. µt, and Yt represents the parameter being
observed at time t i.e. xt. Hence, the equation 3.2 can be rewritten as:
µt =
x1 if t = 1λxt + (1− λ)µt−1 if t > 1 (3.3)
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where 0 6 λ 6 1. The current implementation of the change detection algorithm
uses λ = 0.02 (unless otherwise specified). This is done to give more weight to
recent observations while calculating the mean at a given time interval.
Instead of flagging a change in the parameter being observed with every
single occurrence of the threshold condition (equation 3.1), the change detection
technique has been slightly modified so that it triggers an alarm (an actual
change) only after a minimum number of consecutive occurrences of threshold
condition are detected. This is done to minimise the false alarms that would
potentially arise due to erratic fluctuations in the parameters being observed.
Thus, an alarm is triggered when there are k consecutive time intervals for which
the change detection condition occurs before flagging an actual change in the
observed parameter.
Configurable parameters of the change detection algorithm As shown
in Algorithm 3.3, the change detection technique used in the ensemble makes use
of three configurable parameters (η, λ and k) which can be fine-tuned to different
values. These parameters are:
• η: this parameter is used to adaptively calculate the threshold value used
for change detection. The chosen value of η is partly based on the expected
sensitivity of the parameter being observed. Unless otherwise specified,
η = 0.5 has been used for the observed parameter i.e. new or NSP source
IPs. Later on in Chapter 6, different values of η are chosen for different
parameters, however, they are kept constant for any given parameter across
all the datasets used in the evaluation.
• λ: this parameter determines the relative weight given to the most recent
values of the mean parameter value computed before the current time in-
terval. The value of λ lies between 0 and 1. The experiments conducted
for this chapter use a low value (0.02) of λ, thereby giving weight to the
recent means computed before the current time interval.
• k: this parameter is used to determine the number of consecutive changes
to detect before flagging an actual change in the parameter being observed.
This is done to filter out erratic fluctuations and thereby reduce the false
alarms. Unless otherwise specified, all experiments have been conducted
using k = 3.
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Algorithm 3.3: Change Detection Algorithm.
Input: Time series file of the parameters of interest, η, λ and k
Output: String of 1’s (change) and 0’s (no change)
/* First instance of the time series */
if (t = 1) then
/* current mean using equation 3.3 */
µt = x1
Print output
else
/* subsequent instances of the time series */
µt−1 = µt
/* change condition (equation 3.1) true */
if (xt >= (1 + η)µt−1) then
/* Increment change counter */
ChangeCounter++
/* k consecutive change condition occurrences */
if (ChangeCounter >= k) then
Change detected
Print output
/* Decrement change counter */
ChangeCounter−−
end
else
/* change condition (equation 3.1) false */
No Change detected
/* Reinitialise change counter */
ChangeCounter=0
end
Print output
/* current mean using equation 3.3 */
µt = λxt + (1− λ)µt−1
end
An additional parameter used in the change detection algorithm is t, indi-
cating the time resolution (in seconds) or the duration of the sampling interval
over which the individual parameters are measured. The results presented in this
chapter use 10 seconds as the sampling interval.
The chosen values of these configurable parameters are based on previous
work done in change detection using EWMA, specifically in DDoS related sce-
narios [105]. Douglas [76] found that in general the values of λ within the interval
0.05 6 λ 6 0.25 work well in practice. Khoo et al. [58] presented a study on the
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false alarm rates of various change detection algorithms including EWMA, with
λ = 0.15. Paul [88] employed EWMA for detecting saturation attacks against
web-servers, using λ = 0.15. However, he noted that using λ values between 0.1
and 0.2 also brought good results. Siris et al. [105] applied EWMA to anomaly
detection of SYN flood attacks with η = 0.5, λ = 0.02, k = 4, t = 10 for the
configurable parameters.
The EWMA technique was applied on the rate of new source IPs in this chap-
ter using different values for η, λ and k within these suggested ranges, which were
experimentally adjusted to improve accuracy. The value of η directly affected
the sensitivity of the change detection algorithm. Using low values for η such as
0.2 made the change detection prone to small fluctuation in the observed param-
eter, thereby giving rise to false positives, whereas assigning high values such as
1.0 caused EWMA to miss the changes, thereby giving rise to false negatives.
η = 0.50 was used in the experiments, although in general, values between 0.25
and 0.50 gave good results.
The chosen value for λ = 0.02 (the smoothing constant) was based on the
reviewed literature [76, 105], and determined the assigned weight or importance
of recent mean values in comparison to older values. In general, values of λ
ranging from 0.2 to 0.6 were found to give good results. Values lower than 0.02
resulted in a delay in detecting the changes, and for values higher than 0.06
EWMA was unable to accurately detect the end of a change, although the main
focus in this work is to detect the onset of a DDoS attack indicated by a change
in the observed parameter.
The k value determined the robustness of the EWMA technique to erratic
fluctuations in the observed parameter. The value of k = 3 used here is once
again based on the reviewed literature [105]. A larger value for k such as 4 or
5 unnecessarily delays the change detection, as also indicated by the small gap
between the increase in the number of new source IPs and the decision function’s
output around the 260th sampling interval, as shown in Figure 3.5. On the other
hand, a small value of k, such as 1, can give rise to false alarms, depending on
the nature of the parameter being observed. The datasets used in this chapter
were not adversely affected by lower values of k, and gave good results even with
k = 1. However, k = 3 was chosen, for the NSP source IPs parameter analysed
in this chapter, and also for most of the parameters used later in Chapter 6, to
minimise the false alarms that potentially may arise due to fluctuations.
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Thus, the configurable parameters chosen for EWMA, as applied to NSP
source IPs were η = 0.50, λ = 0.02, k = 3, and t = 10.
3.4 Experimental Results and Analysis
The proposed DDoS attack detection algorithm uses the change in the rate of new
source IP addresses as the key parameter to detect the onset of DDoS attacks. In
order to validate the use of this technique for the detection of HRF DDoS attacks,
a comparative study of two different network traffic traces has been conducted.
The analysis conducted by Peng et al. [91] compared daily traces collected by the
University of Auckland (Auckland VIII dataset) [1] with the previous two week’s
data to observe the persistence of source IP addresses. Their analysis concluded
that a majority of the IP addresses appearing in a network traffic under normal
or non-attack conditions have appeared previously.
In this work, a similar analysis has been conducted using network traffic traces
collected from a dedicated block of unused IP addresses (a so-called Darknet)
and also the Auckland VIII traffic. In contrast to the used address space in the
Internet where there are interconnected production hosts, the unused address
space (Darknet) comprises routable IP addresses which are not connected to
any production hosts. Hence, due the absence of real hosts in the Darknet, the
observed traffic is by definition unsolicited and likely to be either malicious or
opportunistic, or due to mis-configuration of the source software. Table 3.1 shows
the results of our analysis by comparing the two network traffic traces – Auckland
VIII and the Darknet – for the persistence of source IP addresses. It provides a
comparative analysis of the percentage of source IP addresses appearing within a
fortnight of the listed dates for both Auckland VIII and Darknet network traffic
traces. It should be noted that the Auckland VIII trace used in this analysis
is preprocessed to remove all TCP flows indicative of an anomaly i.e. any TCP
flow with less than 3 packets. Thus, the Auckland VIII trace used in the analysis
is representative of network under normal traffic conditions.
Table 3.1 shows a marked dissimilarity between the percentage of source
IP addresses that appeared in the last fortnight for the two datasets. In the
Auckland VIII dataset, a large percentage (about 88-90%) of source IP addresses
reappeared when compared with the traffic observed in the last fortnight – a
normal network traffic behaviour. In contrast, a very low percentage of source
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Table 3.1: Persistence of source IPs in the Auckland VIII and Darknet Trace.
Auckland VIII Trace Darknet Trace
Date Percentage Date Percentage
2001-Mar-26 88.7% 2009-Dec-25 1.25%
2001-Mar-27 90.3% 2009-Dec-26 1.05%
2001-Mar-28 89.1% 2009-Dec-27 1.03%
2001-Mar-29 89.2% 2009-Dec-28 0.91%
2001-Mar-30 90.2% 2009-Dec-29 0.94%
2001-Mar-31 89.9% 2009-Dec-30 1.07%
2001-Apr-01 88.1% 2009-Dec-31 7.99%
IP addresses re-appear in the case of likely malicious network traffic collected
from the Darknet. Thus, it can be concluded that the change in rate of new
or NSP source IP addresses is relatively high (low persistence) for a malicious
activity such as DDoS attack, and low (high persistence) for a normal network
behaviour. This can thus be used as a key parameter to detect the onset of a
DDoS attack.
3.4.1 Datasets Used
In order to experiment with and evaluate the proposed DDoS attack detection
technique it is important to have a dataset with two distinct components, viz.,
normal (background) traffic and the anomalous traffic. The normal traffic compo-
nent is drawn from the data collected by the University of Auckland (Auckland
VIII dataset) [1] and the anomalous (attack) traffic component is constructed
using the fudp3 utility.
Background Traffic
The Auckland VIII dataset is a continuous 2 week (Wednesday, 1st December
2003 – Monday, 15th December 2003) GPS synchronised IP header trace collected
using a DAG3.5E Ethernet network measurement card at the University of Auck-
land [1]. The entire trace consists of only TCP, UDP and ICMP based traffic
and all the non-IP traffic has been discarded. All TCP and UDP packets have
been truncated to 20 bytes after the start of transport header. All UDP pay-
loads, except for port 23 (DNS) packets which are not altered, have been zeroed.
3fudp – http://sourceforge.net/projects/usoft/
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To ensure anonymity and privacy, the IP addresses in the captured traffic trace
have been mapped to 10.*.*.* using a one-to-one hash mapping. The one-to-one
mapping is performed sequentially so that the first real IP address observed is
replaced by 10.0.0.1, and the next new IP address is mapped to 10.0.0.2, and so
on. The sequential mapping pattern is preserved across the entire traffic trace.
For the purpose of experimentation, a subset of the entire dataset was used,
comprising nearly 1 hour of continuous bidirectional real-world network traffic
collected on the 1st December 2003. Before using this data, it was pre-processed.
The dataset was analysed to extract traffic destined for the busiest web-server
(destination IP address 10.0.0.63). The selected traffic was then processed to
remove TCP SYN attacks, which were the most common type. In order to
achieve this, TCP flows with less than 3 packets (and represents TCP SYN
attacks) were considered malicious and were removed. TCP flows with no data
from the web-server were also ignored. The processed (clean) data was then
converted into a one-way incoming traffic target at the destination web-server
10.0.0.63. The cleaned data was reproduced over the testbed (Figure 5.2) using
the Tcpreplay utility4. The cleaned network traffic trace was replayed at around
300 packets per second.
Table 3.2: Statistics of the Attack Traffic.
Number of Unique
Source IPs
Number of
Packets
Attack
Duration
(seconds)
Traffic Rate (Mbps)
35 342,141 134.38 1.01
40 328,579 129.35 1.01
45 321,433 129.29 1.01
50 313,747 123.23 1.01
100 237,831 93.49 1.01
150 201,020 86.83 1.01
Attack Traffic
The attack traffic, superimposed on the cleaned background traffic, was gener-
ated using the fudp utility. It was used to flood the target host (Figure 5.2)
with UDP packets having between 35 and 150 different source IP addresses. The
4Tcpreplay – http://tcpreplay.synfin.net/
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rationale for using this variation was to analyse the proposed algorithm under dif-
ferent attack conditions. It is acknowledged that attacks with a large number of
different source IP addresses (e.g. UDP flooding with 150 different source IP ad-
dresses per second) are relatively easier to detect compared to those with a small
number of different source IPs. The average packet rate for the attack traffic is
approximately 3000 packets per second (10 times the normal background traffic
rate). The attack traffic used for experimentation is summarised in Table 3.2.
Figure 3.3: The testbed architecture for evaluating the NSP algorithm
3.4.2 Experimental Set-up
A proof-of-concept evaluation of the proposed NSP algorithm using EWMA as
the change detection technique and bit vectors for IP address classification (as
previously described in Section 3.2.1) has been performed. Figure 5.2 shows the
testbed architecture used for evaluating the proposed technique.
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In the simple experimental set-up, three desktop machines were connected
via a layer-2 switch. Two of the three machines were used to generate network
traffic, one each for attack and normal (background) traffic. A mix of attack
and normal traffic was directed against a target host (victim) machine. All the
incoming traffic (normal and attack) to the victim was captured and used for an
off-line analysis and evaluation of the proposed NSP algorithm using the change
in the rate of source IP addresses to detect the onset of the HRF DDoS attack.
3.4.3 Performance Evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm, several separate
UDP flooding attack traffic datasets were configured with varying numbers of new
or NSP source IP addresses – 35, 40, 45, 50, 100, and 150 new IPs per second.
This traffic was then embedded in the normal (background) network traffic in
several separate experiments which replayed the composite traffic streams against
the target. The results of the experiments were analysed using 10 seconds as the
sampling interval. Figure 3.4 shows the result of the UDP flooding attack using
35 new source IP addresses per second.
In Figure 3.4, the horizontal axis represents the sampling intervals (10 sec-
ond), the left vertical axis is the number of new or NSP source IP addresses
in the measurement interval and the right vertical axis represents the EWMA
decision function with 1 being attack and 0 being no attack. The number of new
source IP addresses in the 10 second measurement interval was calculated using
the algorithm described in Section 3.1.
The UDP flooding attack with 35 source IPs started at measurement interval
260 and ended at interval 280, and was detected by the EWMA technique. Fig-
ure 3.4 naturally shows a large increase in the number of new IPs at the start.
The NSP algorithm was able to generate a list of legitimate IP addresses or white
list. A manual analysis of the generated white list was performed post attack to
check for the presence of any attack sources in the list. No attacking source IP
addresses were found in the white list (in any of the experiments). It should be
noted that the detection delay is bounded by the measurement interval, which
is set to 10 seconds for this experiment. All the attacks listed in Table 3.2 have
been detected in less than 10 seconds, which can be further reduced using smaller
measurement intervals.
Experiments using a higher number of source IP addresses per second for the
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(a) UDP flooding attack with 50 source IPs per second.
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(b) UDP flooding attack with 100 source IPs per second.
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(c) UDP flooding attack with 150 source IPs per second.
Figure 3.5: UDP flooding attack with varying source IPs per second.
UDP attack traffic were also conducted. Figures 3.5a, 3.5b and 3.5c show the
results of the UDP flooding attack using 50, 100 and 150 source IP addresses per
second respectively. A small gap (detection delay) observed around the 260th
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sampling interval, between the increase in the number of new source IPs and
the decision function’s output is due to the chosen value of k which looks for 3
consecutive changes in the observed parameter before flagging an actual change.
This is mainly done to minimise false detection which may potentially arise due
to erratic fluctuations in the parameters being observed. A lower value of k
will further reduce this detection delay; however, it would also make the detec-
tion process more vulnerable to small fluctuations in the observed parameter.
The proposed NSP algorithm successfully identified the attack instances in all
the UDP flooding attacks with varying number of new source IP addresses per
second.
3.5 DDoS Detection andMitigation Model (D2M2)
A workable solution to protect against DDoS attacks requires an accurate and
timely detection of the onset of attack. However, once a DDoS attack has been
successfully identified, the next step is to protect the system by mitigating the
impact of the attacks.
Figure 3.6: Deployment architecture of DDoS Detection and Mitigation Model.
Figure 3.6 presents a security architecture that has been designed as part
of a larger project5 to which the candidate has contributed. The architecture
intends to protect such a security device such as an application firewall, and
5A joint research project into DoS and DDoS attacks undertaken under the auspices of the
Australian and Indian Governments as part of the Australia-India Strategic Research Fund
(AISRF) 2008 – 2012.
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to ensure continuous service availability during DDoS attacks. Importantly, it
includes a DDoS Detection and Mitigation Model (D2M2) – a conceptual model
which can employ the different attack detection techniques developed as part
of this research, deployed in an off-line mode to protect a target server and its
application firewall.
The DDoS attack detection algorithm developed in this chapter (see Sec-
tion 3.2 for details) identifies a client white-list (a list of legitimate IP addresses)
which can then be dynamically downloaded to an application firewall. Prelim-
inary work in this regard was carried out to demonstrate the feasibility of the
design. In this proof-of-concept work, Apache was used as the web-server and
ModSecurity [2] as an application firewall. The white-list generated by the attack
detection technique was downloaded to the directory containing ModSecurity’s
main configuration file and the web-server gracefully restarted, thereby allow-
ing traffic only from the white-listed IPs. This demonstrated, at the conceptual
level the overall design goal of D2M2 to have a single component with integrated
DDoS attack detection and mitigation capabilities to protect a target host run-
ning an application firewall against HRF DDoS attacks. The future work section
in Chapter 7 expands on this work and suggests how it may be fully automated.
3.6 Conclusion
Notwithstanding the research conducted in DDoS attack detection over the past
decade, timely and reliable detection of such attacks remains a challenging prob-
lem. So too does the formulation and implementation of an effective attack
mitigation strategy.
The main contribution of this chapter is the design of a DDoS attack de-
tection technique based on new or NSP source IP addresses and its proof-of-
concept implementation and evaluation. The technique exploits a key character-
istic of DDoS attacks, viz., a marked increase in the number of new source IPs
accompanying the onset of a HRF DDoS attack than can transcend protocol-
specific defences, such as those that protect against specific types of flooding
attacks, such as SYN flood [49, 121]. The current implementation of the de-
tection technique, although post hoc, uses a single network traffic feature and
a lightweight data structure, and thus facilitates the detection of DDoS attacks
at ‘wire speed’, compared to computationally intensive machine learning-based
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models such as Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) [126] and Artificial Neural
Networks (ANN) [66].
Finally, this chapter has presented the conceptual design of a mitigation strat-
egy, which can employ the various detection strategies designed and developed
in the thesis, including that presented in this chapter.
Chapter 4
Identifying, Classifying, and
Modelling Flash Events
The previous chapter described the design, development and evaluation of a
DDoS attack detection technique based on the rate of arrival of new or Not Seen
Previously (NSP) source IP addresses, and provided a proof-of-concept imple-
mentation using bit vectors. However, this technique focused on detecting DDoS
attacks without considering Flash Events (FEs), a network anomaly sharing a
number of features with DDoS attacks. An FE refers to the situation that arises
when a large number of legitimate users concurrently send access requests to
a web-server. Examples of FEs include popular websites experiencing a surge
in incoming traffic during major world events (e.g., earthquakes, 9/11 attacks,
sporting events, newsworthy elections, etc).
Both DDoS attacks and FEs represent anomalies in the Internet traffic and
cause performance degradation. However, each of these network activities results
from a different section of the web-community with varied intentions. A precise
distinction between DDoS attacks and FEs is important because each requires
an entirely different set of actions to be undertaken by a network administrator
after they have been successfully identified. In order to understand how FEs
may be differentiated from similar looking DDoS attacks, a detailed study of
FEs and their characteristic features is needed. However, the relative lack of
public domain FE datasets hinders research in this area. The work presented in
this chapter addresses these issues by proposing a model that provides the foun-
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dations for both identifying and synthesising FEs. Thus, the chapter addresses
two research questions identified earlier – Research Question 2: Is it possible to
differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs? and Research Question 3: What are the
essential characteristics of different types of FE and is it possible to use those
characteristics to model and subsequently generate different types of synthetic FE
traffic? In the process it focuses on:
• the development and evaluation of a technique for distinguishing DDoS
attacks from FEs.
• the development of an FE model, which enables the generation of FE traffic
datasets.
The characteristic features of FEs explored in this chapter will be used in
tandem with some server-load based features, such as CPU and memory utili-
sation, to develop an ensemble-based DDoS attack and FE detection technique
in Chapter 6. The ensemble-based technique is designed to detect a variety of
DDoS attacks and to differentiate them from similar looking FEs.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 presents a set
of parameters viz., the change in rate of incoming traffic, the change in rate of
new source IP addresses, and the distribution of requests among source IP ad-
dresses, which can be used to differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs. Section 4.2
provides a detailed classification of FEs into three categories: predictable, un-
predictable and secondary. Section 4.3 presents a server-side FE model based
on three characteristics: change in Rate of Incoming Traffic, change in rate of
Source IP Addresses, and change in pattern of resources accessed. Section 4.4
presents the experimental results and validates the proposed model using real-
world datasets. The model presented in this section facilitates the generation of
synthetic FE traffic, using the traffic generation and testbed framework described
in Chapter 5, and is used where applicable in this thesis. Finally, Section 4.5
summaries the research presented in the chapter.
4.1 Distinguishing Flash Events and DDoS At-
tacks
Although both DDoS attacks and FEs are accompanied by a surge in the incom-
ing traffic volume, FEs are caused by legitimate clients, whereas DDoS attacks
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result from malicious activities usually carried out by a set of compromised ma-
chines. DDoS attacks can be crafted to look very similar to FEs, with only
the intent separating them from FEs, and not the actual traffic content. How-
ever, this criterion does not help in differentiating between the two. In order
to exploit the behavioural differences between these two class of events, in this
section a set of parameters are proposed which, while not completely orthogonal,
do capture different aspects of the incoming traffic, and can be used to efficiently
differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs.
4.1.1 Change in the Rate of Incoming Traffic
In a DDoS attack, the attacking machines or bots are often compromised via
malware (malicious software), which can be configured to send packets at a pre-
defined rate. In order to cause maximum damage, the bot-master triggers the
machines simultaneously. On receiving control commands from the bot-master,
the bots start sending huge amounts of data. Hence, the victim server often ex-
periences a sudden burst in incoming traffic over a relatively short period of time.
This unexpected surge causes the server to exceed its maximum pre-defined sus-
tainable limits, thereby slowing it down considerably, and in some cases forcing
it to shut down. In contrast, when a newsworthy event occurs, triggering an FE,
it is highly unlikely that the entire web community is simultaneously informed.
Instead, it takes times for the news to spread. Therefore, the incoming traffic to
the web server increases less rapidly over time as compared to a DDoS attack,
before reaching a maximum. It should thus be possible to use this difference in
the rate of incoming traffic to differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs.
4.1.2 Change in the Rate of New Source IP Addresses
DDoS attacks are usually conducted by a finite set of compromised machines also
known as a Botnet. Recent studies on Botnets define two terms related to their
size: the Botnet’s footprint and its live population [98]. A Botnet’s footprint is
the total number of infected machines at any point in its lifetime. A Botnet’s
live population is the number of bots currently available in the Command and
Control (C&C) channel. The bot-master takes control over these live-bots, and
issues commands, often using an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) server or a particular
channel on a public IRC server. Rajab et al. [98] estimated that even though
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the footprints of the Botnets tracked by them went as high as several tens of
thousands, their effective size i.e. the live population at any given point in their
lifetime was usually limited to a few thousand.
On the other hand, the number of web users accessing a popular website to
obtain information related to a special event is substantially greater than the
number of distinct bots. This difference in the total number of distinct machines
or source IP addresses – bots in the case of a DDoS attack and legitimate clients
in the case of a FE – forms the basis of the second parameter that can be used
to differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs.
In the case of a DDoS attack, since only a limited number of bots are avail-
able to the bot-master, to maximise their utilisation the bots are simultaneously
triggered. Thus, at the commencement of an attack, the victim host experiences
a large number of previously unseen or new source IP addresses, along with an
increase in incoming traffic. Due to a relatively small and finite set of com-
promised machines, the attacker uses nearly the same set of sources during the
course of the attack. Thus, after an initial burst of new source IP addresses, the
victim host receives traffic from relatively fewer new source IP addresses.
In contrast to a DDoS attack, during an FE, as the information related to the
event travels across the web community, more and more new users come online to
access the information. Hence, the web-server constantly experiences incoming
traffic from previously unseen or new source IP addresses. It is conjectured,
therefore, that change in the rate of new source IP addresses, as seen by the
target, can be used as one of the parametric differences between DDoS attacks
and FEs.
4.1.3 Distribution of Requests Among Source IP Addresses
In the case of a DDoS attack, since the attacker has control over a limited
number of compromised machines, he/she tries to achieve the desired maximum
load by forcing each bot to send a large number of requests. Hence, the sudden
surge in incoming traffic to the victim is mainly attributed to a high number of
requests per source IP address. In contrast to this, during an FE, the majority
of the clients are interested typically in a limited amount of information, hence a
relatively small number of requests originate from each client. It is conjectured,
therefore, that the excess load that the server experiences during an FE is mainly
due to an increase in the overall number of clients with a smaller request per client
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rate than is the case in a DDoS attack.
The three proposed parameters viz. the change in rate of incoming traffic, the
change in rate of new source IP addresses, and the distribution of requests among
source IP addresses, suggest a way to distinguish a real-world DDoS attack from
an FE. Section 4.1.4 presents the experiments conducted on the two publicly
available datasets to validate the proposed parameters.
4.1.4 Experimental Results and Analysis
The proposed parameters for distinguishing DDoS attacks from FEs were inves-
tigated and validated by analysing two publicly available datasets, representing
a real world FE and a real world DDoS attack. Each of the traces used in this
research is available in the public domain and contains traffic pattern informa-
tion relating to time, pseudonymised source and destination IP addresses, and
the request type.
It should be noted that, because of legal and privacy issues involved in ob-
taining real-world data, only a very limited number of datasets, representing
DDoS attacks and FEs, are publicly available. Thus, validation of the three
parameters proposed to differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs is limited to these
datasets. (Indeed, one of the research objectives of this thesis addresses this very
issue, i.e. the lack of public domain datasets, by designing a traffic generation
and testbed framework, cooperatively developed as a part of this research. This
framework, discussed in Chapter 5, consists of a modest hardware platform and
a software traffic generator, developed to synthetically generate different types
of DDoS attack and FE traffic which approximates to real-world scenarios.)
Flash Event Dataset The ‘1998 FIFA World Cup’ Dataset [12] is used as
the FE dataset for validating the proposed parameters. This dataset is provided
by the Internet Traffic Archive and contains all the requests made to the 1998
FIFA World Cup websites during a period of 92 days between 30th April 1998
and 26th July 26 1998. During this period, 33 different web servers were used
to host information related to the World Cup. These servers were located at
four different geographical locations: Paris (France), Plano (Texas), Herndon
(Virginia) and Santa Clara (California). A time resolution of 1-second was used
on all the servers. The time on each server was synchronised with the local time
in France (GMT + 0200), which was the host country. The source IP addresses
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in the traffic traces have been replaced by unique integer identifiers which are
preserved throughout the dataset. To ensure privacy, the mapping file for the
source IP address pseudonymisation is not publicly available.
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Figure 4.1: Incoming traffic profile of the 1998 FIFA World Cup dataset.
The FE dataset, available as web-server logs in Common Log Format (CLF)1
contains only the incoming HTTP requests (GET, POST, HEAD and OTHER)
made to one of the 33 servers hosting the 1998 FIFA World Cup content. Fig-
ure 4.1 shows the daily aggregates of incoming traffic volumes experienced by
the websites hosting the 1998 FIFA World Cup. Each of the individual peaks or
bursts of traffic is essentially a fine structure within the overall 92 day period,
and represents individual FEs on a smaller scale than the overall event [13]. This
chapter of the thesis focuses largely on the two FEs corresponding to the two
semi-final matches on the 73rd and the 74th days of the tournament. Figure 4.2
presents the incoming traffic volumes seen during the semi-final matches. For this
section, the incoming traffic around the 2nd semi-final is used as an FE dataset.
DDoS Attack Dataset The CAIDA ‘DDoS Attack 2007’ Dataset [51], repre-
senting a real-world DDoS attack, was used to validate the chosen parameters.
The dataset contains pseudonymised traces from a DDoS attack that occurred
on August 4, 2007 for approximately one hour (20:50:08 UTC to 21:56:16). The
dataset represents a type of attack in which the attacking machines attempt to
1http://httpd.apache.org/docs/current/logs.html
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Figure 4.2: Incoming traffic profile around the semi-final matches of the 1998
FIFA World Cup dataset.
block access to the target server by sending a large number of access requests,
and thus consume all the available computing resources, including the bandwidth
of the server’s Internet connection. The dataset contains the attack traces to the
victim and its responses, pseudonymised using prefix-preserving CryptoPAn via
a single key, and all packet payloads are removed. The entire CAIDA-dataset
is divided into 5-minute packet capture (pcap) files. From the complete DDoS-
dataset, only the one-way attack traffic going to the victim is used for analysis.
Figure 4.3 shows the one-way attack traffic of the DDoS-dataset. It shows
variations in the number of incoming packets (per minute) against time. After
the initial 25 minutes, the incoming packet rate rises abruptly. The maximum
traffic rate is attained at around the 35th minute, and is held nearly constant for
the remainder of the attack. Table 4.1 summarises the macro-level characteristics
of the two datasets (1998 FIFA World Cup and CAIDA) used for evaluation.
Using these two datasets, the following sections now present an evaluation
and validation of each of the three parameters proposed to differentiate DDoS
attacks from FEs – the change in rate of incoming traffic, the change in rate
of new source IP addresses, and the distribution of requests among source IP
addresses.
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Figure 4.3: Incoming traffic profile for the CAIDA dataset
Table 4.1: Macro-level Statistics of the 1998 FIFA World Cup and the CAIDA
dataset.
Characteristic Features 1998 FIFA World
Cup Dataset
CAIDA Dataset
Activity type Flash Event DDoS Attack
Duration 92 days 66 min
Packets type HTTP ICMP ECHO
Number of target(s) 33 1
Number of packets sent 1,352,804,107 359,655,826
File format Common Log Format pcap
Size (uncompressed) 8.1 GB 5.3 GB
Change in the Rate of Incoming Traffic
This section discusses the rate at which the incoming traffic appears at the server
or victim host in the cases of an FE or DDoS attack. The number of requests
or packets in both cases is considerably greater than in the normal situation i.e.
non FE and non DDoS traffic. The focus is on analysing the manner in which
the number of these incoming requests or packets increases in both cases. In
order to achieve this, the increasing part of the peaks for each of the two events
are compared. In the case of the DDoS attack, this period is represented by a
ten minute window starting at the 25th minute and ending at the 35th minute of
the CAIDA dataset (see Figure 4.3). Figure 4.4 shows the increasing part of the
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Figure 4.4: Incoming traffic profile for one 10 minute period (25th – 35th minute)
within the CAIDA dataset.
CAIDA dataset in terms of number of incoming requests per second. In the case
of the FE, the two hour interval (46th and 47th hours) during the 2nd semi-final
match of the World Cup i.e. the 74th day, is shown in Figure 4.5, which shows the
incoming traffic volume during these two hours. Table 4.2 gives the micro-level
statistics during the observation period for the FE and DDoS datasets.
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Figure 4.5: Incoming traffic profile for a two hour period (46th – 47th hour) during
the 2nd semi-final match of the 1998 FIFA World Cup dataset.
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The Figures 4.4 and 4.5 and the Table 4.2 demonstrate a clear difference in the
slopes for the two traffic profiles, thus validating the proposal that this feature can
be used as a distinguishable parameter to separate a real-world DDoS attack from
an FE. (Figure 4.4 also shows a sudden drop in the number of incoming packets
at time 210 seconds and 480 seconds, which may be due to the measurement
frequency (30 seconds) used in this analysis. The nature of the data and lack
of additional information makes it difficult to identify the exact cause of such
behaviour.)
Table 4.2: Micro-level statistics of the 1998 FIFA World Cup and the CAIDA
dataset during the observation period.
Characteristic Features 2nd Semi-final of the
1998 FIFA World
Cup Dataset
CAIDA Dataset
Observation time 2 hours 10 mins
Number of Requests/Packets 15,698,000 74,478,486
Number of Source IPs 41,566 8,585
Requests per source IP 377.66 8675.42
Change in the Rate of New Source IP Addresses
This section presents an analysis of the rate of increase in new source IP addresses
as a characteristic feature which can differentiate a DDoS attack from an FE. As
discussed in Section 4.1, in the case of a DDoS attack, the attacker has control
over a finite set of compromised machines. Activation of the bots produces a
gigantic traffic load on the target host coming from a set of sources which have
not been previously seen. Therefore, it produces a sharp increase in the new
source IP addresses synchronised with the onset of the attack. This limited set
of compromised machines is used continually during the attack to produce the
desired effect. In other words, this means that once the attack starts, the target
host rarely sees any new source IP addresses.
Figure 4.6a shows the changes in the new source IP addresses, as seen by the
target host, for the CAIDA dataset over five minute sampling intervals or history
periods. Similar experiments were conducted using a smaller sampling interval
of one minute, and the results are shown in Figure 4.6b. Both these figures, 4.6a
and 4.6b, support the conjecture that with the onset of the DDoS attack, the
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(a) New source IP addresses using a five minute history period.
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(b) New source IP addresses using a one minute history period.
Figure 4.6: New source IP addresses for the CAIDA dataset.
number of previously unseen or new source IP addresses increases abruptly, and
remains fairly low and constant for the remaining duration of the attack.
By contrast, during an FE, the web server observes a relatively constant or
slowly increasing rate of new IP addresses, quite unlike a DDoS attack. Fig-
ure 4.7a shows the change in rate of new source IP addresses, using a five minute
sampling interval, as seen by the target host, for the FE dataset. It shows that,
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Figure 4.7: New source IP addresses for a two hour period (46th – 47th hour)
during the 2nd semi-final match of the 1998 FIFA World Cup dataset.
apart from the initial five minutes, the number of new sources accessing the
server remains fairly constant. Using a small sampling period of one minute,
the experimental results in Figure 4.7b show that the gradual increase in the
number of new IP addresses is still very different from the DDoS attack, where
the increase is more abrupt. Hence, the change in the rate of new source IP
addresses can be used to distinguish between FEs and DDoS attacks.
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Figure 4.8: Requests per source IP distribution for the CAIDA and a subset of
the 1998 FIFA World Cup dataset.
Distribution of Requests Among Source IP Addresses
Table 4.2 shows a marked difference in average requests per IP and an analysis
of the distribution of the requests per IP appears in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8 shows that in the case of an FE, 90% of the total clients contribute
less than 10% of the total outgoing traffic, which is distinctly different from
a DDoS attack, where the distribution of traffic is more uniform amongst the
source IP addresses. Thus, the distribution of requests per source IP clearly
distinguishes DDoS attacks from FEs.
An important observation that can be drawn from this analysis is that the
majority of traffic in the case of an FE is generated by a small percentage of
the overall participating clients, less than 10% in this case. The source IPs
sending large numbers of requests are suspected to be network proxies hiding a
large number of private source IPs behind a comparatively small set of public
IPs. Another possible explanation could be the presence of web-crawlers or web-
spiders, which often send very large numbers of requests within a short time
interval.
One of the differences between a proxy and a client, as pointed out by Krish-
namurthy et al. [59], is the think time. A proxy has a lower think time than a
client and hence it issues more requests per time interval compared to a client.
In other words, the inter-arrival-time (IAT) for packets coming from a proxy is
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Figure 4.9: Packet IAT comparison for proxy and client from the the 1998 FIFA
World Cup dataset.
smaller and stays fairly constant compared to packets coming from clients which
have a large and variable think time.
This behavioural difference is shown by Figure 4.9, which compares the inter-
arrival-time for packets from two different IPs within the FE dataset used in this
analysis i.e. the two hour interval (46th and 47th hours) during the 2nd semi-final
match of the World Cup. Packets arriving from two different IPs were extracted
from the dataset, one IP hypothesised to be a proxy, corresponding to an IP
address sending a large number of requests, and the other hypothesised to be a
client, corresponding to an IP sending a relatively small number of requests. The
inter-arrival-time of packets originating from these two source IPs was computed
and compared, and this comparison is shown in Figure 4.9. The client was ‘alive’
for just 624 seconds, from the 6167 second mark to the 6790 second mark.
It is conjectured that the evolution of botnet behaviour to mimic the variable
IATs characteristic of FEs is just around the corner, and presents a possible threat
to the successful use of IATs to differentiate botnet traffic from FEs. Future work
may explore both this threat and possible counter-measures based on identifying
IAT distributions per IP.
This led to the analysis of traffic during the first 25 minutes of the CAIDA
dataset. The packet rate for this period is considerably lower than the rest of the
dataset, therefore it is considered as non-attack or normal traffic. Figure 4.10
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Figure 4.10: Requests per source IP distribution for traffic during the first 25
minute of the CAIDA dataset.
shows the distribution of outgoing traffic among the clients for the non-attack
traffic of the CAIDA dataset. The experimental results look very similar to
those observed during the FE dataset (Figure 4.8). The total number of unique
sources responsible for the normal traffic (183) is very small as compared to
the ones responsible for DDoS attack (8585). In summary, Figure 4.8 shows a
noticeable difference between the distribution of outgoing requests among the
source IPs which can be used to distinguish between these two class of events.
4.2 Flash Event Classification
It is argued in this section that FEs may be divided into three broad categories:
predictable, unpredictable and secondary. Research presented by Jung et al. [54]
briefly describes the predictable and unpredictable nature of FEs. This section of
the chapter extends that work by presenting a detailed classification of FEs based
on a few real-world examples, and then uses that classification in Section 4.3 to
propose a general server-side FE model.
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4.2.1 Predictable Flash Events
A predictable FE (henceforth pFE), is one whose expected occurrence is known
a priori, thus allowing network administrators to prepare for it by using various
provisioning techniques, such as the use of load-sharing mechanisms or Content
Distribution Networks (CDNs) [54]. Some popular examples are product re-
leases (e.g. by hi-tech companies like Apple), widely followed sporting events
such as the Olympics, or online play-along websites for popular television pro-
grams, where the expected time of the incoming traffic burst is well known in
advance. The time when the incoming traffic will hit its peak can also be fairly
accurately estimated, so permitting better handling and provisioning for such
events. Moreover, most pFEs are directed against servers owned by big compa-
nies, who can afford the necessary load or content-sharing techniques to mitigate
their effects. The 1998 FIFA World Cup dataset [12], described in Section 4.1.4,
is one of the few datasets available in the public domain representative of a pFE.
Figure 4.2 shows incoming traffic of two such pFEs, the semi-final matches of
the 1998 FIFA World Cup.
4.2.2 Unpredictable Flash Events
Events that are totally unexpected can, if sufficiently newsworthy, also cause a
sudden and dramatic surge in network traffic to a site that is supposed to describe
the event or provide further leads. The term unpredictable FE (henceforth uFE)
is used to describe the ensuing burst of network traffic. Provisioning for these
events in advance is akin to preparing for natural catastrophes like a tsunami
or an earthquake. Designing systems to handle them is possible but may be
economically infeasible due to their unpredictability and rarity. The 9/11 terror
attack led to such an uFE when major news websites like CNN and MSNBC were
overwhelmed by the amount of incoming traffic, pushing their availability close
to 0% within minutes after its occurrence [52]. The start and peak-load time of
such events is unpredictable and sometimes difficult to identify even post hoc.
Their frequency of occurrence is relatively lower than for pFEs. Figure 4.11 is an
example of an uFE when the popular website Wikipedia experienced a sudden
increase in its hourly hits following the death of Steve Jobs [73]. Similar traffic
was also observed following the death of Michael Jackson [73].
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Figure 4.11: Incoming traffic profile for an unpredictable FE dataset: hourly hits
on Wikipedia following the death of Steve Jobs.
4.2.3 Secondary Flash Events
The third category of FE is what this work calls a secondary FE (henceforth
sFE). These events usually occur when a brief article, along with a web-link is
posted on widely followed websites like Slashdot or Facebook. This link is often
related to an interesting news item, although not as newsworthy an event on a
world-wide scale as a uFE. This can capture the attention of a large number of
followers and redirect a high percentage of them to another website in search
of additional information. When these (usually user-posted) articles contain
links to poorly resourced websites, they can easily result in the redirection of
an unprecedented amount of traffic to those small websites, which exceeds their
available resources and eventually cripples them. Once again, the event (article
posting) is unpredictable, and the peak-load time is likewise relatively difficult
to predict. Provisioning for such events can be challenging but is more feasible
than for uFEs, due to the smaller nature of the event.
Anderson [10] shows the incoming traffic patterns of an sFE when the geolog-
ical department web-server at Southern Methodist University was listed on the
front page of Slashdot on June 15, 2003 and August 10, 2003. While the former
posting on Slashdot briefly described their research on a two-wheel balancing
robot, the later posting was on ‘two-headed’ virtual web servers, thus attracting
a large number hits from people interested in technology. The receiving server,
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on both the occasions, experienced a ‘phase-transition’ from virtually no traffic
to heavy traffic in a short time. Thus, in the case of this sFE, the incoming
traffic pattern was similar to that of a uFE, as shown in Figure 4.11.
Table 4.3: Flash Event Classification.
FEs Predictable
Start-time
Predictable
Peak-load
Time
Typical
Peak Value
Provisioning OccurrenceFrequency
pFE Yes Yes Medium Feasible High
uFE No No High Not Feasible Low
sFE No No Medium Not Feasible Moderate
Table 4.3 summarises the classification of FEs in terms of Predicted Start-
time, Predicted Peak-load Time, Typical Peak Value, Provisioning and Occur-
rence Frequency. Most pFEs are against web-servers which can afford the cost
of web-content outsourcing though CDNs and other load sharing mechanisms.
Hence, even during peak load they are not as badly affected as those subjected
to sFEs and uFEs, e.g. a Slashdotted website or various news websites after a
large scale natural calamity.
4.3 Flash Event Model
The server-side FE model presented in this section is based on the hypothesis that
an FE can be described in terms of the following three components: change in the
rate of Incoming Traffic, change in the rate of Source IP Addresses, and change in
the pattern of resources accessed during the FE. The model is a variation of the
three parameters proposed in Section 4.1 to differentiate FEs from DDoS attacks.
The differences are the use of changes in the number of source IPs per sampling
interval, instead of NSP IPs per sampling interval, and the use of changes in the
web-resource access pattern, instead of the traffic distribution across IPs. The
web resource access pattern was not used in the set of parameters used earlier to
differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs (Section 4.1) because it is not present in the
DDoS attack datasets, although it can be derived from (the FE) web-server logs.
While this chapter proposes a general server-side FE model, it is acknowledged
that not all components used in the model apply equally to all types of FE.
In the following section the model is developed with respect to these three
components. The relation of each component to the overall FE model is discussed
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in the following sections. However, a full mathematical model is only developed
for the change in the rate of incoming traffic.
4.3.1 Change in the Rate of Incoming Traffic
In contrast to a DDoS attack, during an FE (or more precisely during a secondary
or unpredictable FE) it is unlikely that the entire web community is simultane-
ously informed and goes online to get additional information. It usually takes
time for the news that is the root cause of an FE to spread across the world.
On the other hand, during a predictable FE, the section of the web community
interested in that event has prior information about its occurrence, and hence
concurrently goes online to access the related information. In each case, how-
ever, even though the incoming traffic to the web-server increases sharply, the
results show that it is generally not as immediate as in a DDoS attack, assuming
that it does not mimic an FE. Figure 4.3 shows the rate of incoming traffic for
the CAIDA ‘DDoS Attack 2007 Dataset’[51]. Contrasting this with Figures 4.2
and 4.11 shows that the rate of increase in incoming traffic for this DDoS attack
at least is much higher than for an FE. (Note that whereas Figure 4.3 shows
Time in ‘minutes’, Figures 4.2 and 4.11 show it in ‘hours’).
Let Af or the ‘traffic amplification factor’ be the ratio of the ‘peak request
rate’ (Rp) to the ‘average normal request rate’ (Rn), as observed by a web-
server during an FE, similar to the shock_level parameter of [11]. Rn and Rp
are expressed as the number of incoming requests per unit time. The traffic
amplification factor (Af ) may thus be written as:
Af =
Rp
Rn
(4.1)
Af can be set to different values to simulate various FE scenarios. An FE is con-
sidered to have two major phases: a flash-phase and a decay-phase. A further
‘plateau period’ or sustained traffic phase between these two phases, as proposed
in [11, 24], appears to be extremely short-lived and orders of magnitude smaller
than that of the other two phases in the observed data. The analysis of real-world
datasets in Section 4.4 also shows the absence of any such plateau period. The
flash-phase is defined as the part of an FE where the web-server experiences a
significant increase in the incoming traffic, at the end of which incoming traffic
reaches its maximum. The duration of the flash-phase is denoted by ∆Tf and
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represents the time it takes for the normal request rate (Rn) to reach the maxi-
mum i.e. Rp. Decay-phase is defined as the period of the FE when the incoming
traffic to the web-server subsides and goes back to ‘normal’ at the end of the
phase, and the time taken to do so is written as ∆Td.
There appears to be a difference in the relationship between the durations of
these two phases for the three different types of FEs. In the case of a pFE such
as a football match (and indeed many sporting events), the event has a duration,
from the start through to its completion. So while the ‘event of interest’ is the
final score, which should arguably correspond to the peak load, there is arguably
nonetheless an increasing load throughout the whole of the event. At a point
close to event completion, one would expect the traffic volume to peak, and
the rate of incoming requests to the web-server to quickly decline and return to
‘normal’. If the web-server has difficulty in handling the peak volume of requests,
then increases in the server response time owing to network congestion may force
users onto secondary sources of information, thus causing a still faster decline in
the incoming traffic rate. For these reasons it is posited that for a pFE the decay
time is comparable and possibly less than the build-up time. Thus, for a pFE
∆Tf > ∆Td
However, in the case of uFEs and sFEs, there is no such time-based ‘end of
event’. Long after the actual occurrence of the event, some section of the web-
user community, previously unknowing of it, will become interested in it. Thus,
there is a slow and gradual decay in the incoming request rate for sFEs and uFEs
as compared to pFEs. Therefore, it can be said that the flash-phase has a much
smaller duration than the decay-phase in sFEs and uFEs. Hence, for a sFE and
uFE
∆Tf  ∆Td
The relationship between the durations of these two phases – flash-phase
and decay-phase, especially for unpredictable and secondary FEs, is similar to
that proposed by Ari et al. [11]. Their proposed model focused on modelling
the duration of each phase (ramp-up, sustained and ramp-down) for unexpected
FEs directed against ‘poor’ websites that cannot afford CDNs. Their model
(Figure 4.12) defines the duration of ramp-down phase (t3− t2, ∆Td in our case)
as ‘n’ (constant) times the sustained-phase duration (t2 − t1).
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Figure 4.12: Traffic profile of an FE model proposed by Ari et al. [11]
The two phases of an FE, the flash-phase and the decay-phase, are now dis-
cussed in detail, and separately modelled.
Flash-phase
During an FE, the excess load on the server is mainly due to an increase in the
overall number of clients accessing web-resources rather than in the number of
requests per client [54]. Apart from a small percentage of enthusiastic clients,
the majority of the clients participating in an FE are mostly interested in a very
specific set of information related to that event [54]. Thus, it is expected that the
average number of requests per participating client remains relatively constant
during an FE.
When a newsworthy event occurs, as in the case of a uFE or an sFE, while it
takes finite time for the news related to the event to spread across the world, it
does so as a result of more and more people getting interested and propagating the
information. This leads to a dramatic increase in the interested user population,
which can be represented in terms of the classic exponential growth model used
in many other domains such as worm propagation [132]. The exponential growth
in user population appears intuitive for uFEs and sFEs more so than for pFEs.
However, the proposed model has been tested against all three types of FE, and
the experimental results are presented in Section 4.4.
These two propositions of relatively constant per client request rate and ex-
ponential growth in the interested client population lead to the increase in the
rate of incoming requests being proportional to the current rate i.e. the rate of
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incoming requests varies with time (t) as:
dR
dt
= αR (4.2)
where α is defined as the flash-constant.
Integrating both sides w.r.t time (t) yields the following equation:
lnR = αt+ C (4.3)
where C is the constant of integration.
Assuming that the flash-phase starts at time t = to where R = Rn and
substituting these values into 4.3 we get:
lnRn = αto + C (4.4)
Using 4.3 and 4.4 we get:
lnR− lnRn = α(t− to)
R = Rne
α(t−to) (4.5)
The end of the flash-phase is marked by time t = tf where the incoming
request rate reaches the peak, i.e. R = Rp = Af × Rn (using Equation 4.1).
Substituting these values gives the flash-constant (α) as:
α =
lnAf
(tf − to)
Substituting α in 4.5, the value for the incoming traffic during the flash-phase
(i.e. for to < t 6 tf ) is obtained as:
R = Rne
lnAf
(tf−to)
(t−to) (4.6)
Flash-phase.
The start of the flash-phase i.e. to and the time of the peak request rate (Rp)
can be determined post hoc, visually or in real-time using a change detection
technique discussed in Chapter 2. The exponential increase of the incoming
traffic during the flash-phase differs from the research presented in [11, 24] which
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models the ramp-up phase as a linear function, while [123] defines flash crowds
using a quadratic growth model.
Decay-phase
At the start of this phase, the number of incoming requests is at its peak and
starts to decline. Three possible reasons are speculated for this behaviour.
1. by this time most interested users have the information they were looking
for and have thus moved on.
2. the main web-server hosting the information reaches its serving capacity
and thus starts rejecting new connections.
3. a prolonged response time from the primary web-server starts to annoy
users, forcing them either to return later or to look for other sources of
information (secondary servers).
The last point intuitively suggests that a growth, possibly exponential, in the
number of secondary servers, providing the same information as the primary
server, contributes to the exponential decay in the number of incoming requests
to the main web-server. Hence, it is argued that during the decay-phase, the rate
of incoming requests (R) decreases with time (t) as follows:
dR
dt
= −βR (4.7)
where β is a decay-constant. Integrating and substituting the boundary condi-
tions (at t = tf , R = Rp and at t = td, R = Rn) the decay-constant (β) can be
specified as:
β =
lnAf
(td − tf )
and, the incoming traffic model during the decay-phase i.e. for tf < t 6 td as:
R = Rpe
− lnAf
(td−tf )
(t−tf ) (4.8)
Decay-phase.
where Rp = Af × Rn (from Equation 4.1). The exponential decay model
of incoming traffic during the decay-phase (Equation 4.8) differs from [11, 24],
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which show a linear ramp-down and [123], which models only the ramp-up phase.
For the duration before the flash-phase (0 < t 6 to) and after the decay-phase
(t > td) it is assumed that the rate of incoming requests remains constant, i.e.
R = Rn (4.9)
Pre Flash-phase and Post Decay-phase.
In summary, the model describes the incoming traffic volume for each of the
two main phases of an FE i.e. flash-phase and decay-phase in terms of exponential
growth and exponential decay. An FE is represented as a set of three equations
(4.6, 4.8 and 4.9) with few configurable parameters (Rn, Rp, to, tf and td), which
can be tuned to represent different FEs.
4.3.2 Change in the Rate of Source IP Addresses
The dramatic increase in the number of incoming requests during an FE can be
attributed to either a substantial increase in the number of requests per par-
ticipating client, or to an increase in the overall population interested in that
particular event, or a combination of the two. Based on two FE datasets, Jung
et al. [54] concluded that the per-client request rate does not increase, but rather
drops and remains lower during FEs compared to other times. The analysis of
a pFE dataset presented in Section 4.4 of this chapter shows somewhat different
results. It shows a slight increase in the number of requests per client with the
onset of a FE. But it also shows that the overall increase in incoming traffic
volume is mainly due to an increase in the interested population.
The analysis of a publicly available dataset presented in Section 4.4 shows
how the rate of source IPs increases with the onset of an FE (i.e. at t = t0)
and continues to increase during the flash-phase before starting to decline over
the decay-phase. Thus, during the course of an FE, variations in the number of
source IPs would be expected to closely resemble variations in the incoming traffic
volume. Nonetheless, there are some reasons why the model for traffic rate may
not necessarily be applicable to source IPs, there are some complicating factors.
Firstly, the number of requests per client may not be constant in all cases, and
secondly, IP mapping (NAT, DHCP) may have the effect of invalidating the
assumption that the number of clients is equivalent to the number of source IPs,
thus affecting the assumption of constant packets per IP. The latter reason is
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similar to a previously discussed (see Section 4.1.3 for details) characteristic of
FEs where the majority of traffic appeared to be generated by a small percentage
of participating clients or source IPs, suspected to be network proxies hiding a
large number of private IPs behind a comparatively small set of public IPs.
4.3.3 Change in the Pattern of Resources Accessed
The third component that has been used to understand and model FEs is the
‘randomness of the resources’ being accessed. It is hypothesised that during an
FE, the majority of the participating population are normally interested in a
very specific set of information relating to that event e.g. results of a soccer
match (pFE), an article on a news website related to an unpredictable event like
9/11 attacks (uFE), or an interesting story on a website referred from Slashdot
or Facebook (sFE). In other words, this translates into a greater concentration
of resources being accessed during the event as compared to the pre-event or
post-event period.
The analysis of a publicly available dataset presented in Section 4.4 confirms
this hypothesis in the case of a predictable FE. The number of different resources
being accessed during the course of a pFE decreases considerably compared to
other times. Even though the trend in resources being accessed during unpre-
dictable and secondary FEs is expected to be similar to that of predictable FEs,
this cannot be verified due to the lack of publicly available datasets containing
‘resource accessed’ information for unpredictable and secondary FEs.
Entropy, or the degree of randomness, has been used as the metric to measure
the resources accessed component of the proposed FE model. Section 4.4 presents
the analysis of this component. The (normalised) resource entropy starts to
decrease, from its average value with the onset of the FE, and continues to drop
for the rest of the flash-phase, when most of the interested population start
looking for specific information and thereby access a finite set of resources. Once
the event peaks, at the start of the decay-phase, the majority of the interested
population has already got hold of the information they were after, and hence
the randomness of resources being accessed starts to increase until the end of
this phase, before returning to normal.
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4.4 FE Model Evaluation and Validation
Legal and privacy issues associated with the publication of real-world datasets
results in only a very limited number of datasets being publicly available. Al-
though some of these are old, they represent real FEs, mostly pFEs, and exhibit
some, unfortunately not all, of the key characteristics that might be used to
define an FE. This section uses the datasets described in Section 4.4.1 below to
validate the FE model to the extent possible given the limitations of the datasets.
4.4.1 Datasets
The datasets used in the FE model analysis are described below and summarised
in Table 4.4.
Predictable FE (pFE) Dataset: 1998 FIFA World Cup A subset of the
1998 FIFA World Cup Dataset [12] (henceforth referred to as the pFE-dataset)
described in Section 4.1.4 is used as the base predictable FE dataset in this
thesis in general. In this section, pFE-dataset contains approximately 20 hours
of incoming traffic around the 1st semi-final match of the 1998 FIFA World Cup
is used for FE model analysis and evaluation. Similar results were obtained in
analysing the 2nd semi-final match of the same tournament.
Unpredictable FE (uFE) Dataset: Hourly Hits on Wikipedia The
‘Hourly Hits on Wikipedia’ (henceforth referred to as the uFE-dataset) is used
as the base unpredictable FE dataset for the analysis. This uFE-dataset, briefly
discussed in Section 4.2.2, was provided by Domas Mituzas, who maintains a
repository of page view statistics for various Wikimedia projects2. The records
following Steve Jobs’ death were selected as representative of a uFE. The dataset
provides hourly aggregates of requests and covers a period of 43 hours (starting
16:00 hours UTC, 5th October 2011) as shown in Figure 4.11. Similar traffic was
also observed following the death of Michael Jackson [73].
Secondary FE (sFE) Dataset: Slashdotted Website Since there were no
public domain datasets representing an sFE, high-level statistics of the empirical
2http://dumps.wikimedia.org/other/pagecounts-raw/
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Table 4.4: Datasets Used for Analysing Flash Event Model.
Datasets Duration
(hours)
Granularity Number of
Packets
Number of
Source IPs
Number of
Unique
Resources
FE Type
1st Semi-final
(1998 FIFA
World Cup)
20 seconds 42,373,729 160,704 38,892 pFE
Wikipedia Hits
(Steve Jobs)
43 hours 7,417,070 N/A N/A uFE
Slashdotted
Website
(15th June)
80 hours 1,042,751 N/A N/A sFE
data available from [10] was used. This dataset is incomplete, as it lacks informa-
tion related to source IP addresses and the resources accessed, but it still shows
the incoming network activity on the web-server of the Department of Geologi-
cal Sciences at the Southern Methodist University after their website was listed
on the front page of Slashdot on June 15, 2003 and August 10, 2003, following
the posts related to a two-wheel balancing robot, and two-headed virtual web
servers respectively. Hence, only the traffic volume component can be validated.
Statistical information of the Slashdot event occurring on June 15, 2003 has been
used for the analysis.
Analysis of the above datasets in terms of the three components that have
been used to model an FE i.e. change in Rate of Incoming Traffic, change in
rate of source IPs generating that traffic, and change in pattern of web-resources
being accessed during the FE, is now presented.
4.4.2 Change in the Rate of Incoming Traffic
Figure 4.13 shows the actual incoming traffic volume over a 20-hour period
around the 1st semi-final match during the 1998 FIFA World Cup. The in-
coming traffic volume is represented as the number of packets received per one
minute sampling interval. The rate of incoming packets before and after the FE
is roughly constant. This feature is represented by equation (4.9) of the proposed
model. The match starts around the 420 minute mark on the x-axis (to), con-
tinues for the next 162 minutes (∆Tf ), before ending at around the 580 minute
mark (td). The 1st semi-final match extended into a penalty shoot-out phase.
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Figure 4.13: Incoming traffic during the 1st semi-final match of the 1998 FIFA
World Cup dataset.
During the flash-phase, Rn increased by a factor of nearly twelve.
Except for the FIFA World Cup dataset, the other datasets were only avail-
able with hourly time resolution. Hence, for comparison purposes, a sampling
interval of one hour has been used for the FIFA World Cup dataset to find the
values of the model parameters (Rn, Rp, to, tf , td) as shown in Table 4.5. The
time-based parameters (to, tf , and td) indicate the instances of time (in hours)
when different phases started and ended. Although these instances of time were
determined visually, they could also be detected in real-time by using the Change
Point Analysis (CPA) technique discussed in Chapter 2.
The request rates (Rn and Rp) were calculated (for pFE) and observed (for
uFE and sFE) on a per-hour basis for comparative analysis. (Due to the nature of
the dataset available for uFE (hourly aggregates) and sFE (high-level statistic of
the empirical data), the request rates were observed for these FEs, as compared
to pFE-dataset, where the rates were calculated from the data available as web-
server logs in Common Log Format (CLF).) Table 4.5 also shows the values
for derived parameters viz. the incoming Traffic Amplification Factor (Af ), α
(flash-constant), β (decay-constant), and the duration of flash and decay phase
i.e. ∆Tf and ∆Td, for the three datasets used.
It is interesting to note that the incoming traffic amplifies (Af ) by nearly 600
times in case of the unpredictable FE (uFE) e.g. the hourly hits on Wikipedia
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Figure 4.14: Packets per Source IP during the 1st semi-final match of the 1998
FIFA World Cup dataset.
following the death of Steve Jobs. This substantial increase in incoming traffic,
combined with the relative infrequency and unpredictability of such an event,
makes it less feasible to have any provisioning for such events. Another observa-
tion is the rate at which the incoming traffic increases and decreases for each FE
as determined by α (flash-constant) and β (decay-constant) respectively. These
constants have comparable values for the two pFEs, whereas in sFEs and uFEs
they differ substantially. In the latter cases the incoming traffic tends to fade-off
at a much slower pace as compared to the build-up phase, whereas for the pFEs
the incoming traffic appears to increase and decrease at similar speeds. These
parameters are configured and used in the following chapter to generate different
types of FE traffic, to mimic real-world scenarios.
4.4.3 Change in the Rate of Source IP Addresses
As mentioned previously, it is expected that the per-client request rate will be al-
most constant during the event. The analysis of the 1st semi-final match dataset,
however, somewhat deviates from this speculation, and instead shows an approx-
imately 18% increase in the average per-client request for the duration of the FE
(including both the flash-phase and the decay-phase), as compared to the pre-
flash-event times i.e. before the start of the flash-phase. The average per-client
request rate during the flash-phase increases even more, by nearly 24%, compared
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Figure 4.15: Source IPs during the 1st semi-final match of the 1998 FIFA World
Cup dataset.
to the pre-flash-event times. This increase in the average per-client request rate
could perhaps be attributed to the ‘enthusiastic section’ of the interested pop-
ulation trying to get additional information regarding the event, as compared
to others. Figure 4.14 shows the number of requests per source IP against time
for the 1st semi-final. Notwithstanding this increase, it is the overall increase
in the participating population that causes the dramatic surge in the incoming
traffic during the FE. Figure 4.15 shows the rate of increase and decrease of
source IPs during the event. It varies in a similar fashion to the incoming traffic
(Figure 4.13).
Thus it can be concluded that during an FE, the majority of the traffic
increase is due to an increase in the overall participating population, although
there is also a slight increase in the per-client request rate as compared to the
non-flash period. This result differs from [54], which states that the per-client
request rate drops and remains lower during the flash period as compared to
other time periods.
4.4.4 Change in the Pattern of Resources Accessed
As the news causing the FE spreads across the Web, more and more people go
online to get the related information. It is argued that a majority of the partici-
pating population is generally interested in obtaining a specific set of information
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Figure 4.16: Resources access pattern during the 1st semi-final match of the 1998
FIFA World Cup dataset.
from the web-server. Thus the number of different resources being accessed by
the client during a FE should be lower than during non-flash-event times. One
way to measure this attribute is Shannon’s entropy [103], a measure of the uncer-
tainty associated with a random variable. The entropy H of a discrete random
variable X with n possible outcomes x1, x2...xn, measured in bits, is given by
H(X) = −
n∑
i=1
p(xi)log2p(xi)
where p(xi) is the probability associated with the outcome xi. The entropy
H(X) is minimum at 0 when all the values xi have a probability 1, i.e. there is
no uncertainty with the outcomes of the random variable X. The entropy attains
a maximum value of log2n when all the values xi have equal probability 1/n i.e.
a maximal uncertainty about the outcomes of the random variable X. Dividing
by log2n gives the normalized entropy H0(X) with values ranging between 0 and
1, and is defined as:
H0(X) = H(X)/log2n
For the analysis of the accessed resources component of the proposed FE
model, random variable X represents a unique web-resource being accessed and
the probability pi of each resource represents its relative frequency of occurrence
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Figure 4.17: FE model validation for a predictable FE (1st Semi-final of the 1998
FIFA World Cup).
in each one minute interval. Experiments conducted for one-second and five-
minute intervals gave similar results. Figure 4.16 shows a drop at the onset
of the event in the normalised resource entropy which stays low for the entire
duration of the event.
4.4.5 Model Validation
This section reviews the above results in order to attempt to evaluate the extent
to which they validate the proposed model. Unfortunately, the datasets do not
provide all the information required to do this in any comprehensive fashion.
Due to the fact that the sFE and uFE datasets provide neither IP nor resource
information, the evaluation is necessarily limited to the first feature, namely the
change in the rate of incoming traffic. Also since the dataset for an unpredictable
FE (Wikipedia hits following Steve Jobs’ death) had ‘hours’ as the granularity
level, the same granularity level (hours) has been used for the predictable FE
(1998 FIFA World Cup) dataset.
Figure 4.17 plots the number of incoming requests against time for the real
pFE data and the synthetic data generated using the proposed FE model. During
the flash-phase of the original pFE data, a ‘belly’ shape is observed between time
7 and 10 hours. It seems to reflect a faster initial increase in the incoming traffic
in the original data than the proposed model. This belly shape is followed by a
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Figure 4.18: FE model validation for an unpredictable FE (hourly hits on
Wikipedia following the death of Steve Jobs).
tailing off towards the peak. This deviation is discussed in the future work section
of the final chapter of this thesis. The proposed model, however, mimics the
decay-phase of the pFE more closely than the flash-phase. It also conforms with
the speculation made earlier about the relative absence of the sustained-phase.
The proposed model when applied to the unpredictable FE data (Wikipedia hits
following Steve Jobs’ death), interestingly, follows the flash-phase more closely
than the decay-phase. Figures 4.18 compares real and synthetic data for uFE
generated using the proposed FE model for incoming traffic.
Notwithstanding the limitations imposed on the evaluation by the datasets,
it seems that a simple exponential model, with few configurable parameters, can
be used to capture the essential characteristics of an FE. This, it is argued, can
then be used to generate realistic FE traffic, thereby facilitating research in FE
detection and their differentiation from DDoS attacks.
4.5 Conclusion
The existing problem of accurate and reliable DDoS attack detection is aggra-
vated by the existence of FEs, a network anomaly sharing a number of similar
characteristics with DDoS attacks. Hence an accurate detection of FEs and
their distinction from DDoS attacks is important. The research presented in this
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chapter has addressed this problem by exposing some subtle differences between
these two network anomalies, and has presented an FE model. The two main
contributions of this chapter are:
• The development and evaluation of a technique for differentiating DDoS
attacks from FEs, and
• A server-side model of an FE which enables synthetic traffic generation of
different types of FE.
The proposed FE model is more detailed and precise than earlier proposed
models, and has been partially validated against public domain datasets. It
differs from models proposed by Ari [11] and Bodik [24] which presented the
ramp-up and ramp-down phase as a linear function, and included a sustained
traffic phase, which was not found in our analysis. It also differs from Wendell’s
model [123], which only models the ramp-up phase using a quadratic growth
function.
Regarding the first contribution, it is acknowledged that there are marked
dissimilarities between the datasets used for evaluation. However, the datasets
used in the analysis are possibly the only publicly available and complete datasets
representing a DDoS attack and an FE. The future work section in Chapter 7
addresses this issue by proposing an evaluation on different dataset examples,
that are not markedly dissimilar. The validation of the FE model presented
in this chapter is also significantly limited by the availability of real datasets
representing different types of FEs. However, within those limitations it has been
demonstrated that the proposed server-side FE model with minimal parameters
can capture various characteristic properties of different types of FE, which can
then be used to synthetically generate realistic FE traffic.
Chapter 5 uses the FE model presented in this chapter to synthetically gen-
erate FE traffic. Traffic generated using the model is then used in the evaluation
of the ensemble-based DDoS attack detection technique developed in Chapter 6,
which can potentially detect not only a variety of DDoS attacks, but also suc-
cessfully distinguish them from FEs.
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Chapter 5
Synthetic Traffic Generation
The work presented in this chapter addresses Research Question 4 identified
earlier (Section 1.2) i.e. Is it possible to design and implement a simple experi-
mental traffic generation and testbed framework, using only modest hardware for
the testbed and a software-only traffic generator, to synthetically generate realistic
network traffic representing DDoS attacks and FEs? This is an important ques-
tion because one of the key challenges in DDoS and FE research is the scarcity of
recent and realistic datasets, reflecting real-world DDoS attacks and FE scenar-
ios, for testing and evaluation purposes. The datasets that are publicly available
such as the KDD Cup 1999 Dataset [50] are not only old but also lack sufficient
comprehensiveness to be suitable for evaluating contemporary DDoS scenarios
[70, 116]. Existing testbeds for generating and evaluating realistic DDoS and FE
traffic, such as DETER [17] and Emulab [124] have technical limitations relating
to realism and the number of attackers/clients they support, and they are also
shared facilities. The chapter addresses the above issues by focusing on:
• the development and evaluation of a traffic generation and testbed frame-
work, consisting of a hardware testbed set-up and software traffic genera-
tion tool, and
• using this framework to investigate and develop techniques to synthesise
realistic emulation of real-world DDoS attack and FE traffic.
The synthetic generation of DDoS attack and FE traffic is based either on
the characteristics of some real-world datasets, available in the public domain, or
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on known methodologies. The traffic generation and testbed framework uses the
FE model developed in Chapter 4 to synthetically generate similar FE traffic.
The datasets generated in this chapter for DDoS attacks, FEs and background
traffic are then used for testing and evaluating an ensemble-based technique for
detecting a variety of DDoS attacks and FEs, developed in Chapter 6.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 provides the
detailed characteristics of the datasets needed for this research. Section 5.2 dis-
cusses the details of the traffic generation and testbed framework consisting of
a hardware testbed and software traffic generator – Botloader, cooperatively de-
veloped as a part of this research1. It also provides details of synthetic traffic
generated using this framework and evaluates the effectiveness of the obtained
results to see how closely they mimic real traces. Section 5.3 provides the simu-
lation results of synthesising a real-world FE. Section 5.4 presents the simulation
results of synthesising a real-world DDoS attack using the traffic generation and
testbed framework. Finally, the chapter is summarised in Section 5.5.
5.1 Dataset Characteristics
An integral requirement for a workable solution for evaluating DDoS attack detec-
tion is the availability of realistic traffic datasets, whether attack or benign. For
the purpose of experimentation and evaluation, it is essential that the datasets
being used have two distinct components, viz., attack traffic, such as DDoS
and non-attack traffic, such as an FE or normal background traffic. This sec-
tion describes the characteristic properties of datasets required for testing and
evaluating techniques developed in this thesis for detecting DDoS attacks and
differentiating them from FEs.
• Non-spoofed source and destination IP addresses. In order to sim-
ulate realistic scenarios, especially in the case of application layer DDoS
attacks and FEs, it is important that the host machines interact with the
applications running on the target server. This interaction is feasible only
1The testbed was developed as part of the the Australia-India Strategic Research Fund
(AISRF) project investigating Denial-of-Service 2008–2012. The candidate’s contributions were
to the original concept of using interface aliasing, a preliminary implementation using Curl-
loader, Wget and ifconfig, and significant contributions to testing, configuration and design,
especially of the FE plugin, and to the scripts for pre/post processing of data.
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when there is a valid TCP connection between the source and the destina-
tion machines. And to ensure a valid TCP connection it is necessary that
both the source and destination IP addresses are real and non-spoofed.
• A wide range of source IP addresses. Real DDoS and real FE traffic
datasets exhibit a wide range of source IP addresses, thus network traf-
fic originating from a wide spectrum of IP addresses forms an essential
characteristic of the required datasets.
• Network packets with valid content. In order to closely approximate
the real traffic generated by application layer DDoS attacks and FEs it is
desirable that packets have not only packet headers but also valid content
(data). Packets with valid content may also be required at the application
level in order to elicit a meaningful response from the targeted service. This
processing of incoming packets consumes resources (memory, CPU) which
can be measured and used in the proposed ensemble-based DDoS detection
technique.
• A mix of normal and anomalous network traffic. In order to ef-
fectively test and evaluate the DDoS attack and FE detection techniques,
datasets must be constructed with a controllable mix of two distinct com-
ponents, viz., normal traffic and attack traffic. The normal traffic can
represent the background noise for DDoS attack and FE simulations.
In order to obtain datasets with the aforementioned characteristics, four pos-
sibilities were identified: using the data captured from a live production network,
using network simulators such as ns–2 or Opnet, replaying the existing network
traces available in the public domain, and using some of the popular off-the-shelf
hardware and software traffic generators.
Capturing and using live network capture from the research lab (ISI) or the
university (QUT) had significant legal and privacy concerns, especially while
sharing the data with other collaborators involved in the project2. Hence, the
use of live network traffic capture was not considered to be a valid an option
for obtaining the desired datasets. As previously discussed in Chapter 2 (see
Section 2.5.3 for details), network simulation programs such as ns–2, have some-
times been used to simulate DDoS attacks and measure their effects [21, 101],
2The research conducted as part of the Australia-India Strategic Research Fund (AISRF)
project on DoS and DDoS attacks.
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but the realism of a method in which the attackers, targets and network devices
are all simulated for HRF attacks in particular seems doubtful, and has recently
been called into question [72]. Therefore, the use of network simulators, as an
alternative for obtaining the desired datasets, was also discarded.
Chapter 2 highlighted the limitations identified in the direct replay of existing
publicly available network traces, and in using some of the popular off-the-shelf
traffic generators (see Section 2.5). A detailed review of the latter approach
is given in Appendix B. The research work involved in these two approaches,
however, laid the foundations for the development of the traffic generation and
testbed framework. The framework uses modest hardware and a custom-built
traffic generator, guided by traffic characteristics extracted from public domain
datasets. The traffic generation and testbed framework will now be discussed in
detail.
5.2 Traffic Generation and Testbed Framework
The work presented in this section addresses Research Question 4. This relates to
designing and implementing a simple experimental traffic generation and testbed
framework, comprising the testbed facility (aka the hardware platform) and the
software traffic generator, which can together be used to synthetically generate
realistic network traffic for DDoS attacks and FEs.
Given the limitations of the various approaches investigated for obtaining
realistic datasets, one obvious way around this problem was to develop such
a customised traffic generation and testbed framework to meet the identified
requirements. This framework had to be based on available hardware and a
customised software traffic generator able to simulate a wide range of network
and application layer DDoS attacks and FEs. This section describes both the
hardware and traffic generation components of the testbed.
5.2.1 Framework Design Requirements
The following design-level requirements were identified for developing the frame-
work.
• Maximum resource utilisation. A single attacking host should be able
to generate sufficient traffic to impede a server of similar power from servic-
5.2. Traffic Generation and Testbed Framework 111
ing its clients. Thus, orchestrating a number of such host machines should
have a substantial impact on a large server, used as the target host.
• Traffic load coordination. Each attacking host should send a relatively
small portion of the overall traffic. Thus, an attacker would combine the
strength of all participating hosts. This feature would cater for coordinated
attacks, but at the same time would require a so-called ‘control machine’ for
remotely issuing commands to the attacking machines and synchronising
their activity.
• Traffic aggregation. Since each of the participating hosts would be a
standard PC with limited capabilities, in order to simulate a variety of
volumetric DDoS attacks and FEs, the outgoing traffic from all of the par-
ticipating hosts (attackers or legitimate clients depending on the scenario)
would need to be aggregated to a single network interface before arriving
at the target server.
• Modest hardware. Given the financial constraints of the project, it was
necessary to develop a testbed facility using only modest hardware. It is
acknowledged that the scale of simulated attacks can be increased by using
high-end networking devices. However, at the same time, many meaningful
experiments can still be conducted using modest equipment and customised
software, for example, by comparing the results of different configurations.
• Reconfigurability. The framework is required to simulate a variety of
DDoS attacks, both at the network and application level, and a variety
of FEs, and as a result must allow for reconfigurability of the network
topology.
• Monitoring capabilities. The framework should make it possible to
monitor various intermediate nodes such as switches, firewalls, and end
nodes such as applications running on the target hosts in real time.
5.2.2 Botloader: a software traffic generator
In order to simulate various types of DDoS attacks and FEs it was decided to
make use of multiple autonomous agents. At the conceptual level, Botloader,
running separately on every host machine (Figure 5.2), uses the technique of
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IP-aliasing to create a large number of bots (or legitimate clients in the case
of FEs), each with a unique source IP, and uses them to synthetically generate
network traffic based on a user-specified profile (Figure 5.1).
IP aliasing is a well-known technique for associating multiple unique IP ad-
dresses to a single network interface card, and is available on most computing
platforms. This use of IP-aliasing allows the creation of a large number of differ-
ent data flows originating from a single physical machine, creating the impression
(to the target) as if they were coming from different physical machines.
Bots, Clusters and Modules: the building blocks of Botloader
Each of the unique aliased-IP addresses created by Botloader is called a bot. The
bots are referred to as ‘compromised machines’ (or real bots) when simulating
DDoS attacks and as ‘legitimate clients’ during FE simulation scenarios. In
software terms, a bot is like an ‘object’ that consumes a small amount of memory
(approximately 46 bytes, plus whatever is allocated by the operating system for
its socket and its alias), and performs a fixed set of functions via an Application
Programming Interface (API). All bots, irrespective of their types, have the same
API, thus allowing them to be uniformly controlled by the Botloader program.
A group of bots performing similar operations is called a cluster. All the
bots within a cluster share the same user-specified configuration, such as the IP
address of the target machine, the duration of the attack or FE, the data rate
(kilobytes) of the attack, or the resource map to be used in case of HTTP-based
DDoS attacks and FEs. The use of clusters presents two obvious advantages:
first, aggregating bots with similar functionalities avoids duplication of code,
and secondly it keeps the memory requirement of the Botloader program low.
Each cluster is assigned a separate execution thread to facilitate the simultane-
ous execution of different types of attack or background traffic. The Botloader
program itself has its own main execution thread and controls the various types
of clusters.
A module is essentially a library or ‘plugin’, comprising of a set of functions
that define a given attack type and are shared by all the bots within a clus-
ter. Each attack type is carried out by a different module (also referred to as
bot-type). On start up, Botloader reads the configuration file and searches for
available modules or bot-types. Figure 5.1 shows an abstract level representa-
tion of Botloader with bots, clusters, and modules. Modules come in two basic
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Figure 5.1: Schematics of Botloader
flavours: attack and data modules.
Attack Modules are responsible for sending the network traffic repre-
senting a user-specified attack-type, an FE, or normal background traffic.
Each bot participating in an attack uses the characteristic properties of the
relevant attack module and shares it with the other bots in its cluster. How-
ever, in an attack involving multiple clusters sharing the same functionality,
clusters may be configured separately, as in case of a HTTP flooding at-
tack with background HTTP traffic at a different rate. Botloader currently
caters for seven attack modules, viz., syn_flood, udp_flood, icmp_flood,
http_flood, xml_flood, ssl_flood, and fe_flood to simulate various
types of DDoS attacks and FE scenarios.
Data Modules Apart from the modules responsible for conducting differ-
ent types of attacks as specified in the configuration file, there are other
modules designed for monitoring and data gathering. Two such data mod-
ules are currently implemented, viz., snmp_bot and resp_bot.
The snmp_bot is responsible for gathering data using the standard and
custom MIB via the SNMP protocol. The snmp_bot when used with other
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attack modules gathers information at 5 second intervals. The snmp_bot
can gather both system-wide information such as the amount of data re-
ceived on all the interfaces of the target, as well as application-specific
information such as CPU and memory utilisation. The resp_bot is used
for measuring the response time of a specific application running on the
target host.
Both of these data modules – snmp_bot and resp_bot – use a separate
‘management network’ to perform monitoring and data collection oper-
ations. Using a separate network channel helps to avoid any potential
interference between the operation of the data and attack modules. The
data gathered by the snmp_bot is saved directly on the control machine, in
a tab-delimited spreadsheet format.
SNMP data collection during UDP flooding attacks Even after using
separate networks for attacking and monitoring the target host, UDP flooding
attacks were found to interfere with the SNMP functionality, which also uses
the UDP protocol for communication. UDP flooding attacks disable the UDP
networking stack of the target machine and hence it was unable to respond to
SNMP queries. In such cases a separate monitor program was used on the target
machine. The monitor program performed the same data-gathering role as the
snmp_bot, but was copied to the target at the start of the run. Once the ex-
periment was complete, the gathered SNMP MIB data such as CPU utilisation,
memory usage, etc., was copied back to the control machine. The monitoring
program or SNMP daemon was given a higher execution priority on the target
machine by increasing its ‘niceness’3 value. As the SNMP data was collected
locally on the target machine, or via a separate monitoring network, any inter-
ference with the traffic on the attack network was eliminated. An insignificant
amount of CPU was consumed on the target by the monitoring process which
activates only once every 5 seconds.
IP address allocation
As discussed previously, the Botloader program consists of bots, clusters, and
the attack and data modules. Each host machine in the experimental testbed
3nice is program available on most Unix or Unix-like operating systems, and is used to
reschedule a program with a particular processing priority. Niceness values range from -20
(highest priority) to +19 (lowest priority).
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runs an instance of Botloader. An abstract level design of Botloader is shown in
Figure 5.1. Based on the number of IP addresses specified in the configuration file
to simulate a given traffic scenario, Botloader reduces the size of the interface’s
netmask and so expands the available pool of addresses (initially 254 for a class
C address) to a suitably large number. For example, if the netmask is expanded
to a class B network then a total of 64,770 aliased addresses can be created
(65,024 for class B, less the original 254 for the class C network, so as to avoid
clashes with other machines). From this pool, Botloader selects random IP
addresses. In practice only around 10,000 aliases per machine can be defined,
without slowing down the simulation to the point where experimental fidelity
begins to be compromised.
Figure 5.1 shows an instance of Botloader running on a host machine. Within
each instance, the assigned IP address pool is further subdivided into n different
clusters (Ci, i ∈ [1, n]) with non-overlapping IP addresses. Each of these clusters
(Ci) is a collection of m bots (bi, i ∈ [1,m]), each with a unique IP address
and a network socket, and sharing the hardware address of the physical network
interface. Before each data transfer cycle, bots are jumbled and then invoked in
a sequential manner to send and receive traffic to/from the target. At the end of
each data transfer cycle, the bots are jumbled again before repeating the cycle
(see Figure 5.1). A typical traffic simulation scenario usually involves several
data transfer cycles per second until the simulation times out. This ensures a
randomised spread of source IP addresses (as seen by the target machine) that
resembles the entropy of source IPs from real-world DDoS attack scenarios. As
previously discussed (Chapter 4), Entropy H of a discrete random variable X is
given by
H(X) = −
n∑
i=1
p(xi)log2p(xi)
where n is the number of symbols and p(xi) is the probability of that symbol
appearing in the message. The entropy H ranges between 0 and log2n. Dividing
by log2n gives the normalised entropy H0(X) with values between 0 and 1, and
is defined as:
H0(X) = H(X)/log2n
A normalised entropy of 1 implies that the symbol ‘xi’ under consideration is
purely random. Thus, H0 = 1 if all bots transmit equally, and 0 if all traffic
comes from a single address. Applying this formula to the source IP addresses of
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packets in the CAIDA DDoS Attack 2007 dataset [51] resulted in H0 = 0.9405,
suggesting that the experimental value of H0 = 1 is realistic.
5.2.3 Experimental Testbed Architecture
The experimental testbed environment contains two distinct networks: the attack-
network for sending and receiving all the attack and normal background traffic,
and the management-network for monitoring the target and collecting MIB data.
The testbed architecture consists of ten dual-homed4 host machines (Host 1 –
Host 10), one layer 3 switch (attack switch), one layer 2 switch (monitor switch),
and a target machine. In the attack-network, all hosts machines are connected
to the target via the layer 3 switch. One of the 10 host machines in the attack-
network is a control machine used for orchestrating the other hosts and for sim-
ulating various DDoS attacks or FE scenarios. Figure 5.2 given an abstract-level
schematic of the testbed architecture.
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Figure 5.2: Testbed architecture
4A dual-homed host is a system equipped with two networking interfaces (Network Interface
Cards (NICs)), generally sitting between an untrusted network and a trusted network in order
to provide secure access.
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All host machines in the attack-network use a 1 Gigabit per second (Gbps)
link to connect to the attack switch, which is connected to the target machine
via a 10 Gbps link. In the management-network, all connections between the
target and the host machines to the monitor switch are 100 Megabits per second
(Mbps). Every host machine runs an instance of the Botloader program and
represents a ‘group of attackers or bots’ while simulating DDoS attacks, and a
‘group of legitimate clients’ during FEs scenarios. The control machine acts like
a ‘master’ and issues commands to initiate the instances of Botloader in each
of the participating hosts. All the traffic coming from the individual hosts is
accumulated and sent through the 10 Gbps link connecting the attack switch
to the target machine. All the host machines are standard PCs with 3.0 GHz
Intel Core2 processors, 4 GB of memory, an integrated 1 Gigabit (Gb) NIC, an
external 100 Megabit (Mb) Ethernet card, and are running Ubuntu 10.04 Desktop
as the Operating System (OS). A small number of essential services like ssh, ntp
etc. are also installed on each of the host machines. The target machine is a
Dell PowerEdge R710 with six quad-core Intel Xeon 2.27 GHz processors (hyper-
threaded), 32 GB of memory, and running Ubuntu 10.04 (Server) as the OS and
Apache2 as the web-server. The monitor switch used in the management network
is a layer 2 Cisco Catalyst 3560 switch while a Dell PowerConnect 6224 layer 3
switch is used to bind together the attack-network component of the testbed
architecture.
The ARP Problem
In order to generate realistic DDoS attacks and FEs, it is important that the
simulated traffic originates from a large number of IP addresses. In the case of
an FE, such as the 1st semi-final match of the 1998 World Cup, the number of IP
addresses approaches 80,000. The problem with this requirement is that an Eth-
ernet LAN is not designed to support that many IPs. On an Ethernet network,
IP packets are sent within frames, with a source and destination MAC address.
In order to identify which MAC address corresponds to a given IP address, the
switch maintains an ARP table, which is of limited size. For example, the Dell
switch in the testbed has a maximum ARP table size of only 1024 entries. When
packets come back from the target (Figure 5.2), the switch must decide which
of the 10 host machines receives the reply packets. If the IP-address is not in
the table it broadcasts an ARP request packet, effectively asking ‘who has IP
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address x.x.x.x?’. While waiting for a reply the switch has no option but to
drop the packet. When the reply comes back from the correct interface card
the switch has nowhere to store it if the table is full, and hence cannot forward
the packet when it is later retransmitted by the target (which by default takes 2
seconds). So the end result is that the network fills up with ARP requests and
replies rather than with transmissions of desired traffic between attackers and
target.
Figure 5.3: Multi VLAN with IP forwarding
The Work-around
In order to avoid this flood of ARP requests, it was necessary to change the overall
infrastructure from a switching-mode to a routing-mode. Figure 5.3 shows the
configuration of the testbed architecture. The process of turning the switch and
each host machine into an effective router is achieved via the following steps:
1. The first step is to configure the main attack interface on each host machine
as belonging to a separate network. On hosts 1 – 10, the network interfaces
connected to the attack-switch (eth0) are assigned IP addresses in the
range 192.171.150.1 – 192.171.150.10, and the network is specified as
Class B.
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2. The second step is to re-use the secondary interface, normally used for
monitoring, as the repository of all the aliased addresses. In this way they
will be hidden from the switch, which can only see 11 address in total –
well within the limit of switch’s ARP table size.
3. The third step is to set up each host machine to act as a router by enabling
IP-forwarding on every machine (on Linux). This allows the network pack-
ets on one interface (eth1) to be forwarded to another interface (eth0)
and vice versa. IP-forwarding bridges the two (or several) interfaces into
a single network topology and routes the packets between them extremely
fast using internal pathways of the computer, without the need of any ARP
(IP to MAC address mapping) information.
4. The final step is to sub-divide the switch into 11 VLANs, one of which
is connected to the target, and the other 10 to the attacking host. Each
attacker-VLAN has its next-hop address set to the IP address of the main
attack interface. For example VLAN 1 has its IP set to 192.171.255.254 and
its default route to 192.171.150.1. Likewise, the main attack interface on
attacker 1 has its default route set to VLAN 1’s address, 192.171.255.254.
Thus all traffic between VLAN 1 and attacker 1 destined for the aliased
addresses for eth1 (172.1.1.1/24) will be routed via the eth0 interface with-
out the need for any ARP resolution. A similar set-up is applied to other
10 VLAN’s.
This solution to the ARP problem allows the creation of a large set of ‘real’
IP-addresses (bots or legitimate clients) that can communicate and exchange
data with the target, which responds to network traffic as if from a large number
of physical machines. Unlike Network Address Translation (NAT), where the
source or destination IP address is modified for local delivery, the packets sent to
(and received by) the target host exactly resemble the packets sent by an external
machine. The packets have unmodified source and destination IP address and the
target responds to them as if they were physically located in a real network. But
all the packets remain within a controlled and isolated test environment. This
set-up of the testbed has so far sustained around 80,000 different IP addresses
without any ARP related issues.
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5.2.4 Performance Evaluation
This section presents the performance evaluation of the traffic generation and
testbed framework including the Botloader program in terms of its ability to
mirror a given network trace. In order to test the effectiveness of the testbed
facility, a subset of the 1998 FIFA World Cup Dataset [12] was used as sample
input trace. This network traffic trace was preprocessed and was then given
to the Botloader program in a specific format to generate similar traffic. It is
acknowledged that the validation is limited by a lack of datasets representing
different DDoS attacks and FE scenarios available in the public domain.
Dataset Processing
A subset of the 1998 FIFA World Cup Dataset [12] was used for the experiments
described in this section. The dataset is a six hour network trace around the
1st semi-final match of the 1998 FIFA world cup. The original dataset was first
filtered to remove all traffic except HTTP GET requests. Secondly, only packets
containing 200, 206 and 400 HTTP status codes were extracted and used as the
input trace (processed dataset) for the experiments. Table 5.1 shows the high-
level characteristics of the original dataset and the processed dataset used in the
simulations.
Table 5.1: Characteristic features of the dataset used for simulations.
Parameters Original Dataset Processed Dataset
Number of requests 29,662,465 19,615,109
Number of unique source IPs 79,033 78,646
Number of unique resources accessed 11,885 11,839
Peak packet rate (requests per second) 4,089 2,376
HTTP request type GET, POST, HEAD GET
HTTP status codes all 200, 206 and 400
In order to ensure that the same web-resources are downloaded during the
simulation as were present in the original trace, a fake directory structure was
created and installed on the target machine’s web-server. All the files within this
directory structure used the same file name and contained the same amount of
data as in the original traffic trace, although the contents were junk data.
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Experimental Results and Analysis
The processed dataset was further characterised by four parameters: the number
of packets (HTTP GET requests), the number of unique source IP addresses, the
number of unique resource accessed, and the entropy of the accessed resources.
All four parameters were computed for a 1 second time sampling interval, which
reflects the time resolution of the original FE dataset. However, the sampling
interval is a configurable parameter and can be changed to any value depending
on the available data.
The sampled input file with per second values of the four parameters was
provided to the Botloader program, which ran on every host machine in the
testbed set-up described in 5.2.3. All the host machines were controlled by a
single machine, which also synchronised the simulated FE traffic. In order to test
the effectiveness of the traffic generation and testbed framework the simulated
FE traffic was compared to the original FE traffic in terms of three parameters
viz., the incoming traffic, the source IPs generating the traffic, and the entropy
of the resources being accessed. The following section presents and discusses the
experimental results obtained for each of these parameters.
Incoming Traffic The incoming traffic for the simulated and the original pFE
trace was compared in parts: the total traffic volume, and the traffic shape. The
original FE traffic trace here refers to the processed data i.e., per second values
for the number of packets, the number of unique source IP addresses, the number
of unique resources accessed, and the normalised resource entropy given as input
to the Botloader program.
The total traffic volume of the simulated FE traffic trace was found to be
2.6% short of the original traffic trace. The original traffic has 19,615,109 GET
requests, although at the end of the 6 hour simulation 19,103,258 GET requests
were registered in the web-server logs.
The experimental results for the second part of the incoming traffic validation
i.e. comparing the shape of the incoming traffic for the simulated and the original
dataset are shown in Figure 5.4, which plots the number of incoming requests
per second against time. Figure 5.4a compares the incoming network traffic in
a raw format, while 5.4b uses a built-in smoothing technique (bezier) within the
gnuplot5 utility.
5Gnuplot is a command-line graphing utility available on many computing platforms in-
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(a) Incoming traffic comparison using raw data.
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(b) Incoming traffic comparison using smoothed data.
Figure 5.4: Incoming traffic comparison for the simulated and original FIFA
dataset.
Although there are large variations in the simulated incoming traffic as com-
pared to the original, these variations are very fine grained, and the simulated
traffic closely mimics the original trace in terms of the overall traffic shape.
Source IP Addresses The source IP address parameter of the original trace
is compared with the simulated traffic in two forms: the total number of unique
source IPs, and the variations in the number of unique source IPs over time.
The Botloader program is designed to distribute the overall traffic being sent
to the target host equally divided among all the participating host machines.
cluding Linux.
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So effectively each host machine sends 1/10th of the total traffic and also uses
1/10th of the total aliased-IPs assigned to the experiment.
The original FE dataset used in the simulation has 78,646 unique source IP
addresses (see table 5.1). Conducting the experiment using 7,865 bots per host
machine, nearly 1/10th of source IPs found in the original dataset (Table 5.1), all
of 78,650 unique source IPs were found in the web-server logs. This demonstrates
the capabilities of the traffic generation and testbed framework to simulate traffic
scenarios involving a large number of distinct source IP addresses.
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Figure 5.5: Source IP address comparison for the simulated and original FIFA
dataset.
The variations in the unique source IP addresses for the original and the
simulated traces are shown in Figure 5.5. The figure plots the number of unique
source IPs per second against time for the two datasets. As for the incoming
traffic comparison (Figure 5.4), the shape or variations in the unique source IPs
in the simulated trace closely mimics the original traffic trace. However, the
number of unique source IPs observed at any given time in the simulated traffic
is somewhat less than in the original.
Resource Entropy The last parameter used to test how closely the traffic
generation and testbed framework can mirror a given network trace is resource
entropy. Figure 5.6 compares the normalised entropy of the resource being ac-
cessed for the original and the simulated network trace. The normalised resource
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entropy for the original FE traffic is calculated using Shannon’s entropy for-
mula [103], as discussed above in Section 5.2.2.
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Figure 5.6: Resource entropy comparison for the simulated and original FIFA
dataset.
In the simulated FE traffic, large variations are observed in the entropy of the
accessed resources. These variations are mainly attributed to the overall design of
the Botloader program. Instead of directly replicating the resource access pattern
of a given input trace, Botloader has been designed to take the number of unique
resources to be accessed in any given interval and the desired normalised entropy
as the input parameters and performs reverse entropy calculations to compute
the frequency distribution of resources that can generate the desired entropy.
This approach gives a rather realistic feel to the synthetic traffic generation by
not simply duplicating the exact resource access pattern from the original trace
and at the same time keeping the overall access pattern close to the original. The
approach is also light on memory usage as each host machine is not required to
load the entire resource access map into available memory. All it needs is to load
a comparatively small text file with the total number resources and the desired
resource entropy per sampling interval.
Another observation made during the analysis of the web-server logs was that
all of 11,839 different resources in the original trace (Table 5.1) were found in
the simulated network traffic, demonstrating the ability of the traffic generation
and testbed framework to mirror a given network trace.
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The Botloader program is able to create a large number of bots and use them
to generate traffic volume comparable to the original traffic trace. However,
the variations in the simulated network traffic were much larger than the orig-
inal trace. Reducing these variations and improving the simulation results for
resource entropy have been identified as future work.
5.3 Simulating Flash Events
In this section, the traffic generation and testbed framework described above
uses the FE model developed in the previous chapter (Section 4.3) to generate
different types of FE scenarios. In order to generate FE traffic, the model uses
information extracted from the few existing FE datasets, but due to their limited
number and types, is limited to predictable and unpredictable FE scenarios. For
similar reasons, as described in the previous chapter, the simulation of synthetic
FEs is limited to representing traffic volume.
5.3.1 Datasets
In this section two publicly available datasets, representing a predictable FE
(pFE) and an unpredictable FE (uFE) respectively, are used as base models to
generate similar FE traffic. For simulating a pFE, a subset of the 1998 FIFA
World Cup Dataset [12] is used as the basis. This dataset contains six hour
long network traffic around the 1st semi-final match of the 1998 FIFA world
cup. The dataset containing the hourly hits on Wikipedia following Steve Jobs
death is used as the base dataset for simulating the uFE, which provides hourly
aggregates of requests over a period of 43 hours [73].
Model Parameters
The FE model developed in the previous chapter characterises FEs via three
key components: the volume of incoming traffic, the related source IP-addresses,
and the resources being accessed. Since the FE model provides a mathematical
representation only of the incoming traffic, the values used in the simulations for
other two components i.e., source IP addresses and the resources being accessed,
are reproduced from those present in the original datasets. The information
relating to source IP addresses and the resources being accessed is not available
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for the uFE dataset (hourly hits on Wikipedia following Steve Jobs death), and
the same applies to the case of the pFE dataset. The FE model developed in the
previous chapter makes use of five key parameters to mathematically represent
the incoming traffic volume during an FE. The essential parameters used by the
FE model are:
• Rn: average normal incoming request rate
• Rp: peak incoming request rate
• to: start time of the flash-phase
• tf : end time of the flash-phase or start time of the decay-phase
• td: end time of the decay-phase
Using these key parameters, the FE model derives the following parameters to
model the incoming traffic volume during FEs:
• Af : amplification factor or the ratio of the peak request rate (Rp) and the
average normal request rate (Rn)
• ∆Tf : duration of the flash-phase i.e., time take for the average normal
request rate (Rn) to reach the peak request rate (Rp)
• ∆Td: duration of the decay-phase i.e., time taken for the peak request rate
(Rp) to reach the average normal request rate (Rn)
• α: flash-constant defined as α = lnAf
(tf−to)
• β: decay-constant defined as β = lnAf
(td−tf )
Table 5.2: FE model parameters for datasets used in simulations.
FE Datasets Rn Rp to tf td
pFE (1st Semi-final) 391 2,376 2,880 13,320 17,280
uFE (Wikipedia hits) 1,826 1,063,665 8 10 43
Table 5.2 provides the values for all the essential parameters used in the
simulations. All the values are computed using ‘seconds’ as the time unit for
simulating the pFE and ‘hours’ for simulating the uFE. Therefore for the pFE
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dataset, Rn and Rp denote respectively the average number of incoming requests
per second and the maximum number of incoming requests per second observed
over a period of six hours. Values for to, tf , and td denote the instances of time
(in seconds) which mark the start and end of the flash-phase and the decay-
phase. Similarly, the values for the uFE are computed using ‘hour’ as the time
resolution. Different time resolutions were chosen for the pFE and the uFE
because the original datasets were only available with different time resolutions.
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(a) Original predictable FE traffic.
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(b) Simulated predictable FE traffic using the FE model.
Figure 5.7: Incoming traffic profile for the predictable FE.
5.3.2 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, the FE model parameters presented in Table 5.2 are used to
generate an ‘input file’ which is then loaded to the Botloader program (running
128 Chapter 5. Synthetic Traffic Generation
on each host machine within the testbed architecture) to synthetically generate
the traffic. This input file consists of tab separated values for the number of
packets (HTTP GET requests) to be sent, the number of unique source IPs
to use, the number of unique resources to access, and the resource entropy to
simulate. All of these values are supplied on a per-sampling-interval basis to the
Botloader program.
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(a) Original unpredictable FE traffic.
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(b) Simulated unpredictable FE traffic using the FE model.
Figure 5.8: Incoming traffic profile for the unpredictable FE.
Figure 5.7a shows the incoming traffic profile for the original pFE dataset
i.e. six hour traffic around the 1st semi-final match of the 1998 FIFA world
cup. The predictable FE traffic, based on the model developed in Chapter 4, is
shown in Figure 5.7b. The simulated traffic is able to mirror the shape of the
actual dataset, with exponentially increasing flash and decreasing decay phase.
5.4. Simulating DDoS Attacks 129
However, there are variations in the traffic that are noticeably different from the
original data. The time-synchronisation of the 10 host machines, each sending
1/10th of the total traffic, is speculated to be the reason for these variations. Such
variations can also be seen in the simulated traffic of the original FIFA dataset in
Figure 5.7a. Figure 5.8a shows the incoming traffic profile for the original uFE
dataset i.e. hourly hits on Wikipedia following Steve Jobs’ death. The simulated
uFE traffic using the FE model is shown in Figure 5.8b. The simulated traffic
is able to closely mimic the original traffic. Chapter 7, in the section on future
work, discusses directions for further work to investigate the possible reasons for
such variations in the simulated pFE traffic.
5.4 Simulating DDoS Attacks
In this section, the traffic generation and testbed framework is used to emulate a
real-world DDoS attack. In order to generate network traffic, attack or benign,
the Botloader program takes user specified parameters such as the duration of
the simulation, the number of bots (aliased-IP addresses) to use, and the traffic
or data rate (specified in packets per second and kilobytes per second), via a
configuration file. So each of the attack types has its own configuration file with
some features that are common across all attacks, such as the duration of the
simulation and the number of bots to create, and some custom features, such as
a resource file containing a list of resources to download during a HTTP flooding
attack or an FE. For example, the configuration file for a HTTP flooding attack
contains the following line of code, with the user specified values for various
parameters:
http_bot 100 debug=0 time=60 port=80 res_file=web-resources.txt
rates="100" dest_ip=192.168.200.76
This configuration file creates 100 bots and uses them to direct HTTP traffic
towards the web-server running at port 80 on 192.168.200.76. During the sim-
ulation, the resources are downloaded at 100 kilobytes per second, spread across
60 seconds from the web-resources.txt file. In this section, simulation results
for the CAIDA “DDoS Attack 2007” Dataset [51] are presented. The following
chapter presents the simulation results for application level DDoS attacks.
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5.4.1 Datasets
In order to simulate a real-world DDoS attack, the CAIDA “DDoS Attack 2007”
Dataset [51] has been used as the base traffic model for extracting features re-
quired by the Botloader program to generate similar traffic. The CAIDA dataset
contains pseudonymised traces from a DDoS attack that occurred on August
4, 2007 for approximately one hour. From the complete dataset, one-way at-
tack traffic is used for simulation. Table 5.3 shows the high-level statistic of the
dataset used in the simulation.
Table 5.3: Characteristic features of the DDoS datasets used for simulations.
Parameters CAIDA Dataset
Duration 66 minutes
Attack Type Ping flood
Packet Type ICMP
Number of Packets 359,655,765
Number of unique source IPs 9,311
Peak packet rate (packets per second) 175,010
5.4.2 Experimental Results and Analysis
The incoming traffic profile (packets per second) of the CAIDA dataset is shown
in Figure 5.9. The one-way traffic profile clearly shows two rather distinct traffic
rates, as experienced by the target victim. The first one is the packet rate during
the first-half of the trace i.e. from the start of the trace until around the 1500
second mark. For simulation purposes, the packet rate during this period is
referred to as the normal packet rate. The average packet rate for this period
was approximately 385 packets per second in the original dataset. The second
distinct traffic rate is seen during the second half of the trace i.e., starting from
approximately 1500 seconds until the end of the trace. During this period, the
packet rate is referred to as the attack packet rate, and contains approximately
125,705 packets per second on average.
In order to simulate network traffic similar to the CAIDA dataset, the normal
and the attack packet rates, calculated from the original dataset, are provided
to the attack configuration file of the Botloader program to generate a 5 minute
sample network trace. The configuration file is in the format given below where
two simultaneous threads (clusters of bots) are started, with the first one for
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Figure 5.9: Incoming traffic profile for the CAIDA dataset.
simulating normal traffic part, and the second for simulating the attack part of
the original CAIDA dataset.
ping_bot 73 debug=0 ip_version=4 time=120 packet_size=64
rates="46200" burst_default=1000 dest_ip=10.1.1.76
ping_bot 859 debug=0 ip_version=4 time=300 packet_size=64
rates="0 0 7542300 7542300 7542300" burst_default=1000 dest_ip=10.1.1.76
The first thread runs for 120 seconds, and sends 46,200 packets during this
period, thereby achieving the desired rate of roughly 385 packets per second.
The second thread is started simultaneously, and runs for the entire length of
the simulation (300 seconds). However, this thread is dormant for the first
120 seconds, as specified by the two leading 0’s in the rates section of the
configuration file. During the remaining 180 seconds, the threads send ICMP
traffic at a rate of approximately 125,705 packets per second to the target victim
(10.1.1.76), as specified by the dest_ip parameter of the configuration file.
Figure 5.10 shows the simulation results of a 5-minute traffic trace syntheti-
cally generated using the traffic rates from the CAIDA dataset. The Botloader
program was able to match up to nearly the normal and the attack packet rates
from the original trace, thereby effectively emulating an existing real-world DDoS
attack. Using different configuration files, application level DDoS attacks (HTTP
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Figure 5.10: Incoming traffic profile for a simulated DDoS attack.
GET flood and SSL flood) and normal traffic trace have been also simulated and
will be presented in the following chapter.
5.5 Conclusion
Research associated with network anomaly detection, particularly DDoS attack
detection and FE separation, often suffers from lack of accurate evaluation,
mainly because of the scarcity of recent and realistic datasets available in the
public domain. The majority of the publicly available datasets are either too
old to reflect current network trends, or are heavily anonymised to eliminate
any associated privacy and legal concerns, and so cannot provide useful informa-
tion about the traffic contents or origins, or are available only in a format such
as Common Log Format (CLF), which limits their usability, since they cannot
be replayed over the network. Commonly used off-the-shelf hardware and soft-
ware traffic generators have their own limitations in generating realistic network
traffic, as do simulation programs such as ns–2.
This chapter addresses the aforementioned challenges in obtaining realistic
network traffic datasets, and in the process makes two related contributions:
• the development and evaluation of a traffic generation and testbed frame-
work, based on only modest hardware and using a software traffic generator,
cooperatively developed as a part of this research, and
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• the development of techniques to realistically emulate real-world DDoS
attacks and FEs.
These contributions provide a cost-effective and dedicate test environment
which can emulate large-scale DDoS attacks, both at the network and application
layers, and FEs, and to monitor them in real time, and at a scale not previously
possible with existing emulation testbeds.
Chapter 6 uses the datasets generated in this chapter, along with some ap-
plication level attack and normal traffic datasets, for evaluating the developed
ensemble-based attack detection technique, which is potentially able to detect a
variety of DDoS attacks and differentiate them from FEs.
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Chapter 6
Ensemble Based DDoS Attack
Detection
In chapter 3, a DDoS attack detection technique based on the rate of arrival of
new or Not Seen Previously (NSP) source IP addresses was presented. That chap-
ter provided the design, a proof-of-concept implementation using bit-vectors, and
experimental evaluation of the proposed technique. The technique was evaluated
against UDP attacks with varying numbers of source IP addresses. However, it
focused only on detecting DDoS attacks without considering Flash Events (FEs),
a network anomaly sharing a number of characteristics with DDoS attacks.
This chapter extends that work by including additional parameters – from
both the incoming traffic and also the target server side, thereby extending the
DDoS identification criteria beyond the simple property of NSP source IPs. It
also addresses Research Question 5, i.e. Can a more sophisticated ensemble-
based technique based on both network traffic characteristics and server-load data
(memory and CPU utilisation) improve the accuracy of DDoS attack detection
and provide a means to identify and differentiate DDoS attacks, FEs and nor-
mal traffic? This chapter thus focuses on the development and evaluation of an
ensemble-based DDoS attack detection technique using interval-based sampling
of various features. The technique combines two rather orthogonal attack de-
tection strategies – network traffic analysis and server-load data analysis, and
is expected not only to detect a variety of DDoS attacks, including application
layer attacks, but also to differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs.
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The attack detection technique developed in this chapter is evaluated against
a variety of datasets, synthetically generated using the traffic generation and
testbed framework developed in Chapter 5. The simulated datasets consist of
network and application layer attacks, FEs, and normal traffic scenarios. Con-
siderable care has been taken in generating and using representative datasets;
however, the results presented here are undoubtedly influenced by the particu-
lar nature both of the datasets generated and the real world datasets on which
they are modelled. This is an unavoidable aspect of such research, and while
the results are clear and represent an important outcome, it would, as proposed
in Chapter 7, also be desirable to apply these techniques to a wider variety of
datasets.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 describes the
attack detection model and its two components i.e., network traffic analysis and
server load analysis. Section 6.2 presents the set of features analysed by each
of those components, which will be used in the proposed ensemble. Section 6.3
provides the technique used for detecting changes in each of the parameters
belonging to the feature set. Section 6.4 describes the experimental set-up used
for simulating different datasets, both for attack and non-attack (such as FE)
traffic scenarios. Section 6.5 presents the experimental results when the change
detection technique is applied to individual features used within the ensemble.
Section 6.6 correlates changes in those different features to detect a variety of
DDoS attacks and separates them from FEs. Finally, Section 6.7 summaries the
research presented in the chapter and provides concluding remarks.
6.1 DDoS Attack Detection Model
The ensemble-based DDoS attack detection approach correlates two different
attack detection strategies – network traffic analysis and server-load analysis.
The reason for this is that different components of the system (the network
infrastructure and the target server) react differently when subjected to different
kinds of attack or FEs. Some attacks aim to consume the network bandwidth
leading to the target host, whereas other attacks are directed against the resource
allocation strategies of the victim. For example, during a high rate network layer
flooding attack such as an ICMP attack, the available network bandwidth is
more adversely affected than the processing capabilities of the target machine.
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On the other hand, during an application level attack, it is expected that both
the network bandwidth and the available resources such as CPU utilisation are
synchronously targeted and consumed, as the target server is forced to process a
large number of incoming requests directed at a specific application.
One example of an application level attack is the HTTP GET flooding attack.
In this attack, compromised machines send conventional HTTP GET requests to
the target web-server to download the complete response. This attack is typically
used to exhaust the available bandwidth of the victim as well as consume the
system and application resources. Such situations can at times be misinterpreted
as FEs where a large number of legitimate users concurrently send access requests
to a Web server, similar to a High-Rate Flooding (HRF) DDoS attack using
HTTP GET as the attack vector. Both of these situations can often lead to
service degradation, either due to a high network bandwidth consumption, or a
high resource consumption, or a combination of both.
There are also DDoS attacks which work by exploiting a design or implemen-
tation level flaw in a service running on the target, so even a modest packet rate
can potentially have severe effects on the available computing resources. A re-
cent example of such attacks by suspected Iranian sources on US banks exploited
the cryptographic protocols of the server [18]. Although the exact nature of the
attacks is unknown, it was probably based on a recently published Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) exploit [117]. Additional details of this attack are provided later in
the chapter (Section 6.4).
Since both of the attack categories discussed here, network and application
level flooding attacks, often target different components of the system, effective
attack detection criteria in one domain (network level) may not necessarily work
for attacks belonging to the other domain (application level) and vice versa.
Thus, in order to effectively detect different types of DDoS attacks it is important
to take both sets of attack detection criteria into account, and use them in
tandem.
This reasoning forms the basis of the proposed ensemble-based DDoS attack
detection technique, schematically represented in Figure 6.1, where the individual
server-load and network traffic features are detected and correlated to decide
whether the incoming traffic represents a DDoS attack, or an FE, or normal
network activity.
Although the proposed ensemble-based technique is designed to detect dif-
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Figure 6.1: Schematic of the Ensemble-based DDoS Attack Detection Model.
ferent types of High-Rate Flooding (HRF) DDoS attacks, this approach is also
believed to be able to detect a variety of low rate flooding DDoS attacks at the
application level. However, such an application of this technique is beyond the
scope of this thesis.
The following section describes the network traffic and the server-load based
parameters used in the ensemble-based DDoS attack detection technique.
6.2 Feature Set Selection
As already mentioned, the features to be monitored and analysed fall into two
major categories: incoming network traffic features, mostly used in detecting
HRF flooding attacks, and server-load features, which are mostly used in identi-
fying application level DDoS attacks and FEs. However, in certain attacks both
the network traffic and the server-load may change, as in the case of a HTTPS
GET flooding attack. The features chosen to represent each of these categories
will now be described.
6.2.1 Incoming Network Traffic Features
The proposed ensemble based DDoS attack detection technique uses five charac-
teristic features (however, for the reasons described below, the prototype imple-
mentation implements only four of these) of the incoming network traffic indica-
tive of a potential HRF DDoS attack, both at the network or application level.
These features are all calculated and used on a per sampling interval basis. For
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the proof-of-concept implementation of the proposed attack detection technique,
unless specified otherwise, a 5 second sampling interval has been used for all the
network traffic based parameters. However, since the current implementation of
the proposed ensemble based DDoS attack detection technique is post hoc, the
time resolution for the individual parameters may vary.
Incoming Traffic Volume
One of the fundamental characteristics of a HRF DDoS attack is the dramatic
increase in the incoming traffic volume. The incoming traffic volume also in-
creases in the case of an FE; however, the increase is not as immediate as in the
case of a DDoS attack, assuming that the attack is not mimicking an FE. This
parameter is represented by the number of packets per sampling interval, and is
referred to as the NumPack in the ensemble.
New Source IP Addresses
The onset of a DDoS attack is also accompanied by an increase in the number
of unsolicited packets arriving at the target from previously unseen or new IP
addresses. This characteristic property has been previously used in Chapter 3
to develop and implement a DDoS attack detection technique, and in Chapter 4
to differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs. The new source IP address parameter
is referred to as NewSrcIP in the ensemble.
Number of Source IP Addresses
During a DDoS attack, the bot master commonly uses a set of compromised ma-
chines in concert to maximise the damage. This causes the victim to experience
an abrupt increase in the number of source IP addresses per interval throughout
the attack. This parameter is referred to as SrcIP in the ensemble.
Although the property is also a characteristic of FEs, the dramatic increase
in incoming traffic is mainly due to an increase in the number of IP addresses
(clients) rather than due to an increase in the number of requests per IP address
(see Section 4.3.3 for details). On its own this parameter may not be sufficient
to differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs, but when used in tandem with other
network traffic parameters, it can potentially differentiate between these two
network anomalies.
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Incoming Traffic Distribution
To maximise damage during a DDoS attack, a bot master forces each of the
available bots to send a large number of requests or packets, which then aggregate
to the desired load before reaching the target server. This feature of the incoming
network traffic translates to a high rate of requests or packets per source IP
address, and can thus be used as a parameter to detect the onset of a DDoS
attack.
This parameter is useful in distinguishing DDoS attacks from FEs, where the
majority of clients are interested only in specific information related to the event,
hence a relatively small number of requests originate from each accessing client
(see Section 4.1.3). This parameter is referred to as PackPerIP in the ensemble.
Access Pattern of Web Resources
An additional parameter that can potentially be added to this list is the ‘access
pattern of Web resources’ during different traffic situations. This parameter
has been previously used to understand and model FEs (See Section 4.3), and
varies in a distinct manner, especially in case of a predictable FE, and hence
can be used to efficiently detect such events and differentiate them from DDoS
attacks. However, the unavailability of this parameter in the public domain
datasets representing DDoS attacks has led to its exclusion from the parameter
feature set used in the ensemble.
6.2.2 Server-load Features
The proposed ensemble based DDoS attack detection technique makes use of
four server-load characteristic features, features which are indicative of a DDoS
attack, especially at the application level. These features are grouped into CPU
based and memory based features, and while not completely orthogonal, are
used to capture various aspects of different DDoS attacks. All the features are
observed locally on the target machine by reading various /proc1 files at 5 second
intervals.
1/proc is a boot-time mount point name given to procfs or proc file-system: a special files-
system for Unix-like operating systems containing information about the system and various
processes in a hierarchical file-like structure. Thus, /proc acts like a real-time API to the
kernel, providing functionality to set or retrieve kernel information.
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CPU Utilisation
DDoS attacks force the target server to process the incoming requests at the
network and/or application level, thereby consuming a considerable amount of
its processing power. Thus, the percentage of CPU utilisation, both at the system
level (henceforth referred to as SysCpu) and at the user level (henceforth referred
to as UsrCpu) can potentially indicate the occurrence of a DDoS attack.
Using both the system and user level CPU utilisation within the ensemble
may facilitate the detection of different types of DDoS attacks. For example, a
network layer flooding attack such as ICMP flooding will consume more of system
level CPU rather than at user level, since no application running at the target
server is involved in the attack. However, an application level DDoS attack, such
as a HTTP GET flooding attack, will affect the target machine’s CPU both at
the system and user level.
An additional parameter indicative of overall load on the target is CPU Load.
This represents the number of processes running or waiting for execution. This
parameter is particularly useful in detecting SSL based DDoS attacks, where
even a modest traffic rate can overpower the target server’s CPU resources by
forcing it to perform computationally expensive calculations. This parameter is
available in all Unix and Unix-like platforms as ‘load average’, computed every
1, 5 and 15 minute interval. The 1 minute average is used in the ensemble, and
is referred to as CpuLoad.
Memory Utilisation
Since applications allocate and deallocate memory as part of their normal exe-
cution, during a DDoS attacks or an FE, the use of ‘real-memory’ – RAM – may
potentially increase. This parameter is referred to as RealMem in the ensemble.
In summary, the proposed ensemble based DDoS attack detection technique
thus makes use of various parameters from the incoming network traffic side
(NumPack, NewSrcIP, SrcIP and PackPerIP) and the target server-load side
(SysCpu, UsrCpu, CpuLoad, and RealMem). These parameters are then corre-
lated to detect the onset of different types of network and application level DDoS
attacks, and to differentiate them from FEs. The following section discusses the
attack detection technique used in the ensemble.
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6.3 DDoS Attack Detection Technique
As discussed previously, at the onset of a network anomaly such as a DDoS at-
tack or an FE, it is expected that the statistical properties of the parameters
indicating anomalous activity may change abruptly. Hence, the problem of de-
tecting such anomalies can be formulated as a change detection problem. In
order to detect such changes, various detection techniques have been proposed
by researchers and were described earlier in Chapter 2. The change detection
technique used in the proposed ensemble based DDoS attack detection uses Expo-
nentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA): a variation of the moving average
technique, discussed previously in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.3 for details).
The attack detection technique relies on detecting changes in the individual
‘parameters of interest’, gathered via an offline analysis of datasets represent-
ing different type of DDoS attacks, FE and normal traffic. These datasets have
been generated using the traffic generation and testbed framework developed in
Chapter 5 (see Section 5.2 for details). As discussed in Section 6.6, the changes
detected in the individual parameters are then correlated using the Feature Cor-
relation Matrix (FCM) to decide whether the current network activity represents
a DDoS attack or not.
6.4 Experimental Set-up and Datasets
The proposed ensemble-based DDoS attack detection technique has been evalu-
ated against a number of datasets representing different type of DDoS attacks
(both at the network and the application layer level), FEs, and normal back-
ground traffic. These datasets, described in Section 6.4.3, are synthetically gen-
erated using the traffic generation and testbed framework developed in the pre-
vious chapter (see Section 5.2). Wherever possible, the synthetic generation of
these datasets is based on the statistical properties of real-world datasets avail-
able in the public domain. The network architecture of the experimental set-up
used for traffic generation is discussed in the following section, and Section 6.4.2
describes the methodology used for the experiments.
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Figure 6.2: Experimental set-up
6.4.1 Network Architecture
The experimental set-up used for generating the required traffic (DDoS attacks,
FEs, and normal traffic) consists of 11 interconnected Linux machines. The
choice of operating system for all the host machines is governed by the traffic
generator, Botloader, which is currently implemented for the Linux environment.
From the 11 host machines used in the set-up, 10 machines behave as attackers,
and are connected via a layer 3 switch, and while the remaining machine acts as
a victim, as shown in Figure 6.2. The traffic generated by each attack machine
is aggregated before being sent to the victim.
All of the 10 attack machines are standard PCs with 3.0 GHz Intel Core2 pro-
cessors, 4 GB of memory, an integrated 1 Gb NIC, and run Ubuntu or Debian
as the operating system. The internal configuration of all the attack machines,
i.e. the default IP addresses of the interfaces and the IP forwarding (enabled),
is identical to that described in Chapter 5 (see Figure 5.3 for additional details).
All of the attack machines run their own instance of Botloader, along with some
essential services such as SSH (Table 6.1). All the attacking machines are inter-
connected via a 1 Gbps link.
The victim machine is a Dell PowerEdge R710 with two six-core Intel Xeon
2.27 GHz processors (hyper-threaded), 32 GB of memory, running Ubuntu 10.04
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(Server) as the OS, and Apache2 (with mpm worker module) as the web-server.
Table 6.1 summarises the hardware and the software components of the experi-
mental set up. The following section describes the datasets used in the experi-
mentation.
Table 6.1: Hardware and the software components of the experimental set up
Components Host Machines
Attacker (x 10) Victim
Hardware
Architecture 64-bit 64-bit
Cores 4 24
CPU (GHz) 3.0 2.27
Memory (GB) 4 32
NIC (Gb) 1 10
Software Operating System Ubuntu 10.04/Debian 6.0 (Desktop) Ubuntu 10.04 (Server)Essential Services Botloader, SSH Apache 2.2.16, SSH
6.4.2 Methodology
As previously discussed in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.2.2 for additional details), the
traffic generation and testbed architecture includes a monitor program running
on the target machine. This program is executed locally to collect the server
load based data by reading various /proc files, and copy back the collected data
onto the control machine or Attacker 3 (see Figure 6.2), once the simulation is
over. This approach of using a separate program, running locally on the target
machine, to collect the server load-based data differs from an earlier strategy of
probing the server via SNMP GET requests. The idea of the monitor program is
to avoid any interference between SNMP packets and the actual simulated traffic
in general, and in particular during UDP flooding attack simulation (since SNMP
uses UDP as its transport protocol). Hence, before the start of every simulation,
the monitor program is remotely copied to, and executed on the target machine
with a high execution priority.
As discussed in the following section, the values of the incoming network traf-
fic parameters used within the ensemble were extracted either from the collected
pcap files (collected by Tcpdump) in the case of ICMP and SSL flood attack or
from the Apache web-server logs in the case of a HTTP GET flood attack, FE,
or normal traffic scenario. However, the use of Tcpdump to log the traffic was
found to interfere with the monitoring of the server load parameters, especially
those related to memory, thereby confounding the actual results. Figure 6.3
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Figure 6.3: Tcpdump influence on memory utilisation.
shows this behaviour during the ICMP flooding attack simulation by comparing
the percentage of memory utilisation of the target system when monitored with
and without running a Tcpdump instance. Hence, in order to minimise any such
interference with the monitoring of the target system, two iterations of every
experiment were performed, one with Tcpdump on the target machine and one
without. The iteration with Tcpdump was used to collect and analyse the net-
work traffic parameters, and the iteration without Tcpdump was used for the
server load analysis. The results obtained from each of the two iterations were
then combined.
6.4.3 Datasets
The datasets used for testing and evaluation are divided into three broad cat-
egories: DDoS attack datasets, FE datasets, and normal background datasets.
Within the DDoS attack category, different datasets representing network layer
flooding and application layer flooding are used.
DDoS Attack Datasets
Three DDoS datasets are used for evaluating the proposed attack detection tech-
nique. One of these datasets represents a network layer flooding attack while the
other two represent different types of application level attacks. Each of these
attack datasets are simulated for a period of 5 minutes: first by two minutes of
normal activity, followed by three minutes of flooding. Each of these datasets is
now described.
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1. The ICMP dataset is based on the CAIDA DDoS Attack Dataset, which
represents a real-world DDoS attack and contains approximately an hour
(20:50:08 UTC to 21:56:16) of pseudonymised traces from a DDoS attack
that occurred on August 4, 2007 [51]. The traffic profile of the CAIDA
dataset represents a flooding attack where the attacking machines send
a large number of ICMP Echo Requests (ping) to the victim aimed at
consuming the victim’s networking bandwidth. The simulated attack uses
an identical packet rate and the same number of source IP addresses, as in
the CAIDA dataset, to generate a 5-minute attack dataset containing one-
way traffic i.e., directed against the target host. Generation of this dataset
was previously described in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.4.1 for details).
Figure 6.4: SSL protocol.
2. The HTTP dataset represents an application level attack where the par-
ticipating bots (aliased IP addresses) send a large number of conventional
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HTTP GET requests to the target server and download the complete re-
sponse. The access requests are made by randomly choosing a Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) from a file containing a list of all URLs available
on the target web-server. This dataset contains one-way HTTP traffic to
the web-server where the attack traffic starts at the two-minute mark into
the traffic trace.
As pointed out by Gavrilis et al., [46] this type of attack is easy to launch,
but can seriously affect a web-server’s ability to service legitimate clients.
This attack can also be difficult to repel, owing to a strong similarity be-
tween the legitimate and attack requests. A real-life application of this
attack against a company in the U.S. allegedly caused their website to go
off-line for a period of two weeks [95].
3. The SSL dataset represents a more recent application level attack that ex-
ploits the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) handshake protocol to exhaust server
resources [117]. SSL, or its successor Transport Layer Security (TLS), is
a widely used protocol over the Internet to provide a secure channel of
communication between client and server. The SSL/TLS connection starts
off with a ‘client hello’ ‘server hello’ exchange that chooses, among other
things, an encryption algorithm acceptable to both sides, as shown in Fig-
ure 6.4. The server then sends its certificate. The client is supposed to
verify the certificate and encrypt a random key using the server’s public
key. However, in the attack, the client merely sends a canned response
(encrypted pre-master secret) to the server, so avoiding any cryptographic
cost. If the RSA algorithm is chosen with a large keysize the server is
forced to perform an expensive decryption, up to 40 times the cost of the
client [19]. The attacker then breaks off the connection and starts a new
one.
In the original version of this attack, a normal SSL handshake is completed,
but is immediately followed by a renegotiation of the keys. As soon as the
first renegotiation is complete, another renegotiation is requested, and so
on. If the SSL renegotiation is disabled on the server (the recommended
security practice), the attacker simply closes the connection after the initial
negotiation is complete and then opens up a new connection to restart the
negotiation process.
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The ssl_bot implemented within Botloader is based on Trojnara’s sslsqueeze
program [118]. Hence, this SSL dataset represents an attack where every
participating bot asynchronously initiates a large number of SSL hand-
shakes. Half-way through the handshake it sends some garbage data using
a 2048 bit key, and immediately breaks off the connection and starts a new
one. The one-way traffic of such an attack is used as the SSL dataset. A
detailed description of the HTTP GET flood and SSL flood dataset gener-
ation is given in Appendix C.
Flash Event Dataset
This simulated dataset, henceforth referred to as the FE dataset, is based on
a subset of the 1998 FIFA World Cup Dataset provided by the Internet Traffic
Archive, containing 92 days of pseudonymised Web server logs of all the access
requests made to the websites hosting the 1998 FIFA World Cup [12]. Each of
the individual peaks or bursts of traffic represents individual FEs on a small scale
as compared to the overall event [13]. A detailed description of this dataset is
provided in Section 4.1.4. From the complete 1998 FIFA World Cup Dataset, a
six hour trace of incoming traffic around the 1st semi-final match was used for
generating the FE dataset.
Normal Traffic Dataset
This dataset, henceforth referred to as the NT dataset, contains a simulated
traffic trace of a 5 minute non-flash-event activity before the 1st semi-final match
of the 1998 FIFA World Cup Dataset.
Thus five datasets (ICMP, HTTP, SSL, FE and NT) representing different
type of network activities viz., network level flooding, application level flooding,
flash event, and normal background traffic are used for evaluating the proposed
ensemble based DDoS attack detection technique. Table 6.2 summarises the
high-level characteristics of these datasets.
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Table 6.3: Parameter values used in Change Detection Algorithm.
Domain Features Parameters
η λ k t
Network Traffic
NumPack 0.50 0.02 3 5
NewSrcIP 0.50 0.02 1 5
SrcIP 0.25 0.02 3 5
PackPerIP 0.25 0.02 3 5
Server Load
SysCpu 0.5 0.02 3 5
UsrCpu 0.50 0.02 3 5
CpuLoad 2.00 0.02 3 5
RealMem 0.15 0.02 3 5
6.5 Analysis of Change Detection Results for In-
dividual Features
In this section, the change detection algorithm using EWMA, as described earlier
in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.3 for details), is applied to the network traffic and
server-load features discussed previously.
6.5.1 Incoming Network Traffic Features
The EWMA technique is applied to individual network traffic features by setting
the values of its tunable parameters. The values chosen for these parameters are
based on previous work in change detection using EWMA, specifically in DDoS
related research [105], as previously discussed in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.3 for
details). Table 6.3 summarises the optimal values, which were experimentally
adjusted to improve detection accuracy.
Incoming Traffic Volume
The abrupt change in the incoming traffic for the three different DDoS attack
datasets is shown in Figure 6.5, where the attacks start at 2 minutes (mark 24
on x-axis) into the traffic trace. The change detection technique identifies this
sudden change in the incoming packets at the start of attack with the decision
function showing 1, within each dataset. The decision function continues to show
1 for the remainder of the attack, for the HTTP and SSL datasets, implying that
6.5. Analysis of Change Detection Results for Individual Features 151
the current packet rate is greater than the mean packet rate until that time
interval.
In the ICMP dataset, which emulates the CAIDA traffic, the incoming traffic
rate shows a few dips at various time intervals. The decision function picks the
biggest of these dips and drops back to 0 at around 50 second mark, staying at 0
for the next couple of intervals before going back to 1. It is speculated that this
behaviour is due to heavy traffic that the server is constantly subjected to, which
leads to some packets being dropped by the kernel. However, it is to be noted
that such behaviour is also seen in the original CAIDA dataset (see Figure 5.9
for details), where the incoming traffic is erratic and often drops to lower levels
during the attack phase.
A small phase-shift between the attack traffic and the decision function is
due to the value of k used in the change detection technique which flags a change
(indicated by 1) after 3 consecutive occurrences of the detection condition have
been identified.
The changes in incoming traffic for non-attack traffic datasets (FE and NT) is
not as immediate and significant as in the case of the DDoS attack datasets. This
characteristic is shown in Figure 6.6, where a negative result from the decision
function indicates that the change in the incoming traffic is much more gradual
and not of the same magnitude as in the case of the DDoS attacks.
New Source IP Addresses
As discussed previously in Chapter 3 (Section 3.1), DDoS attacks are accom-
panied by a sudden change in the new or previously unseen IP addresses, as
demonstrated by the results illustrated in Figure 6.7. This characteristic i.e.,
change in rate of new source IPs, is different for non-attack traffic scenarios such
as FEs, where the target server constantly observes new source IPs with the in-
coming traffic, as shown in Figure 6.8a. These variations in the number of new
source IPs, both for DDoS attacks and non-attack traffic scenarios, are shown
in Figures 6.7 and 6.8 respectively. The new source IP feature in the original
FIFA dataset (Figure 6.8a) is distinctly different from any of the DDoS attack
datasets (Figure 6.7) and thus can be used to differentiate between these two
network anomalies.
For this particular feature, the original FIFA dataset (Figure 6.8a) has been
used instead of the simulated FE dataset (Figure 6.8b). This is mainly because
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(a) ICMP flood attack.
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(b) HTTP GET flood attack.
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(c) SSL flood attack.
Figure 6.5: Incoming traffic volume variations for different DDoS attack datasets.
of an artefact of the Botloader program which tends to use all the available bots
(aliased IPs) at the start of the simulation, and reuses them during the course
of the simulation. This artefact can be seen in the simulated FE dataset shown
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(a) Flash Event
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(b) Normal Traffic
Figure 6.6: Incoming traffic volume for non-attack datasets.
in Figure 6.8b where all the available bots are used (or seen by the target host)
within the first hour of the simulation, resulting in no new IP addresses for the
rest of the simulation.
Number of Source IP Addresses
In DDoS attacks, as the bot master synchronously uses the set of compromised
machines or bots, the target machine experiences a sudden increase in the number
of source IPs. As these bots are reused during the course of attack to continue to
send the desired traffic, the target server continues to experience a high number
of source IPs per interval throughout the attack. This characteristic is shown in
Figure 6.9, which shows an increase (or a change) in the number of source IPs
with the onset of attack, which persists for the rest of the attack.
In case of an FE scenario, the number of IPs per sampling interval also
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(a) ICMP flood attack.
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(b) HTTP GET flood attack.
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(c) SSL flood attack.
Figure 6.7: New source IPs for different DDoS attack datasets.
increases, but more significantly at the start of the event i.e., at the start of the
flash-phase, just as news of the event has probably reached the masses, pushing
them to go online to get additional information. For additional details regarding
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(a) Original FIFA dataset.
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 0  720  1440  2160  2880  3600  4320
 0
 1
 2
N
u m
b e
r  o
f  N
e w
 S
o u
r c
e  
I P
s
D
e c
i s
i o
n  
F u
n c
t i o
n
5 Second Sampling Intervals
(b) Simulated FE dataset.
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(c) Normal Traffic.
Figure 6.8: New source IP addresses for non-attack datasets.
the flash-phase, please refer to Chapter 4 (Section 4.3). This feature is captured
in the simulation and is shown in Figure 6.10, where a change in the number of
source IPs is triggered at the start of flash-phase i.e., at around the 720 second
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(a) ICMP flood attack.
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(b) HTTP GET flood attack.
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(c) SSL flood attack.
Figure 6.9: source IP addresses for different DDoS attack datasets.
mark, and is successfully detected by the decision function.
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(a) Flash Event
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Figure 6.10: Source IP addresses for non-attack datasets.
Incoming Traffic Distribution
The incoming traffic distribution in terms of the number of packets per source
IP address is much higher in the case of DDoS attacks as compared to FEs.
During DDoS attacks, a limited number of compromised machines (bots) forces
the bot master to send a large number of packets from each bot to maximise
their utilisation and the damage they can cause on the target. However, this
characteristic is different during FEs, where the legitimate clients are usually
interested only in a specific set of information related to that event, thereby
having a relatively low number of requests per client (source IP address) as
compared to DDoS attacks.
The number of packets per source IP feature for DDoS attacks is shown
in Figure 6.11. The dips observed at fairly regular intervals during the ICMP
flooding attack correspond to the dips observed in the incoming traffic volume
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for this particular attack, as previously shown in Figure 6.5.
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(a) ICMP flood attack.
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(b) HTTP GET flood attack.
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(c) SSL flood attack.
Figure 6.11: Incoming traffic distribution for different DDoS attack datasets.
In the case of the non-attack (FE and normal traffic) scenarios, the number
of packets per source IP remains almost constant, resulting in no change notified
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by the decision function, as shown in Figure 6.12. The differences in this feature
i.e. number of packets per source IPs, can therefore be used to distinguish DDoS
attacks from FEs.
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(a) Flash Event.
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Figure 6.12: Incoming traffic distribution for non-attack datasets.
6.5.2 Server-load Features
The change detection technique is now applied to individual server-load features
viz., system level CPU utilisation (SysCpu), user level CPU utilisation (UsrCpu),
CPU load (CpuLoad) and real memory utilisation (RealMem), to identify the
parameters which could potentially indicate the onset of a DDoS attack and
differentiate them from similar looking FEs.
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System CPU
DDoS attack datasets, especially the HTTP and the SSL flood attack datasets,
show a considerable increase in the percentage of system level CPU utilisation as
shown in Figure 6.13. For SSL flooding attacks this increase is mainly attributed
to the expensive decryption operations involved during the SSL handshake, re-
sulting in a near-capacity (approximately 90%) utilisation of the available pro-
cessing capability.
During the HTTP GET flood attack, as each incoming request is made to
an existing resource on the target server, it has to be processed by the server,
resulting in high CPU utilisation. It is, however, interesting to note that during
the ICMP flooding attack, CPU utilisation does increase but only slightly, as
compared to the pre-attack period. This is possibly due to the heavy traffic load
of nearly 125,000 packets a second, that the target is subjected to for a period
of 3 minutes.
During the FE traffic scenario, the system level CPU increases rather grad-
ually from approximately 0.1% to a maximum of 2.66% (excluding the start-up
value of 4.85%) over a period of 3.6 hours, and hence is not picked by the change
detection technique. These variations in the system level CPU utilisation for FE
dataset are shown in Figure 6.14.
For the normal traffic dataset, the system CPU starts-off with a relatively
high value, gradually decreasing and stabilising at nearly 0.5% half-way through
the simulation. This initial high value of the system level CPU, also observed in
other simulated traffic traces, is likely due to the background processes that are
activated at the boot time. However, in any case it does not affect the overall
behaviour being observed.
User CPU
The user level CPU utilisation varies as expected for the ICMP flooding attack
i.e., near 0% utilisation, as no user level processing is involved in such an attack.
In the case of HTTP GET and SSL flooding attacks, as the target server is
forced to process the incoming requests that target a running application, this
results in a higher user level CPU utilisation as compared to the network layer
flooding attack. For these attacks (HTTP GET and SSL) the CPU utilisation
shows a dip, towards the end of their simulations resulting in a 0 value for the
decision function. However, this behaviour in either case does not interfere with
6.5. Analysis of Change Detection Results for Individual Features 161
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  6  12  18  24  30  36  42  48  54  60
 0
 1
 2
C P
U  
U t
i l i s
a t
i o
n  
( S
y s
t e m
)
D
e c
i s
i o
n  
F u
n c
t i o
n
5 Second Sampling Intervals
CPU Utilisation (System) Decision Function
(a) ICMP flood attack.
 0
 4
 8
 12
 16
 20
 0  6  12  18  24  30  36  42  48  54  60
 0
 1
 2
C P
U  
U t
i l i s
a t
i o
n  
( S
y s
t e m
)
D
e c
i s
i o
n  
F u
n c
t i o
n
5 Second Sampling Intervals
(b) HTTP GET flood attack.
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(c) SSL flood attack.
Figure 6.13: System CPU for different DDoS attack datasets.
the overall trend of the parameter under observation.
In the case of the FE dataset, it is interesting to note the similarity in shape
for different load-based parameters such as user CPU, system CPU, with the
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(a) Flash Event.
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(b) Normal Traffic.
Figure 6.14: System CPU for different non-attack datasets.
network traffic based parameters, such as incoming traffic volume and source
IPs. The user level CPU utilisation for the FE dataset is again gradual (as in
the case of system level CPU utilisation) and is therefore not identified as a
change. This behaviour is shown in Figure 6.16a. A relatively low packet and
data rate for the normal traffic dataset has resulted in an average 0.15% of user
level CPU utilisation, as shown in Figure 6.16b.
The results of applying the change detection to various server-load based
parameters are now discussed.
CPU Load
Another server load-based parameter used in the proposed ensemble is the CPU
load averaged over 1 minute intervals. The variations in this feature for different
attack datasets is shown in Figure 6.17. The target machine used for these
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(a) ICMP flood attack.
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(b) HTTP GET flood attack.
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(c) SSL flood attack.
Figure 6.15: User CPU for different DDoS attack datasets.
simulations has two six-core processors (hyper-threaded), thus making a total
of 24 available cores. Therefore, a value of 24 on the left-hand y-axis for the
graphs presented for this feature indicates a 100% utilisation of the available
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(a) Flash Event.
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Figure 6.16: User CPU for different non-attack datasets.
CPU power.
The CPU load is almost constant at 0 for ICMP flooding attack as seen in
Figure 6.17a. In the case of the HTTP flooding attack, besides an unexpected
increase at the 9th interval, it increases slightly just after the onset of the attack
i.e., at the 24th observation interval, after which it remains fairly constant at
around 1.42. This behaviour can be seen in Figure 6.17b.
As shown previously in Figure 6.13, during an SSL attack, the target server’s
CPU is heavily loaded, due the computationally expensive decryption operations
involved in the SSL handshake. This trend is also reflected in the CPU load pa-
rameter for the SSL attack dataset, where immediately following the onset of
attack (at the 24th sampling interval), the CPU load starts to increase and con-
tinues to increase for the remainder of the attack period as shown in Figure 6.17c.
This increase in the CPU load is slowed down after the 54th observation interval
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(a) ICMP flood attack.
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(b) HTTP GET flood attack.
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Figure 6.17: CPU Load for different DDoS attack datasets.
resulting in a 0 value from the decision function. The CPU load parameter stays
at a relatively lower value for the non-attack datasets (Figure 6.18), apart from
the initial increase which is likely to be due the background processes. How-
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ever, these variations do not affect the decision making process related to this
parameter.
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Figure 6.18: CPU Load for different non-attack datasets.
Memory Utilisation
The ICMP flooding attack, being a network level attack, has as expected, no
affect on the target system’s memory utilisation, which thus stays constant at
its start-up value of 3% (Figure 6.19a). However, in the case of the HTTP GET
flooding attack, as the web-server running on the target machine is expected to
process the incoming requests and fetch the requested data from the disk, some
memory is consumed for temporary holding of the data before it is sent back to
the client. This behaviour is shown in Figure 6.19b, where following the start of
the attack traffic, the memory consumption increases and continues to increase
for the rest of the attack. It is to be noted that the real memory available on the
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target machine is 32 GB, as previously mentioned in section 6.4.1. Therefore, in
order to detect small variations in the total available memory, a lower value of
λ = 0.15 is used for this parameter across all the datasets (Table 6.3).
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(a) ICMP flood attack.
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(b) HTTP GET flood attack.
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(c) SSL flood attack.
Figure 6.19: Memory utilisation for different DDoS attack datasets.
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The SSL attack dataset also shows an increase in memory utilisation, cor-
responding to the attack traffic. However, after the increase around the 26th
sampling interval, there is no further substantial increase, resulting in a 0 from
the decision function (Figure 6.19c). The change in memory being consumed per
sampling interval is very gradual (Figure 6.20a) and negligible (Figure 6.20b) for
the FE and normal traffic datasets respectively.
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(a) Flash Event.
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Figure 6.20: Memory utilisation for different non-attack datasets.
6.6 Feature Correlation
In the previous section, the change detection technique described in Chapter 3
(see Section 3.3 for details) was applied individually to every single feature, both
from the incoming network traffic side and the server-load side. This resulted in
identifying the significance of each parameter when used in isolation for indicat-
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ing a possible DDoS attack. This section makes use of the decisions made by
the change detection technique on individual parameters and correlates them to
increase both the variety and the accuracy of DDoS attack detection, and their
differentiation from FEs.
Feature Correlation Matrix
The outcomes of the change detection technique when applied to individual fea-
tures across all five datasets is illustrated by a matrix referred to as the Feature
Correlation Matrix (FCM). Table 6.4 shows this matrix with all the five datasets
used in the experiment listed in the first column and the individual features (both
from network traffic and the server-load side) listed in the first row. The values
or outcomes of the decision function for each feature is placed in the cell corre-
sponding to that feature and the dataset. The FCM shows a 1 if a change was
detected for that feature for that dataset, and a 0 if no change was detected.
6.6.1 Detecting DDoS attacks and FEs
The research presented in this section attempts to address Research Question 5
identified earlier i.e. Can a more sophisticated ensemble-based technique based on
both network traffic characteristics and server-load data (memory and CPU util-
isation) improve the accuracy of DDoS attack detection and provide a means to
identify and differentiate DDoS attacks, FEs and normal traffic? This question
can be addressed by correlating the changes detected in individual parameters
for different datasets, as shown in the FCM.
As evident from the FCM (Table 6.4), a simple boolean AND of all the
network traffic parameters (NumPack, NewSrc, SrcIP , and PackPerIP ) is
sufficient to identify DDoS attacks overall:
DDoS = NumPack ∧NewSrc ∧ SrcIP ∧ PackPerIP (6.1)
It is to be noted that at this stage, the detected attack traffic can be either a
network level or application level attack. If it has been determined that the in-
coming traffic is non-DDoS traffic (represented by DDoS), the traffic can further
be classified as an FE or normal traffic (NT) by combining it with the SrcIP
feature. Thus, for non-DDoS traffic, a distinction between an FE and a normal
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traffic scenario can be made using:
FE = DDoS ∧ SrcIP
NT = DDoS ∧ SrcIP
(6.2)
whereDDoS and SrcIP stands for ‘NOTDDoS’ and ‘NOT SrcIP ’ respectively.
The network traffic features are thus sufficient to determine if the incoming
traffic represents a DDoS attack or an FE or normal traffic. The server-load
features are not needed for this classification. However, they will be required to
further classify the DDoS attacks identified at this stage into network and ap-
plication level attacks, and also to separate application level attacks into HTTP
and SSL attacks, as will now be discussed.
Detecting Network level flooding attacks
Once the incoming network traffic has been identified as attack traffic using
Equation 6.1, it can further be classified into a network or application level attack,
represented by NetAttack (ICMP flood) and AppAttack (HTTP and SSL flood)
respectively. These attacks are detected by combining two server load parameters
(UsrCpu, and RealMem) with the AND of network traffic parameters (obtained
using Equation 6.1), via the following correlations:
NetAttack = DDoS ∧ UsrCpu ∧RealMem
AppAttack = DDoS ∧ UsrCpu ∧RealMem
(6.3)
where UsrCpu and RealMem stands for ‘NOT UsrCpu’ and ‘NOT RealMem’
respectively.
At this stage, in order to differentiate between network and application layer
DDoS attacks, for the datasets used in this analysis, only two server load-based
parameters – UsrCpu and RealMem – have been used. However, it is speculated
that SysCpu feature may play an important role in successfully identifying other
attack types such as TCP SYN flood attack, which can potentially have an effect
on system CPU, in addition to user CPU and real memory utilisation. Thus,
future work in this direction, as discussed in Chapter 7, would be to use a wider
range of datasets and to evaluate the proposed correlation function.
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Detecting Application level flooding attacks
After identifying the incoming network traffic as an application level attack,
HTTP and SSL flooding attacks, represented by HttpAttack and SslAttack re-
spectively, can finally be distinguished. This can be achieved by combining the
AppAttack value, obtained from Equation 6.3, with the CpuLoad feature of the
target server. Hence, in order to differentiate an SSL attack from a HTTP GET
flood, the following correlations are performed:
HttpAttack = AppAttack ∧ CpuLoad
SslAttack = AppAttack ∧ CpuLoad
(6.4)
where CpuLoad stands for ‘NOT CpuLoad’.
The correlation performed between different parameter outcomes, as pre-
sented in the Feature Correlation Matrix (FCM), shows that it is possible to
identify whether the incoming network traffic represents attack or non-attack
traffic, simply by using the network traffic parameters (Equation 6.1). These
network side parameters are also sufficient to decide whether the incoming traf-
fic represents an FE or normal traffic (Equation 6.2). However, in order to
detect (or differentiate between) different types of DDoS attacks, the server load
parameters are required, as shown by Equations 6.3 and 6.4.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter extends the work presented earlier in Chapter 3 by including ad-
ditional parameters, both from the incoming network traffic side and the server
load side, to identify the onset of DDoS attacks and to differentiate them from
FEs. It extends the DDoS detection criterion, developed in Chapter 3, beyond
the simple property of Not Seen Previously (NSP) source IP addresses. The main
contribution of this chapter is the development and evaluation of an ensemble-
based DDoS attack detection technique, which combines two rather orthogonal
attack detection strategies, viz., network traffic analysis and server load analysis.
The network traffic features used within the ensemble are: incoming traffic
volume (NumPack), new source IP addresses (NewSrcIP), source IP addresses
(SrcIP), and the incoming traffic distribution (PackPerIP). The parameters used
from the server load side are: system level CPU utilisation (SysCpu), user level
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CPU utilisation (UsrCpu), CPU Load (CpuLoad), and real memory utilisation
(RealMem).
The selected features are first individually detected using a customised change
detection technique based on Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA).
The outcome of detecting changes in individual parameters is fed into a Feature
Correlation Matrix (FCM), and subsequently correlated to detect various types of
DDoS attacks, both at the network and the application layer, and to differentiate
them from FE and normal traffic scenarios. While the network traffic parameters
proved to be sufficient for flagging the incoming network traffic as a DDoS attack,
and for differentiating the non-attack traffic as an FE or normal traffic, the server
load parameters play an important role in further classifying the DDoS attacks
as network layer or application layer attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, although network MIB variables measured on
the target host have been previously used to detect DDoS attacks, there have
been no techniques proposed that use server performance parameters for this
purpose, or that combine network parameters and server resource monitoring to
differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs.
It is acknowledged that a limited number of simulated datasets have been
used for analysing the ensemble-based attack detection technique proposed in
this chapter. These datasets, although limited in their number and variety,
are based on real-world datasets, except for the HTTP GET and SSL flooding
attack datasets. In these cases, however, the attacks are still based on the known
attack methodologies. The future work, as discussed in detail in Chapter 7, aims
to validate the proposed technique against a more diverse variety of datasets.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Directions
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks utilise the power of thousands,
and sometimes tens or hundreds of thousands of compromised, geographically
distributed machines, to attack web-services, resulting in their degradation and
consequent financial loss. Hence the early and reliable detection of such attacks
is an important area of research.
The problem of detecting DDoS attacks, already complex in itself, is further
complicated by Flash Events (FEs), which occur whenever a server experiences
an unexpected surge of requests from legitimate clients, because these share
some similar characteristics with DDoS attacks. Unfortunately, the required
research in developing DDoS attack detection and FE differentiation techniques
is hampered by the extreme scarcity of public domain data representing real
traffic, whether attack or benign. This thesis addresses these challenges and
makes a number of related contributions, as summarised in the following section.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.1 presents a sum-
mary of the thesis contributions. Section 7.2 discusses the limitations of the
work presented in the thesis and provides directions for future research. Finally,
Section 7 presents the concluding remarks of this thesis.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
In this thesis, the challenges and limitations of efficient DDoS attack detection
and also their differentiation from FEs, along with the challenges and limitations
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of synthetic traffic generation of both types of anomaly have been addressed.
The contributions relating to the research questions identified in Chapter 1 (see
Section 1.2) are summarised below.
The first contribution has been the design of a DDoS attack detection tech-
nique based on single network traffic parameters viz., the change in rate of new
or not seen previously (NSP) source IP addresses. The proposed technique ex-
ploits an important characteristic of DDoS attacks i.e. a marked increase in
the number of NSP source IPs accompanying the sudden surge of the incoming
traffic. The proof-of-concept implementation of the technique has demonstrated
that this simple network traffic-based feature can be used to effectively detect
HRF DDoS attacks. This directly addresses the scalability issues which apply at
higher network speeds, and demonstrates through the use of bit-vectors that the
approach may be used as part of a real-time DDoS attack detection strategy, in
contrast to more computationally intensive machine learning based approaches.
The second contribution has been the design and implementation of an FE
model, which laid the foundation for the detection and synthetic generation of an
FE. Differences between DDoS and FE traffic were highlighted by analysing two
publicly available datasets and identifying three parametric differences between
these two network traffic anomalies: change in the rate of incoming traffic, change
in the rate of new source IP addresses, and distribution of requests among source
IPs. The proposed model further classified FEs into three broad categories: pre-
dictable, unpredictable and secondary, and described each of them via three key
components: the volume of incoming traffic, the related source IP addresses and
the resource being accessed. This characterisation has been used to develop a
server-side mathematical model for FEs with a small set of configurable param-
eters to synthetically generate different types of FEs.
This model is to the best of our knowledge the most detailed model of Flash
Events yet proposed, and is based on verifiable, publicly available datasets, unlike
other models.
The third contribution has been the development of a traffic generation and
testbed framework, developed as part of this thesis in a cooperative effort with
other researchers to synthetically generate different types of realistic DDoS at-
tacks and FEs in a controlled and isolated environment. This makes use of mod-
est hardware and an in-house software traffic generator tool, Botloader, which
exploits IP-aliasing, a well-known technique available on most computing plat-
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forms, to generate a wide variety of attack and benign traffic originating from a
wide range of valid IP addresses.
One advantage of using a small dedicated facility is the reduction in experi-
mental complications that may arise from use of a large shared testbed. Its main
advantages, however, are the increased realism of fully responsive TCP/UDP
endpoints, and the possibility of simulating very large attacks of up to 100,000
clients using only modest hardware.
The fourth contribution has been the design and implementation of an ensemble-
based DDoS attack detection technique, which combines two orthogonal attack
detection strategies i.e. network traffic analysis and server-load analysis based
attack detection. The proposed technique uses eight features, four from the in-
coming network traffic and four from the server load side. The network traffic
features used in the ensemble were: incoming traffic volume, new source IP ad-
dresses, number of source IP addresses, and the incoming traffic distribution.
The four load-based parameters used from the server side are: system level CPU
utilisation, user level CPU utilisation, CPU load and real memory utilisation.
Using the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) technique, changes
in individual features were correlated to detect a variety of DDoS attacks, both
at the network and application layer, to differentiate them from FE and normal
traffic scenarios.
To the best of our knowledge, no DDoS detection technique has used such an
accurate ensemble-based approach, which is able to detect and differentiate FEs
from DDoS attacks and determine their type, potentially in real-time.
Finally, an additional contribution described in Chapter 1, has been the con-
ceptual design of a DDoS attack detection architecture. The key component of
this architecture is a DDoS Detection and Mitigation Model (D2M2) – a single
device with attack detection and mitigation capabilities, designed to protect a
target server with an application-aware firewall from DDoS attacks.
7.2 Limitations and Future Directions
During the course of the research, a number of limitations have been identified,
which suggest directions for future research. These future directions are described
in the following sections.
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7.2.1 Improving Feature Correlation
The individual features identified and used in the ensemble are currently assigned
equal weights and are thus correlated using simple boolean operations. This
simple correlation, although effective in identifying the types of attack presented
in the thesis, may not hold for a wider range of attacks where the variations
in these features may be more subtle. An obvious step forward would be to
assign different weights to the individual features and then perform a weighted
correlation. This would potentially extend the attack detection capabilities of
the proposed technique to semantic attacks, where the variations in the server-
load based parameters are more significant than those in the network traffic
parameters.
7.2.2 Evaluation against a Wider Range of Datasets
The attack detection techniques developed in Chapters 3 and 6 have been tested
and evaluated against a limited number of real-world and simulated datasets,
either based on exiting real-world datasets or known attack methodologies. The
limited availability of public domain datasets representing different types of
DDoS attacks and FEs has been one of the primary motivations for the work
presented in Chapter 5. Thus, future work in this regard would be to apply
the proposed techniques to a wider range of datasets, especially application level
DDoS attacks, as well as secondary and unpredictable FEs. This will not only
provide an opportunity to perform experiments using different sampling inter-
vals, but would also help in answering questions related to generalising these
techniques for detecting DDoS attacks and differentiating them from FEs.
7.2.3 Real-time DDoS Attack Detection and Mitigation
The current implementation of the attack detection techniques proposed in the
thesis is post hoc. It is believed that these techniques can be implemented to
work in real or near-real time. This would involve an investigation into the
performance of the proposed techniques with respect to detection delays.
A real-time implementation would lead naturally to the investigation of mit-
igation strategies and their design and implementation, including, for example,
further work on the D2M2 work described in Chapter 3.
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7.2.4 DDoS Detection in the IPv6 Address Space
The DDoS attack detection technique developed in Chapter 3 has been designed
for the IPv4 address space. In order to accommodate all of the 232 IPv4 addresses,
it uses bit vectors as the data structure, thus requiring 0.5 GB of space. Using
the same data structure in IPv6 address space would be impossible due to the
significantly increased storage space requirements in order to accommodate 2128
IP addresses. Thus, future work in this direction would focus on implementing
the attack detection algorithm using a more efficient data structure, such as
bloom filters [22]. This would not only help in extending the proposed technique
to a wider address space (IPv6), but would also allow its performance to be
compared with the bit vector implementation.
7.2.5 Improving the Traffic Generation and Testbed Frame-
work
The traffic generation and testbed framework presented in Chapter 5 can be
further improved in the following areas:
• as previously discussed in Chapter 6 (see Section 6.4.2 for details), using
Tcpdump on the target machine to capture the incoming traffic was con-
founding the actual results, especially those related to the memory utilisa-
tion. This required two iterations for each simulation, one with Tcpdump
running on the target machine and one without. This overhead can be
minimised by adding a traffic capture machine to the existing testbed ar-
chitecture (see Figure 5.2), and mirroring all the network traffic between
the attack switch and the target host to that machine. The addition of a
traffic capture machine, however, would also involve additional hardware,
including a 10 Gb network interface module to be plugged into the attack
switch, since the testbed set-up uses a 10 GB link connecting the attack
switch and the target host.
• the current implementation of the FE module (fe_bot) is unable to closely
simulate the ‘new source IPs’ characteristic of the original FE dataset.
This resulted in the use of the FE original dataset for this particular fea-
ture when presenting the detection of individual features for the ensemble
(see Section 6.5 for details). As previously mentioned in Chapter 6, the
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deviation in this feature of the simulated traffic from that of the original
dataset is mainly due to an artefact induced by the software traffic genera-
tor, which tends to use all the available bots (aliased IPs) at the beginning,
and reuses them during the course of the simulation. Changing the traffic
generation to get around this would result in a better and more controlled
simulation overall.
7.3 Concluding Remarks
Correlating two orthogonal DDoS attack detection techniques based on network
traffic analysis and server-load data (memory and CPU utilisation) has resulted
in the development of an ensemble-based technique, capable of accurately and
reliably detecting the onset of different types of DDoS attacks, as well as differen-
tiating them from FEs, with which they share some similar characteristics. The
thesis also addresses an intrinsic challenge in research associated with DDoS at-
tacks, namely, the extreme scarcity of datasets representing real traffic, whether
attack or benign, by investigating and developing techniques, using modest hard-
ware and exploiting a well-known technique (IP aliasing), to synthesise realistic
emulations of DDoS attack and FE traffic.
Given the serious challenge posed by DDoS attacks to our ICT-based society,
it is important to find effective measures to detect such attacks at an early stage.
The work described in this thesis has attempted to contribute to that effort. It
remains to extend the evaluation of this work to a larger and more representative
set of traffic data, and to enhance and deploy these ideas in the real time domain.
Appendix A
Change Detection using CUSUM
As discussed in Section 3.3, parts of Chapter 3 previously published [8, 75], used
a sliding-window-based non-parametric CUSUM proposed by Ahmed et al. [6, 7]
for change detection. This section presents the experimental results of applying
the modified CUSUM to the observed parameter i.e. Not Seen Previously (NSP)
source IPs used in the change detection technique developed in Chapter 3.
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Figure A.1: UDP flooding attack with 35 source IP addresses (CUSUM).
In order to evaluate the performance of the NSP algorithm using CUSUM
as the change detection technique, the UDP flooding attack datasets with a
varying number of source IPs, including 35, 40, 45, 100, and 150 new source
IPs per second, were merged with the normal background traffic. Details of
the attack and background traffic have been previously discussed in Chapter 3
(Section 3.4.1). All the experiments were conducted using a 10 second sampling
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interval and a 100 second sliding window.
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(a) UDP flooding attack with 50 source IP addresses.
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(b) UDP flooding attack with 100 source IP addresses.
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 0  60  120  180  240  300
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
N
u m
b e
r  o
f  N
e w
 S
o u
r c
e  
I P
s
D
e c
i s
i o
n  
F u
n c
t i o
n
10 Second Sampling Intervals
IP Addresses
Decision Function
(c) UDP flooding attack with 150 source IP addresses.
Figure A.2: UDP flooding attack with varying source IP addresses (CUSUM).
Figure A.1 shows the experimental results when CUSUM was applied to the
UDP flooding attack using 35 new source IPs per second. The x-axis in the figure
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represents 10 second sampling intervals, the left y-axis the total number of new
source IPs in the sampling interval, and the right y-axis is output of the CUSUM
decision function with 1 indicating an attack and 0 indicating no attack. The
time series for the number of new source IPs in the 10 second sampling interval
was calculated using the ipac function of the DDoS attack detection technique
developed in Chapter 3.
The UDP flooding attack was started at 260th observation interval and ended
at 280th observation interval and the change in the number of NSP source IPs
was detected by the CUSUM technique. As earlier mentioned in Chapter 3, the
new source IP counter starts with a relatively high value that gradually decreases
over time. This is mainly because the bit vectorW is empty at the start of the
training period, and is then populated with the initial source IP addresses. The
change detection technique is not applied for the training period i.e. up to the
measurement interval 230, and this allows the sliding window based CUSUM to
learn the normal network behaviour.
Similar experiments were conducted using attacks with higher new source IP
values such as 50, 100, and 150 to evaluate the performance of attack detection
technique with various attack types. The results are presented in Figure A.2.
The attack detection algorithm using CUSUM produced comparable results to
EWMA as shown in Figure 3.5. An additional advantage of the CUSUM algo-
rithm over the current implementation of EWMA was its ability to detect nested
changes i.e. a change within a change, as indicated in Figure A.2b. This ad-
vantage, however, came with an associated cost of its complex implementation
as compared to a rather simplistic EWMA, and a higher false detection rate as
shown in all of the above figures at around 200th measurement interval. This
false detection can be minimised by using a longer sliding window, which can
be different for different datasets. This characteristic feature, however, can be
better controlled via the k value, as used in EWMA based change detection,
and the same value can applied across different datasets. Moreover, the prime
focus of the techniques developed in this thesis is to detect the onset of a wide
variety of DDoS attacks and differentiate them from FEs, and therefore, a sim-
pler change detection technique (EWMA) gave comparable results to relatively
complex technique (CUSUM) was chosen.
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Appendix B
Traffic Generators
B.1 Curl-loader
Curl-loader is a C based open-source tool used to simulate the behaviour of large
number of HTTP/HTTPS and FTP/FTPS clients, each with its own unique
source IP address. It uses a real C-based client protocol stack, namely HTTP and
FTP stacks of libcurl and TLS/SSL of openssl to simulate user behaviour. Curl-
loader has the capability to generate large number of so-called ‘virtual clients’
(VCs) each having its own valid unique source IP and MAC address. The multi-
threading option of curl-loader allows a better use of available CPUs on platforms
with multi-core processors.
In order to generate synthetic network traffic, comprising both malicious and
normal data on the experimental testbed infrastructure, the scalability of this
approach was tested and found to be governed by (a) processing capacity of the
individual machines (i.e. the number and speed of CPU’s and the amount of
memory); and (b) the number of distinct platforms available in the experimen-
tal testbed. When curl-loader was being researched, the experimental testbed
consisted of eight host machines and a high-performance Dell PowerEdge R710
as the target server. Each of these host machines were standard PCs with 2.60
GHz Intel Pentium-4 processor, 2 GB of memory and an integrated 1 Gigabit
(Gb) Network Interface Card (NIC), and running Ubuntu 10.04 Desktop. The
target server was equipped with two Six-core Intel Xeon 2.27 GHz processors
(hyper-threaded) and 32 GB of memory and running Ubuntu 10.04 Server as the
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Figure B.1: CPU utilisation with varying number of clients
operating system. The virtualisation software (VMware ESXi) allowed the Dell
platform to be used as a cluster of virtual machines.
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Figure B.2: Memory utilisation with varying number of clients
Notwithstanding the overheads introduced by virtualisation, the idea was to
analyse and compare the performance of curl-loader running on a stand-alone
PC (option 1) with the one running on virtual machine (option 2) using a high-
performance Dell platform. The stand-alone PC used in option 1 was one of the
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host machines (2.60 GHz Intel Pentium-4 processor and 2 GB of memory) from
the experimental testbed. For option 2 a virtual machine was created on the Dell
platform with one dedicated CPU (Intel Xeon 2.27 GHz) and 2 GB of memory.
Two options were compared on the basis of CPU utilisation, memory utilisa-
tion and the number of requests per second versus the number of virtual clients
as shown in Figures B.1, B.2 and B.3 respectively. The maximum number of
VCs that could be supported by curl-loader running on either a stand-alone PC
or a single virtual machine was approximately 45,000. The difference between
CPU utilisation (Figure B.1) in both the cases is attributable to a better family
of processor in option 2. The asymptotic behaviour of the memory utilisation
graphs (Figure B.2) in both cases indicates the availability of memory as the
limiting factor. A dip in the number of requests generated per second by curl-
loader running on a stand-alone PC (Figure B.3) is consistent with the increase
in CPU utilisation.
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Figure B.3: Number of requests with varying number of clients
Thus, curl-loader was found to place a heavy load on host systems’ resources
(CPU and memory) and proved far from an ideal tool for generating synthetic
traffic at the desired rate, originating from large number of source IPs. Each
client generated by curl-loader consumed approximately 30-40 KB of user-space
memory and some non-paged memory in kernel space, thus imposing an effective
limit on the number of VCs that could be created. Curl-loader was modified
to incorporate randomness in source IP addresses and to create ramp-up, ramp-
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down and pulsing attacks. However, these modifications led to instabilities in
the tool’s performance, and combined with the need for further modifications to
incorporate different types of attacks, this led to eventual abandonment of this
approach. However, the research involved in using curl-loader in this way led to
the idea of using IP-aliasing along with wget1, a command line Linux utility for
fetching HTTP files, to generate application layer network traffic.
B.2 IP-aliasing and Wget
A physical network interface on any networking device including a computer is
identified by its assigned name and IP address. However, this is just a software
construct, which can be expanded by creating ‘sub-interfaces’ for each available
physical interface. Each sub-interface, also referred to as aliased IP address, can
be assigned a unique IP address and can act independently to establish TCP
connections with the target host or with other sub-interfaces. The technique
of creating multiple sub-interfaces of a physical network interface (NIC) and
assigning sub-interface a distinct IP address is called IP-aliasing. Using this
technique, traffic originating from a single host can be divided into multiple
network-flows 2 with each flow having at least a unique value for source IP
address, and thus can be made to appear (to the target) to be coming from many
separate machines. IP-aliasing is available on most computing platforms. On
Linux and BSD, for example, thousands of unique IP addresses can be assigned
to a single Ethernet card. IP-aliasing on Linux platform can be achieved with
the use of ifconfig utility.
GNU Wget is a non-interactive command line utility for retrieving files using
HTTP, HTTPS and FTP protocol. As wget is an non-interactive tool, it can be
easily integrated with custom scripts, cron jobs and other command line utilities
available in Linux without the support of X-windows. Therefore, Wget when used
with IP-aliasing can potentially create the appearance of an array of machines
(‘bots’ for DDoS attacks and ‘legitimate clients’ for FEs), each with a unique
source IP address and sharing the hardware address of the physical interface.
This array of machines could then be used to synthetically generate realistic
1GNU Wget – http://www.gnu.org/software/wget/
2A TCP/IP network flow is defined as a sequence of packets from a source machine to a
destination machine with unique values for source IP, source port, destination IP, destination
port, and protocol
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DDoS attacks and FEs.
The approach of using wget with IP-aliasing provided a method for crafting
application layer DDoS attacks like HTTP flooding attack. However, the time
it took to create aliases increased with the number of requested aliases. An in-
crease in the number of aliases also resulted in an increase in the host machines’
CPU and memory consumption. At one stage, 65,000 aliases were successfully
created, however, this resulted in near exhaustion of available memory. Approx-
imately 4,000 aliases per physical interface on a standard PC appeared to be
an acceptable upper limit, taking into account the resource consumption. The
variations in the memory and CPU utilisation with increasing number of aliases
were comparable to the results obtained using curl-loader as shown in Figures
B.2 and B.1. In addition to the resource consumption constraints, the approach
of using IP-aliasing with wget was also limited by the variety of attacks that it
was capable of generating. This approach could not be adapted to simulate dif-
ferent types of flooding attacks such as ICMP flooding or UDP flooding. Thus, it
was limited to generating application layer DDoS attacks. Hence, the approach
of combining IP-aliasing and wget proved to be too resource-heavy and lacked
the desired scalability and flexibility essential for generating different types of
attacks and FEs. However, it did lay the foundations for a customised software
traffic generator Botloader, which was cooperatively developed as a part of this
research.
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Appendix C
DDoS Attack Dataset Generation
Three DDoS attack datasets have been used for evaluating the proposed attack
detection technique. One of datasets represents a network layer flooding attack,
while the other two represent different types of application level attacks. Each of
these attack datasets are simulated using the network traffic generation frame-
work described in Chapter 5 for a period of 5 minutes: first by two minutes of
normal activity, followed by three minutes of flooding. Each of these datasets
are now described.
The generation of network layer flooding attack has been previously discussed
in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.4.1 for details). This section describes the synthetic
generation of application level DDoS attacks.
C.1 HTTP GET flooding attack dataset
The HTTP GET flooding attack dataset is simulated using the http_flood.conf
file given below, consisting of two threads (clusters of bots) started simultane-
ously. The first thread (fe_bot) represents the normal traffic and runs for two
minutes, as indicated by time=120. The attack thread, represented by http_bot
is started simultaneously with the normal traffic thread is inactive for the first
120 seconds, as indicated by two leading 0’s in the rate parameter of the con-
figuration file.
fe_bot 50 debug=0
res_file=/home/ddos/botloader/botloader/fe_compacted_modified.txt
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interval_file=/home/ddos/botloader/botloader/per-1sec-stats time=120
interval=1 port=80 dest_ip=10.1.1.76
http_bot 100 debug=0 time=300 port=80
res_file=/home/ddos/botloader/botloader/fe_compacted_modified.txt
rates="0 0 -1 -1 -1" dest_ip=10.1.1.76
The res_file indicates the resource file, containing a list of URLs being
accessed by each bot during the simulation. The interval_file consists of
per second samples of the number of HTTP GET requests to fetch, the number
of source IPs to use, the number of unique resources to access from the Web
server, and the desired resource entropy. dest_ip specifies the IP address of
the target host, running a Web server, listening on port 80. During the normal
traffic part of the simulation, 50 bots or aliased IPs are used on each of the 10
attack machines. The rates parameter for the http_bot governs the rate at
which the HTTP traffic is being sent. rates="0 0 -1 -1 -1" implies that the
total simulation duration given by time=300 is divided into 5 equal intervals
of 60 seconds. For the first two intervals, no traffic is being sent, and for the
remaining three intervals (or the last 180 seconds of the simulation), all the bots
are sending traffic at the maximum possible rate, indicated by -1.
C.2 SSL breakoff attack dataset
The SSL breakoff attack dataset is generated in a similar fashion to the HTTP
GET flooding attack dataset. The configuration file used to generate this dataset
is given below.
fe_bot 50 debug=0
res_file=/home/ddos/botloader/botloader/fe_compacted_modified.txt
interval_file=/home/ddos/botloader/botloader/per-1sec-stats time=120
interval=1 port=80 dest_ip=10.1.1.76
ssl_bot 100 debug=0 keysize=2048 rates="0 0 -1 -1 -1"
time=300 dest_ip=10.1.1.76
As in the HTTP GET flooding attack, this dataset is also generated using
two concurrent threads, fe_bot and ssl_bot, for normal and attack traffic re-
spectively. The normal traffic thread runs for two minutes, followed by the attack
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thread for the next three minutes. The keysize specifies the size of the key used
in the SSL handshake. The generated dataset uses a 2048 bit key.
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